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2025/17

Space Strategy and Data Law: Four perspectives for developing future EU Space Law regulations

This position paper contributes to the closed EU consultation process initiated by the European Union (EU) regarding potential EU Space Law regulations. It examines four key domains related to the EU Space Strategy, offering regulatory suggestions and considerations across these areas. The goal is to provide interdisciplinary perspectives to evaluate the emerging issues within the legal grey areas of Space Law and to suggest regulatory proposals to overcome them. The first section provides an overview of the global Space Law landscape, focusing on how it affects the EU's space surveillance and national security interests. It explores the EU's navigation of existing international frameworks, its development of supplementary space policies, and the balancing of strategic autonomy with international cooperation. The second section tackles liability issues in space activities, bridging gaps between public and private entities. Through a fictional case study and analysis of national legislation, it illustrates the complexity of allocating liability and jurisdictional competence. The third section evaluates the risks posed by congested space and debris, underscoring their multifaceted impacts on space-based infrastructure, economic activities, and security concerns. The fourth section speculates on potential private colonization of celestial bodies, examining ownership, sovereignty, and resource exploitation. It discusses the legal grey areas and proposes principles for developing new EU rules. The paper emphasizes the EU's role in shaping global space governance, promoting responsible and sustainable practices, and addressing emerging challenges through regulatory measures, international partnerships, and the harmonization of approaches among Member States.

Introduction

Space Law refers to the body of law that governs space-related activities.[1] The term is frequently connected with the rules, norms, and standards of international law included in the five international treaties and five sets of principles governing outer space adopted under the auspices of the United Nations. In addition to these international mechanisms, several countries have national legislation that regulates space-related activities.[2] Space Law, the legal framework governing activities beyond Earth’s atmosphere, has evolved significantly since its inception, mirroring the dynamic nature of space exploration and utilization[3]. Encompassing a multitude of international agreements, treaties, and conventions, as well as national legislation, Space Law addresses diverse matters ranging from environmental preservation to liability for damages caused by space objects[4]. Central to this legal regime are fundamental principles such as the notion of space as the common heritage of humanity and the freedom of exploration and use of outer space by all states. Against historical milestones such as the Cold War and the Space Race, Space Law has adapted to accommodate the complexities of modern space endeavors. In light of the multifaceted challenges and objectives driving the EUSL initiative, the EU has undertaken a targeted consultation to gather stakeholders’ views on the proposed measures and their potential impacts[5]. On the one hand, the global landscape of Space Law Treaties and bodies comprehends several entities that should be considered. For instance, the UN Office of Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) was created as a small office in 1958. Since then, it has undergone departmental changes and assumed various responsibilities, among which: “[It] works to promote international cooperation in the peaceful use and exploration of space, and in the utilization of space science and technology for sustainable economic and social development. The Office assists any United Nations Member States to establish legal and regulatory frameworks to govern space activities and strengthens the capacity of developing countries to use space science technology and applications for development by helping to integrate space capabilities into national development programmes”[6]. The UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), instead, was established one year after the creation of the UNOOSA, and “was tasked with reviewing international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, studying space-related activities that could be undertaken by the United Nations, encouraging space research programmes, and studying legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space”.[7] This purpose evokes the idea that it is an entity looking for the benefit of the whole planet, since it seeks answers through peace, security and development. The committee, at present, is a unique platform where advances in space technology are discussed, as international cooperation in space exploration and the application of technology to achieve comprehensive goals are discussed at the committee between the 95 member states[8]. On the other hand, there are a number of treaties adopted by the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) and many others that continue to be adopted on an ongoing basis every year.[9] The most important Treaties to date remain the Outer Space Treaty (OST) from 1967 and the Moon Treaty from 1979. The first is a foundational document in general Space Law, which establishes principles governing the exploration and use of outer space. The second addresses the issues of exploitation of lunar resources, even though it is not widely ratified. The General Assembly also established several principles, which are non-binding. Those are in favor of space sustainability, debris mitigation and space operations. The Principles were published at the Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III).[10] Among them, there is the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in Exploration and Use of Outer Space; the Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for International Direct Television Broadcasting; and also the Principles Relating to Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space.

It is possible to observe that there has been an advance in the rules at governance level worldwide. However, taking into consideration the current framework where society and technological advances are increasingly faster, the scope of the rules, principles, and regulations that we have today perhaps are not sufficient to cover all the emerging problems that exist concerning outer space. Especially, since many of these issues are broad and rely on free interpretation of the Treaties and considering the advent of private entities into the spatial landscape[11], there is an urgent need to find shared solutions on specific sectors. In this context, the European Union has launched in October 2023 a Call for Evidence[12] with a Targeted Consultation[13] (now closed), to assess the actors’ perspectives on the development of “rules for safe, resilient and sustainable space activities”. This initiative aimed to lay down rules to ensure a coherent EU approach regarding to safety, i.e. common rules on avoiding collision and mitigating space debris, resilience, i.e. common rules on risk management and cybersecurity tailored for the space sector, and sustainability, i.e. common rules for life cycle assessment of space activities. It retrieved 15 feedback from different European space actors and seeks to harmonize the differences in the scope, depth, and implementation of national legislations that can reduce the conditions for fair competition and undermine the competitiveness of EU space operators in the absence of a general legal framework at international level regarding the safe, secure and sustainable use of space. Because such an international legal framework is unlikely to emerge in the near future, the EU has taken action, under Article 114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU)[14] to address the consequences of diverse national approaches that, in recent years, have started enacting legislation in this field autonomously. Therefore, the EU wanted to gather suggestions to regulate these areas by defining minimum common rules in the abovementioned three key areas, to avoid the fragmentation in the single market for space services and products and to ensure the promotions of EU and non-EU operators’ activities. Thus, by encouraging debate and collaboration among stakeholders, the EU hopes to create a complete and adequate regulatory framework that supports the competitiveness of the European space sector, protects critical space infrastructures, and promotes the sustainable and secure use of outer space.

This position paper seeks to contribute to this consultation process by providing thoughts and recommendations on important issues of the EU Space Law strategy by considering the interrelations with existing EU Data Law frameworks. It addresses four domains related to the EU Space Strategy and aims to provide regulatory suggestions to overcome the issues specifically analyzed and that concerns directly or indirectly the areas of the EU Consultation. In section 1 (paragraphs 2 – 3) it provides a general overview of how the global Space Law landscape affects the EU Space Strategy with a focus on surveillance and national security. In section 2 (paragraphs 4 – 6) the paper addresses the concept of public and private liability in space through a fictional case study. In Section 3 (paragraphs 7 – 10) the paper evaluates the risks deriving from congested space and debris damages, while, in section 4 (paragraphs 11 – 14) it speculates on future private colonization of celestial bodies and on the principles that should govern the related issues concerning ownership, sovereignty, and private exploitation of celestial resources. Finally, the paper draws conclusions concerning the role of the EU in the global space arena.

1. Case 1. How the EU could navigate space surveillance and national security under its framework

The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 stands as a cornerstone of the legal framework in Space Law, asserting principles of non-appropriation and freedom of outer space exploration. However, as space activities have expanded beyond governmental initiatives to include private sector involvement and international collaborations, new challenges have emerged, particularly in space surveillance and security. In response to the evolving landscape of space activities and the growing imperative for regulatory clarity and coherence, the European Union (EU) has developed an EU Space Law (EUSL).[15] As the EU seeks to assert its role in space governance and address emerging security concerns, it must grapple with potential conflicts of interest among member states and external stakeholders. Moreover, with the proliferation of space debris and the increasing militarization of space, ensuring the safety and security of space assets has become paramount for the EU’s strategic interests.

The EUSL, based on President von der Leyen’s vision announced in her State of the Union address on September 13, 2023, seeks to establish standard EU rules addressing the safety, resilience, and sustainability of space activities and operations. At its core, the EUSL aims to address the severe difficulties provided by the proliferation of space debris, the growing risk of collisions, and the advent of technological and cyber threats to space infrastructures. Amid a developing “new space” economy marked by the growth of commercial space players and mega-constellations, the need for a robust legal framework to assure the safety, security, and sustainability of space operations has never been more pressing. The EU’s strategic objectives for the EUSL are divided into three pillars: safety, resilience, and sustainability. These pillars demonstrate the EU’s commitment to providing a safe satellite traffic environment, safeguarding space infrastructure from destructive threats, and ensuring the long-term viability of space operations. Furthermore, the EUSL is consistent with broader EU aims such as digital and green transitions, strengthening resilience, and supporting strategic autonomy.

Thus, the European Union faces a critical juncture in space governance. Balancing international obligations with aspirations for strategic autonomy in space security and surveillance necessitates a nuanced strategy. This section explores how the EU can negotiate this situation. We contend that the EU can leverage existing international frameworks, such as the Outer Space Treaty, to carve out its own space strategy. This includes advocating for stronger regulations, fulfilling treaty obligations, and developing supplementary EU-specific legislation. Fostering international cooperation on space traffic management and best practices is also crucial. The primary EU instruments that underpin its space surveillance and security agenda include the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence (2023), the EU Approach to Space Traffic Management (2023), and the EU Space Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2021/696). These instruments provide a framework for developing space capabilities, raising space domain awareness, and ensuring compliance with international law.

Furthermore, there are conflicts of interest with China and the United States, major spacefaring nations. Areas for collaboration include commercial space initiatives and maintaining peaceful uses of space. By recognizing these complexities and promoting transparency, the EU can begin constructing stronger space surveillance and security positions.

2. Existing legal frameworks

2.1 International level

International Space Law, a subfield of public International Law, finds its roots in the traditional focus on state responsibility. Unlike recent legal frameworks, Space Law primarily assigns liability to signatory states, rather than individual or private actors within those states.[16] Following the launch of Sputnik, the United Nations recognized the need for a legal framework to promote international cooperation in outer space activities.[17] Even before the formation of formal treaties, the UN established the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) with the mandate to oversee state cooperation in space exploration and identify potential legal conflicts arising from such endeavors.[18] Notably, COPUOS remains the only transnational Space Law committee consistently governing exploration activities since the enactment of the UN space treaties.[19] Before the establishment of binding agreements, the General Assembly adopted the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Outer Space Declaration), laying the groundwork for the first space treaty.[20]

European Union

Space surveillance and national security are increasingly important issues for the European Union, particularly as space becomes more congested and contested. For the EU, space has become a strategic domain, with the sovereignty, ownership, and operation of vital space assets contributing to its security and defense capabilities. The EU’s recognition of outer space as a global common underscores its commitment to transparency, confidence-building measures, and responsible behaviors in space activities.[21] One challenge for the EU is the integration of civil and military space capabilities. While the EU primarily focuses on civil space activities, such as satellite navigation (Galileo)[22] and Earth observation (Copernicus),[23] there is a growing recognition of the need to ensure the security and resilience of these systems against potential threats such as space debris and collision risks, cyber attacks, electromagnetic interference, physical attacks (such as anti-satellite weapons, kinetic or non-kinetic attacks, and sabotage) and space weather events.

The EU must strengthen its space surveillance capabilities by championing data sharing and collaboration among member states and international partners. This includes exchanging crucial information on orbital data, potential collisions, and other space hazards and coordinating response efforts during crises. One potential conflict of interest for the EU is balancing the needs of its member states regarding national security and sovereignty concerns. Some Member States may be more reluctant to share sensitive information or delegate authority to EU institutions, particularly in areas related to defense and security. The EU can leverage the existing international space surveillance and security framework while carving out its own space within it. For example, the institutions can actively participate in global forums like COPUOS to advocate for stronger regulations. The Outer Space Treaty provides a foundation for peaceful uses of space, and the EU can push for its stricter enforcement.

In a statement delivered at the UN General Assembly’s Fourth Committee in October 2022, the EU underscored its commitment to international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. Against the backdrop of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the EU condemned the act and withdrew its support for specific UN-affiliated initiatives involving Russia. Emphasizing the significance of multilateralism and the UN framework, the EU highlighted the role of COPUOS and of the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) in shaping international Space Law and governance. It reiterated its commitment to implementing space treaties and resolutions, particularly those addressing long-term sustainability and space debris mitigation. Furthermore, the EU announced a partnership between the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA) and UNOOSA to advance space technology for sustainable development. These efforts reflect the EU’s dedication to international cooperation in outer space activities within the framework of COPUOS.[24]

2.2 EU space governance

Before diving into specific EU Space Laws, it is essential to acknowledge the evolving nature of the EU’s space governance strategy. The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence (2023)[25] and the EU Approach to Space Traffic Management (2023)[26], represent recent efforts to address security concerns and promote responsible space activities within the EU. The EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, in particular, acknowledges the increasing importance of space capabilities for security purposes. It calls for developing more effective systems for identifying space objects, enhancing space domain awareness, and improving resilience against threats. Notably, the strategy emphasizes the need for compliance with existing international treaties while pursuing strategic autonomy for the EU. The EU Communication, regarding an approach to Space Traffic Management proposes measures to improve space traffic management within the EU, contributing to global efforts on collision avoidance. These measures include enhancing EU space surveillance and tracking capabilities, fostering dialogue with international partners, and promoting the development of collision avoidance technologies. This initiative contributes to global efforts on space sustainability and reduces the risk of accidents in orbit.

The EU Space Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2021/696)[27] also establishes a comprehensive framework for EU space activities, including licensing and supervision (in the context of Copernicus and Galileo activities), which can be tailored to address security concerns. Additionally, the regulation specifies the EU Space Surveillance and Tracking (EU SST) component, which plays a crucial role in monitoring the space environment and providing data for space traffic management. These instruments provide a legal toolkit for the EU to navigate space surveillance and security within the international framework. By leveraging these tools and fostering global cooperation, the EU can ensure its space activities' safety, security, and sustainability.

2.3 Acts and directives

While the EU Space Strategy, Approach to Space Traffic Management, and Space Regulation form the core of its dedicated space governance framework, other existing EU laws play a surprisingly significant role in space surveillance and security. The EU’s broader legal framework offers additional space surveillance and security tools. For instance, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[28] and the Data Governance Act (DGA)[29] establish robust data protection standards. Space surveillance often involves collecting and processing vast amounts of data on space objects, potential threats, and satellite operations. Therefore, the GDPR and the DGA aim to ensure the information’s confidentiality and integrity by protecting it from unauthorized access. EU member states and space actors are accountable for collecting, storing, and using data related to space surveillance, although the elements that characterize the European Law jurisdiction must be assessed case by case and are not peacefully applicable in outer space.

Additionally, the AI Act[30], which regulates the development and use of artificial intelligence will be applicable, aiming at ensuring the ethical and responsible use of AI in space-based applications, such as anomaly detection or threat identification. Artificial intelligence is increasingly crucial in analyzing space surveillance data, identifying anomalies, and predicting potential collisions. The AI Act, with its emphasis on responsible AI development and deployment, will ensure that AI algorithms used in space surveillance are transparent and that their decision-making processes can be explained to build trust in using AI for critical security applications. Furthermore, the Regulation will help mitigate potential biases that could creep into AI algorithms used for space surveillance, leading to misinterpretations of data and false positives. The AI Act promotes responsible human oversight of AI systems used for space surveillance. This ensures that humans ultimately make critical decisions while leveraging the analytical power of AI.

The last legislation worth mentioning is the Data Act, which aims to establish a harmonized framework for data access and use across the EU. This could be relevant for ensuring access to appropriate space surveillance data across different member states, fostering more collaborative space security efforts within the EU. By effectively utilizing these existing legal frameworks alongside dedicated space legislation, the EU can create a comprehensive approach to space surveillance and security that emphasizes data protection, responsible AI development, and streamlined data access within the bloc. This multifaceted approach positions the EU as a secure and ethical space exploration and utilization leader.

2.4 Non-EU Space Law legal frameworks

2.4.1 China

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) actively participates in the international space governance framework. It is a member of the United Nations COPUOS and has ratified all major space treaties, except the 1979 Moon Agreement.[31] Established in the 1950s, China’s space program initially focused on missile technology to bolster national defense during the Cold War era under the People's Liberation Army’s Second Artillery Corps.[32] In 1993, Beijing founded the China National Space Administration (CNSA), and in November 2000, the Chinese government released its whitepaper “China’s Space Activities” outlining the country’s goals in space for the coming decade.[33] The Tiangong[34] space station, operational since late 2022, is a significant milestone for China’s space program.[35] This human-occupied space station allows China to conduct scientific research, test space technologies, and potentially serve as a stepping stone for future lunar exploration.[36] While there is no evidence that China explicitly uses Tiangong for surveillance, its capabilities raise concerns due to the following: (i) A Right to Privacy under the EU's GDPR. Unlimited surveillance from space could potentially violate privacy rights protected by the GSPR, especially where data is collected on EU citizens without their knowledge or consent; and (ii) The EU promotes the peaceful use of outer space. If Tiangong is employed for military surveillance threatening peace or stability, the EU would likely need to respond.

2.4.2 United States of America

The United States operates in space under a fragmented legal framework. Unlike the EU's more comprehensive approach, the US relies on a mix of international treaties,[37] various national laws,[38] and Executive Orders.[39] Presidential directives shape space policy, with recent ones focusing on space traffic management and promoting US leadership in space exploration. Some additional sectoral regulations include the Communications Commission (FCC) for regulations of satellite communications and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for remote sensing data. Industry standards and self-regulatory codes may set additional privacy protection standards. The US law, known as the Wolf Amendment, prohibits NASA from using government funds to engage in direct, bilateral cooperation with the Chinese government and China-affiliated organizations.[40] This ban was enacted in 2011 due to concerns about national security and intellectual property theft.[41] As a result, China has been excluded from the International Space Station (ISS), a collaborative project between the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, and Canada.[42]

France comes fourth in the number of satellites in space, preceded by the United States, China, and Russia, with 239, 140, and 105 satellites, respectively, before France’s eighteen.[43] The EU’s power in space limits its capacity to bargain effectively for its citizens privacy, data security and other matters. Through the ESA, much of the EU’s interests are represented at the ISS and joint efforts like the Rosalind Franklin rover and the James Webb Telescope. The dialogue around data protection, however, is yet to begin.

3. Recommendations for the EU Space Law framework

The EU navigates a dynamic landscape in space governance. Balancing commitments under international law with aspirations for strategic autonomy in space security and surveillance demands a multifaceted approach. The institutions can leverage the existing international framework while carving out its own space within it. The EU Space Law consultation process should prioritize advocating for stronger international regulations on space debris mitigation, collision avoidance, and cyber threats. Mechanisms to ensure coordinated enforcement of space treaties among EU member states should also be explored.

The EU Space Law framework should consider the development of supplementary regulations addressing specific EU space security concerns, such as traffic management, data governance, and licensing of space operations. The consultation should also identify opportunities for the EU to foster international cooperation on space surveillance and security with other spacefaring nations. By taking these steps, the EU should also take into account several issues concerning data protection and national cybersecurity. The GDPR emphasizes the right to individuals’ control over their personal data, but it remains unclear how to enforce this regulation towards public and private actors processing data from space. Indeed, extensive surveillance from space, even for seemingly innocuous purposes, could potentially violate the citizens’ rights to privacy and data protection. The broad and passive nature of space-based data collection raises questions about what jurisdiction rules should apply under the GDPR and the feasibility of obtaining meaningful consent from individuals potentially being monitored from space or, however, how to inform them in a compliant way for other legal basis adopted. Even with absent targeted surveillance, within the current geopolitical landscape, Russia or China’s activities in space, for instance, may create a “chilling effect” on innovation with higher data-exposure practices, as related to the GDPR or the Data Act. The issues concerning data processing and governance also involve data minimization and collection limitations for specific, legitimate purposes. Space-based surveillance potentially captures vast amounts of data unrelated to any particular purpose, raising concerns about compliance and reusage of data. These concerns extend further to transparency and accountability, as individuals cannot enforce their rights to access the collected data, and to an extent, exercise control of dissemination over it. For instance, China's lack of transparency regarding its space activities coupled with Tiangong station makes it difficult for EU citizens to navigate their rights. However, this poses a jurisdictional challenge too, as mentioned: the current international Space Law framework is an untested patchwork and specifically lacks considerations on data protection and privacy. The GDPR applies to those protected by the EU, but its extraterritorial reach may extend to situations involving EU citizen data rights. This raises complex legal questions about jurisdiction and enforcement if actors external to the EU engage in activities which violate EU citizens’ rights. The same concerns apply to national security, whereas the EU would need to respond immediately if external actors’ space activities impacted sensitive or confidential data. Beyond personal data protection, the EU infrastructure relies heavily on cooperation and sharing of data, thus, in the international framework, the enforcement mechanism is the first to arise.

In conclusion, the EU’s approach to national security considerations in space underscores the importance of resilience, protection, and cooperation to address emerging space threats effectively. By promoting responsible behaviors, enhancing strategic autonomy, and fostering international partnerships, the EU aims to safeguard its space assets and ensure the peaceful use of outer space. Continued efforts in information exchange, coordination, and cooperation are vital to strengthen the EU’s security and defense capabilities in the space domain.

4. Case 2. Enhancing liability in EU Space Law: Bridging the gap between public and private entities

In the international framework, liability for activities in outer space of governmental and non-governmental actors is assigned via the combined regime provided by Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty (OTS)[44], and Article 2 of the Liability Convention[45]. As these agreements are part of international law, private space actors also fall within its scope, as explicitly provided.

According to Article 1 of the Liability Convention, jurisdiction can be assigned by different criteria: the “launching State”, as referred to in the Treaties, is, amongst others, the state of the place of launch or the place of business of the company[46]. However, since the Treaties were designed in an era in which space activities were carried out by States primarily, and since the emerging importance of private actors in the space landscape, it is important to evaluate the adequacy of these rules and their possible grey areas[47]. Thus, strengthening liability in EU Space Law and bridging the gap between public and private entities appears to be crucial for ensuring the responsible and sustainable development of space activities.

This section explores precisely the evolving landscape of liability with a focus on EU Space Law, particularly on the increasing involvement of private actors in space activities. Indeed, despite the existing framework, which primarily holds states liable for damage caused by space operations, the rise of private actors requires a shift towards direct attribution of liability to them[48]. The analysis addresses the challenges arising from the non-harmonised approach of EU Member States and the limits of EU competences in Space Law. Using a fictitious case study and delving into national legislation, the complexity of the allocation of competence and liability is illustrated. It also discusses the potential pitfalls of forum shopping and makes recommendations for EU Space Law, including international cooperation, clarifying the liability framework, providing non-binding guidance to Member States, and introducing mandatory insurance requirements. By implementing these strategies, the EU can address the challenges posed by the involvement of private companies in space activities and promote responsible and sustainable space exploration and utilisation[49].

5. Case study (fictional)

The Company SpaceR is active in the space industry and is based in state X. It, however, launches its rockets from state Y since it is a more suitable territory due to the availability of free land and its relative proximity to outer space (closer to the equator). Damages to another State occur in space due to the incident Z and the issue goes to Court. SpaceR argues that the jurisdiction and applicable law should be given to state Y because it was the place where the rocket was launched. However, the underlying reason was that state Y has a softer Space Law[50]/national tort law in place than state X. This general case presents several issues:

5.1 Activities of EU Actors and regulatory gaps

The exploration and utilization of space have rapidly expanded in recent years, with an increasing number of private entities engaging in space activities alongside traditional state actors. However, the current liability regime in Space Law primarily focuses on States, leaving a gap in holding private entities directly accountable for their actions in space. The existing Treaties predominantly place liability on States for damages caused by space activities. While this approach provides a framework for accountability, it falls short in directly addressing the actions of private entities operating in space. Consequently, there is a lack of specific regulations governing the conduct of private actors – such as pollution, space debris, damages to privates or illicit/illegal activities – in outer space. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive EU Space Law regime. Some countries, recognizing the limitations of the state-focused liability regime, have taken steps to fill the gap by enacting national legislation that directly holds private entities liable for their activities in space. For instance, Luxembourg's Space Law of 2017[51] represents a pioneering effort to shift liability from States to private entities[52]. This legislation establishes a clear framework not only for licensing and regulating space activities conducted by private companies but also to keep them fully responsible for their space activities.

5.2 Challenges of non-harmonized approach: “Forum shopping”

However, the lack of harmonization among EU member states regarding liability in Space Law, and the impossibility to overpass this regulatory gap due to the lack of EU competences[53], poses challenges for preventing potential exploitation of grey areas to avoid liability. While some countries (e.g. Luxembourg) have proactively addressed this issue, others (e.g. Italy) still rely on national tort law, which may not adequately cover space-related activities[54]. This non-uniform approach creates inconsistencies and uncertainties and could potentially lead to forum shopping by space actors: private space actors could take advantage of countries with less-developed Space Law and tort law working in their favor.

5.3 Challenges due to the limited competences of the EU in Space Law

The EU lacks a proper legal basis for harmonization in the space field. Indeed, according to Article 189 TFEU, the EU has only competence in regard to European Space Policy “to promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies”. It clearly states, at paragraph 2, that “to contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council […] shall establish the necessary measures, which may take the form of a European space programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member States”. This provision, therefore, positively excludes that the EU may regulate Space Law activities. The extent and the legitimate ways and opportunity to bypass this limitation are still open to debate. It must be also considered that space activities’ borders do not only regard the European States and aerial space and, therefore, this should be an issue tackled at a broader scale anyway. However, it must be also recognized that the EU already legislated the matter with the Regulation (EU) 2021/696, which may appear as an open and direct violation of Article 189. On the other hand, it may be argued that this law addresses specific EU programs (Galileo and Copernicus) and refers to their specific activities. Nevertheless, this may be a loophole to ground a precedent – in the silence of all Member States and Courts[55] – for the forthcoming need to adopt a EU harmonized regulatory framework on Space Law.

6. Suggestions for an EU Space Law regulation

The EU, due to its powerful influence worldwide, should regulate the matter to ensure a framework not easily circumventable by private actors and with the goal to create a “standardisation effect”. In order to address these challenges and promote responsible behavior in space, the EU should consider the following recommendations:

  • International cooperation: The EU should actively engage in international discussions and initiatives aimed at enhancing liability regimes in Space Law through forums such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS) and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to strengthen international cooperation. Collaborative efforts with other space-faring nations can facilitate the development of comprehensive frameworks that address the challenges of space governance on a global scale. This could involve sharing data, expertise, and resources to develop common standards and guidelines.
  • Clarifying liability frameworks: The EU should establish a clear, precise and comprehensive framework defining the responsibilities of both public and private entities involved in activities in space. This would also imply defining the jurisdictional parameters of the EU Space Law. The framework should also be adaptable to the evolving nature of space activities to reduce ambiguity and legal uncertainty and should cover liability for damage to third parties (privates), the containment of space debris and environmental protection. Member States should, on the other hand, contribute to find a legislative solution to overpass the limitations of Article 189 of the TFUE and provide the EU with the adequate powers and competencies to regulate the matter.
  • Non-binding guidance to the Member States to legislate: the EU should concert with Member States suitable criteria to avoid a race to the bottom by States with less stringent regulations to attract private companies willing to invest in the space industry, it is important that the EU provides guidance (at regional level) to ensure that all States have a certain level of accountability for private companies and that private actors remain liable in the first place for the damages they procure during their activities. This would ensure that national legislation cannot be circumvented. According to the current limitations provided by Article 189 TFEU, the EU can provide non-binding guidance to Member States regarding the development of national space legislation. This guidance could include best practices, model laws, and recommendations for incorporating liability provisions for private entities engaged in space activities. By offering guidance rather than imposing strict regulations, the EU respects the sovereignty of Member States while promoting consistency and coherence in Space Law across the EU.
  • Insurance requirements: The EU could introduce mandatory insurance requirements for space activities to ensure that operators have the financial means to cover potential liabilities[56]. This could include liability insurance for damage caused by space objects and insurance for environmental remediation. Furthermore, this intervention does not seem to directly interfere with Article 189 TFEU limitations because it affects elements that do not deal with outer space strictly. Therefore, it may be provided via regulatory intervention.

In summary, the current framework for liability deriving from space activities within EU Space Law, which predominantly relies on States’ national tort law, is insufficient to address the expanding role of private entities in space activities. By adopting the strategies outlined in this paper, the EU can enhance accountability within Space Law and foster closer collaboration between public and private actors. Through international cooperation, clarification of liability frameworks, provision of non-binding guidance to Member States, and implementation of mandatory insurance requirements, the EU can navigate the challenges posed by the evolving space landscape. Ultimately, these measures will contribute to promoting the responsible and sustainable exploration and utilization of outer space posing the European Union as the point of reference for world standardization regarding outer space activities.

7. Case 3. The risks of congested space and the possibility for future EU regulations

As the utilization of outer space continues to increase, the issue of congested space and the expansion of space debris pose significant challenges to the European Union (EU), the global community and citizens worldwide[57]. Congested space presents significant and multifaceted risks not only to the EU, but to all members of the global community. There are various dimensions of these risks, with implications for the space-based infrastructure, many economic activities and complex multi-layered security concerns. The exponential growth of satellites and space debris heightens the risk of collisions in orbit, posing a threat to operational satellites, space missions, and future launches. For instance, the 2007 anti-satellite test conducted by China led to the creation of thousands of additional debris fragments[58]. While the risks of collisions in space are increasing, the risks of consequential damages – and related liability – are naturally connected to these effects. The risk of collision has big impacts on space-based infrastructure, including communication satellites, earth observation satellites, and global navigation systems. The loss of such critical infrastructure could have far-reaching consequences, such as telecommunication, emergency response systems, and environmental monitoring efforts, among many. Furthermore, congested space raises security concerns, as it increases the risk of accidental or intentional interference with satellites, potentially compromising national security and defense capabilities. For example, the 2007 cyber-attack on the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) satellite system underscores the vulnerability of space assets to malicious activities and underscores the importance of safeguarding space infrastructure from external threats. This section aims to address the risks associated with congested space. Additionally, it explores the potential role of a change of laws within the EU, which could drive a progressive development of space-related policy for international cooperation and coordination to address this global issue.

8. The necessity of space-based data services

Space-based services, facilitated by satellites, have become indispensable tools in modern society. They are serving a multitude of critical functions that underpin various aspects of daily life. From telecommunications to environmental monitoring, navigation, and disaster management, these services play an important role in gathering, transmitting, and analyzing vast amounts of data. Legal frameworks governing satellite communications, such as spectrum allocation and licensing regimes, ensure equitable access and fair competition among service providers, fostering innovation and investment in the telecommunications sector. Satellites equipped with remote sensing instruments capture high-resolution imagery and data about the Earth’s surface, atmosphere, and oceans. Therefore, they provide unique means to monitor and assess the change in natural environments and human landscapes. This valuable data enables policymakers, researchers, and businesses to gather information about our planet and to monitor environmental changes[59]. It can assess land patterns and detect natural disasters and crises in real-time (such as extreme weather events or human conflict), supporting evidence-based policies. With the environment becoming progressively unreliable and susceptible to natural disaster, earth observation satellites play a pivotal role in disaster management. Specifically, satellites support rescue teams to save lives by providing timely and actionable information to support disaster preparedness, early warning systems, and post-disaster recovery efforts. For example, whenever a major natural disaster like hurricane occurs, satellites enable rapid assessment of disaster impacts, identification of affected areas, and coordination of emergency response activities, facilitating timely interventions and resource allocation[60]. Finally, satellite navigation is a very effective tool for providing precise location and timing information, which can be used in numerous ways. As a matter of fact, these data support applications not only in transportation logistics, precision agriculture, personal and commercial navigation, and emergency response but also in educational and fun apps or sports performances monitoring. The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), which is a group or constellation of satellites (such as GPS, Galileo, and GLONASS, each managed by a different country) provides positioning, navigation, and timing service on global services.

8.1 A risk-assessment of debris collision

Currently, a pressing concern in Space Law is represented by the potential for space debris to collide, posing significant risks such as disrupting communication networks, internet connectivity, and emergency response systems. Such collisions could pose a threat to humanity itself. Moreover, the presence of space debris also impedes crucial activities like Earth observation, which is vital for analyzing environmental changes and responding to disasters. Without access to these services, the monitoring of such events would be compromised, limiting the effectiveness of emergency systems, particularly in high-risk areas. Ultimately, this jeopardizes not only human lives but also the integrity of essential infrastructure[61]. For instance, major flooding occurring always more often in Europe, which usually results in damaged infrastructure, as well as the destruction of crops, could be monitored in real time for coordinating rescue activities on the ground. Space satellites can be used to risk-assess many specific factors from hydrometeorological risks up to geo-hazards, allowing even small communities to take into account the natural changes and prepare accordingly[62]. Collision of space debris can also lead to a failing of infrastructure as such: as mentioned, satellites determine many of the indirect services used on the ground, for instance for transportation (aerial and sea traffic, vehicle monitoring, etc.). Once the technological functioning of these systems is damaged in scale, there may be major risk for the collapse of all kinds of service infrastructure on earth[63], not to count national security[64].

Next to vital transportation issues, collusion of debris can also impact other areas of our daily life. Satellites are one of the major carriers for broadcasting services, which are used in various areas in society. Indeed, the usage of radiofrequency systems is more than abundant, reaching from day-to-day communication, entertainment services, to civilian and military activities. Thus, the collision of space debris poses a multilateral threat, endangering infrastructure integrity and essential services like transportation and broadcasting. Disruptions to satellite systems could have far-reaching consequences, from logistical disruptions to compromised military operations, and undermine the reliability of trusted mediums like radio. Addressing this issue is paramount for safeguarding the resilience of our interconnected society.

9. EU Space Governance

Since the Cold war, the rules of dynamics in space have changed significantly, as space is now more congested, contested, and competitive than before, due to new public and private players which have entered. The term we use with “global space governance” encompasses international and national norms and the entities or institutions that regulate all movement in space, i.e., the processes or regulations of the activities that occur there. Additionally, within this term, we observe the development of institutions, instruments, norms, regulations, measures, mechanisms, and national procedures, international standards, and ethical codes of conduct among space actors to create confidence in the different governments. We also must consider that there are two main groups in which Space Law is developed nowadays[65]:

  • Binding instruments: treaties, standards, and national regulations;
  • Non-binding agreements: non-normative tools, standards, and/or aspirational purposes.

In its efforts to regulate and set minimum standards for space activity, the EU has developed an EU Space Policy[66] by which it aims to help boost the economy while taking into consideration its sustainable development. The Space Programme and the European Space Agency (ESA) have an important role in this regard. In April 2021, the EU Space Programme for 2021 to 2027 was adopted by the Council and European Parliament to ensure high quality and up to date space related data and services. With this regulation the EU tries to simplify existent regulation and shed more light on the security issues[67]. As part of the space traffic initiatives, the EU is working on making space activities sustainable. The satellites put into orbit are working on technology that might help track space debris. On the 8 of December of 2023 the European Council urged for a common approach to the topic and call on the Commission and the member states to implement the United Nations’ 21 voluntary guidelines for outer space activities[68].

On the other hand, on 2014, the ESA introduced a series of Space Debris Mitigation requirements by which they set another layer of requisites for the disposal of space debris in addition to the ones included in the Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and other guidelines[69]. With this last addition, the ESA strives to provide a future without space debris. Although the EU has carried out several initiatives to promote a sustainable space traffic and avoid the proliferation of space debris, there is no central piece of legislation that could make all of these efforts homogeneous and more efficient within the European territory.

10. Suggested adjustments to the EU Space Law framework

In order for the EU to address the described risks underpinning space debris, the it should consider enacting progressive legislative measures aimed at mitigating these challenges. This could be done by prioritizing the establishment of comprehensive Space Traffic Management regulations to monitor and manage space traffic effectively. Also, stricter requirements for debris mitigation would need to be established to prevent the increase of space debris from both public and private players. Furthermore, the EU should prioritize strengthening international collaboration and coordination[70]. This could, for example, be reached through data sharing or multilateral agreements and partnerships concerning data exchange. In this regard, the EU could leverage the so-called GDPR effect[71] by promoting clear jurisdictional rules concerning its Data Law framework. Moreover, by fostering cooperation with international partners, the EU could also leverage collective national expertise (e.g. within the ESA consortium) and national intelligence resources to address the mentioned global challenges[72].

The handling of other countries on that matter could provide useful orientation. For instance, the United States' Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates commercial space launches and operations[73], providing a model for comprehensive Space Traffic Management regulations. On the other hand, Japan’s Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA)[74] has developed the KITE (Kounotori Integrated Tether Experiment)[75] project, which aims to demonstrate the effectiveness of tether-based debris removal systems[76]. Also, initiatives such as the United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA)[77], Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, and the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC)[78] provide valuable frameworks for international collaboration in space debris mitigation.

Thus, by enacting legislative measures in such areas the EU can play a proactive role in mitigating the risks associated with congested space. Through focused efforts and strategic partnerships, the EU could help to ensure the sustainability, safety and security of space for future generations and mitigate the above-mentioned risks and prevent new risks from arising in the long term. Indeed, the challenges presented by congested space underscore the importance of proactive measures to safeguard the EU and the global community from potential risks. By embracing forward-thinking legislation and fostering international collaboration on the basis of existing Data Law legislation, the EU can effectively navigate these challenges and ensure the continued safety, sustainability, and resilience of space infrastructures and activities.

11. Case 4. Private colonization of celestial bodies from a EU perspective

In October 2023, Elon Musk suggested that in four years his company could land a spacecraft on Mars. Even if his promise might be deemed extra-optimistic, it raised a new concern: what about the possible private colonization of outer space?

As humanity ventures further into space exploration, the prospect of private entities colonizing celestial bodies such as the Moon, Mars, and beyond raises significant legal challenges, despite the rules provided by the OST. Indeed, while space exploration has traditionally been the domain of governments, the rise of commercial space companies has blurred the lines of jurisdiction and ownership. Thus, as private entities eye colonization of celestial bodies, legal and ethical complexities loom large. Space Law’s grey areas, coupled with rapid technological advancements, necessitates a robust regulatory framework. The EU, leveraging existing legal frameworks, can foster responsible exploration while upholding international treaties. Ethical considerations underscore the balance between innovation and established norms: in this regard, incentivizing private investment while preserving space's common heritage is key. However, navigating property rights and jurisdictional issues within space pose governance challenges that require transparent frameworks and clarity on applicable laws. this section examines the regulatory hurdles and ethical considerations surrounding European initiatives in celestial body colonization, focusing on potential private European initiatives colonizing celestial bodies.

12. Grey areas of space colonialism and elements to be considered

Space Law lacks clear territorial boundaries[79]. Therefore definitions, scope and general principles are essential for the design of directives and regulations. Unlike countries, the space is vast and borderless. Additionally, multiple actors, diverse potential activities and legal uncertainty led to a majorly unregulated environment. At the same time, the Earth’s immediate orbit is bustling with numerous satellites, driven by our reliance on television services, navigation aids, data, natural resources and global internet connectivity. Furthermore, discussions are already emerging about establishing human colonies on Mars and extracting valuable minerals and metals from asteroids. These potential activities are raising concerns among governments and the United Nations that regulation needs to catch up with plans to exploit space and its resources[80]. Advancements in space technology are outpacing the development of Space Law, but addressing these challenges requires international cooperation, consensus, and the development of a robust legal framework that is able to adapt to the ever-evolving space race.

In this context, understanding the European Union’s competence in this area appears to be crucial. Article 114 TFEU focuses on measures to align the laws of the Member States. Together with article 189 TFEU, which allows the EU to “to promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of its policies” and to “establish the necessary measures”, these two articles build the ground stone for the development of the regulation of Space Law. Whitin this framework, it must be considered that, in order to overcome the natural limits of space, any new EU space regulation should adapt to the realities of space and could consider the following elements regarding territorial and material scope to be included:

  • A focus on celestial bodies within the solar system only. This would include planets, moons, asteroids, comets and similar natural elements that transit into the solar system. This limitation would allow to limit the regulation to the current and near future technological capacities, without useless constrain of future situations and needs deriving from scientific advancements and technologies that now overpass our limits.
  • An application to the activities and undertakings of EU Member States, their natural and legal persons, and any individuals or entities residing or having their main interests and legal effects within the Union or towards European citizens. All legal persons that undertake activities within the EU in preparation for such endeavors, such as research, development and similar activities should fall under this new regulation. This provision should create a standardization effect, by leveraging an extended jurisdiction that interlinks space activities with effects on earth.

The regulation should not establish sovereignty or territorial claims by the EU or its Member States or legal and natural persons over any celestial body, according to the International Treaties. The destiny of the profits deriving by direct activities on celestial bodies should also be encompassed for the global common good (e.g. profits deriving by mining).

13. Ownership and sovereignty: An open issue for private actors

One of the primary legal challenges in future Space Law will concern determining ownership and sovereignty over celestial bodies or, mor precisely, over private installations on the celestial ground and/or over private exploitation of celestial resources. As seen, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, to which many space-faring nations are signatories, prohibits any (signing) nation from claiming sovereignty over outer space bodies. However, it remains unclear how this applies to private entities, especially for those States that have not signed the Treaty. Without clear international regulations and with the permanence of such grey area of uncertainty, conflicts over ownership rights are likely to arise in the future of space exploration. According to the OST, which serves as the foundational legal framework for any further regulation on space activities and exploration, celestial bodies including the Moon and other planets are not subject to national appropriation by any means, whether through sovereignty, use, occupation, or any other form of appropriation. With an extensive interpretation. this implies that private companies, as well as governments, cannot claim ownership of land on celestial bodies. However, the treaty does not explicitly prohibit private companies from engaging in resource extraction or colonization activities on celestial bodies. Instead, it emphasizes that exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit of all countries and should be conducted in accordance with international law. In Article VI, concerning internation responsibility for national activities in space, the Treaty states that “the activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty”. The reference to non-governmental bodies can be reasonably extended to comprehend private entities. Nevertheless, it remains debatable if the provision informs the prohibition laid out in Article II or not. Indeed, the legal status of resource extraction and colonization activities by private companies on celestial bodies is a topic of ongoing debate and interpretation within the framework of the Outer Space Treaty[81]. Nevertheless, the issue remains complex and subject to interpretation. As space exploration and exploitation continue to evolve, it is likely that further clarification and development of Space Law will be necessary to address the legal challenges and opportunities presented by private sector involvement in space activities. An EU regulatory framework could help clarify these remaining questions and different interpretations.

 

Balancing general principles for new EU rules on space exploitation

The challenging part of addressing these grey areas is to outline a harmonized, yet feasible and realistic approach to overcome the problems that occupation of outer space and celestial bodies from both public and private entities could represent to humanity in terms of equality, accessibility, and sovereignty[82]. As it often happens against new factors, it raises the philosophical question about whether to seek after innovation or stick to the re-interpretation of existing rules. It may be argued that the EU should take a binary position against this problem. On the one hand, it should incorporate the existing international treaties to harmonize their provision in the whole EU territory and the general EU regulation that could be subsidiary applicable. On the other hand, it should incorporate new sections to set out a uniform regulatory framework for the Member States. Similarly to the Outer Space Treaty, the first principle would be the one setting the freedom of use of the outer space, in accordance with the general principle of global common good of humankind. However, it must be also taken into account that incorporating certain legal instruments to protect private interests would incentivize privates to invest in the development of this market, which, on the contrary would refrain to risk their investments without any profit. Although, on principle, is agreeable that the use of outer space should be non-rival and with the pursuit of the ultimate goal of benefiting the whole mankind, it is also crucial to consider that private funding is key, nowadays, for achieving any future space objective.

Unsurprisingly, this consideration would require amending the existing principle non appropriation of outer space to make it fit the need to enhance the space market itself, that ultimately would lead us to discuss the actual legal nature of outer space. Indeed, if non-appropriation remains the pivotal element of outer space activities, how would it be possible to promote space exploration, exploitation, and technological development? Before proposing a solution, it is important to consider a further element.

Article II of the OST regulates the non-appropriation principle, determining that outer space and celestial bodies were not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by any means. This provision does not consider privates: thus, the EU legislator should consider including formal reference to private actors. Notwithstanding this suggestion, it is possible to address the legal nature of outer space without breaching the non-appropriation principle, by granting specific rights exploitation under particular conditions. The solution may reside on the legal analogy occurring with similar legal metaphor describing, for instance, the legal nature of personal data[83], which, under the EU legal regime and GDPR provisions, are no subject of property but personhood rights instead, or natural resources in certain countries, which remains public. For these goods the regime provides specific regimes concerning the possibility of exploitation (respectively, data processing and public licensing) that can ensure a regulated and controlled economic use of the resources under specific conditions and requirements laid out by the law. Therefore, whereas outer space is non-appropriable, as it is a humankind public good (as natural resources such as air, water, sea etc.), its profitable use could be regulated in order to promote its efficient, secure, and sustainable use while balancing the need for ensuring protection – and reasonable remuneration – for the private economic initiative.

Nevertheless, it remains one open question concerning what legal instrument could be the most effective to create the desired incentives, while protecting the public nature of space. The solution may reside in adapting the current legal tools for administrative authorizations and licensing of public resources (e.g. mines, exploitation of oil deposit etc.), under the supervision of a dedicated EU Space Authority to grant permission to exploit and develop certain activities in outer space and/or celestial bodies for the common good. The crucial point in this regard would be to ensure a global benefit for this exploitation, and a European one only. In the latter case, indeed, such a provision would create a rush from other countries to compete for the exploitation of space resources by granting their private actors more favorable conditions[84]. Clearly, any EU regulation will also require strong international cooperation to foster a standardization effect, as the more countries involved and adopting similar measures would mean the least risk to possible conflicts, both among countries and private entities competing. Consequently, the EU should seek to have another Bruxell Effect on this area as it definitely did on the Data Regulation.

General conclusions

This position paper has provided a comprehensive analysis of the key issues and considerations surrounding the development of an EU Space Law regulatory framework. By examining the interplay between global space governance, liability challenges, congested space risks, and the potential for private colonization of celestial bodies, the paper has underscored the multifaceted nature of the challenges the EU must navigate. The first section highlighted the intricate landscape of existing international Space Law treaties and institutions, as well as the EU's efforts to assert its strategic autonomy while upholding its commitment to international cooperation. Recommendations centred on the EU leveraging its influence within global forums to advocate for stronger regulations, fulfil treaty obligations, and develop supplementary EU-specific legislation. Crucially, fostering transparency and coordinated enforcement mechanisms among Member States emerged as paramount to bolstering the EU's space surveillance and security posture. Building upon this global context, the second section delved into the evolving liability paradigm, particularly the growing involvement of private entities in space activities. Through a fictional case study, the authors illustrated the complexity of allocating liability and jurisdictional competence, exacerbated by the non-harmonized approach among EU Member States. To bridge this gap, the paper recommended international cooperation, clarification of liability frameworks, provision of non-binding guidance to Member States, and the introduction of mandatory insurance requirements. These measures aim to promote responsible and sustainable practices while fostering a conducive environment for private investment and innovation. The third section tackled the pressing issue of congested space and the proliferation of debris, highlighting the multidimensional risks to space-based infrastructure, economic activities, and security imperatives. Recognizing the vital role of space-based data services in modern society, the paper advocated for the establishment of comprehensive space traffic management regulations, strengthened debris mitigation requirements, and enhanced international collaboration and data sharing. Leveraging the EU's existing data governance frameworks, such as the GDPR and the Data Governance Act, emerged as a strategic advantage, enabling the EU to promote clear jurisdictional rules and foster global standardization. Finally, the fourth section ventured into the speculative realm of private colonization of celestial bodies, navigating the legal grey areas surrounding ownership, sovereignty, and resource exploitation. The section proposed a balanced approach, outlining principles that harmonize the preservation of space as a global common good with the need to incentivize private investment and technological advancement. Central to this vision is the adaptation of existing legal tools, such as administrative authorizations and licensing regimes, under the supervision of a dedicated EU Space Authority. This framework would enable regulated and controlled exploitation of space resources while ensuring global benefit distribution and adherence to ethical considerations.

Collectively, these sections underscore the pivotal role the EU can play in shaping the future of global space governance. By leveraging its influential position and existing legal frameworks, the EU has the opportunity to establish a comprehensive and forward-looking regulatory regime that addresses emerging challenges, promotes responsible and sustainable practices, and safeguards the interests of its citizens and the global community. However, achieving these ambitious goals necessitates a harmonized and multifaceted approach that integrates the EU’s existing data law frameworks and combines the will of Member States to granting the EU its political and legislative central role in this matter. The intrinsic interconnectedness of space activities with data governance, privacy, and national security imperatives underscores the importance of aligning the forthcoming EU Space Law with the well-established principles and mechanisms enshrined in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and other data-centric legislations. As space-based surveillance and monitoring capabilities proliferate, concerns over potential violations of EU citizens’ privacy rights and data protection principles loom large. The broad and passive nature of space-based data collection raises critical questions about jurisdiction, consent, data minimization, and the enforcement of individuals’ rights over their personal information. Reconciling these tensions will require a nuanced balancing act, wherein the EU’s robust data protection standards are extended and adapted to the unique context of space activities.

Furthermore, the national security implications of space operations underscore the need for strong data governance frameworks. The increasing militarization of space, coupled with the advent of cyber threats and the potential for malicious interference with space assets, demands stringent safeguards to protect sensitive and confidential data. The EU’s data law principles, such as those embodied in the GDPR and the Data Act, can serve as a solid foundation upon which to build resilient and secure space infrastructure and operations. Moreover, the integration of data law considerations into the EU Space Law framework is crucial for maintaining a level playing field within the internal market. As private entities increasingly venture into space activities, a harmonized regulatory environment that addresses data governance challenges is essential to prevent forum shopping and ensure fair competition among EU space operators. Consistent application of data protection standards and clear guidelines on data sharing and access can foster an environment conducive to innovation while mitigating potential market distortions. In this context, the forthcoming EU Space Law must be envisioned as a comprehensive and holistic regulatory regime that seamlessly integrates the principles and mechanisms established in the EU’s data law frameworks. This synergistic approach not only strengthens the protection of EU citizens’ rights and national security interests but also positions the EU as a global leader in responsible and sustainable space exploration and utilization.

As the EU embarks on this ambitious endeavor, it must remain steadfast in its commitment to international cooperation and collaboration. While asserting its strategic autonomy, the EU should leverage its influential position to foster global partnerships, share best practices, and promote the adoption of consistent standards and guidelines among space-faring nations. Only through such concerted efforts can the challenges posed by the rapidly evolving space domain be effectively addressed, ensuring the long-term sustainability and peaceful exploration of the cosmos for the benefit of all humanity. In essence, the forthcoming EU Space Law presents a unique opportunity to harmonize the EU’s data law prowess with its aspirations in the realm of space governance. By integrating these complementary legal frameworks, the EU can chart a path towards responsible space activities, safeguarding the rights and interests of its citizens while upholding the principles of sustainability, innovation, and global cooperation. The time is ripe for the EU to take a leading role in shaping the future of space exploration and utilization, setting an example for the world to follow.

1

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Space Law Treaties and Principles’, available at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html.

2

Ibid.

3

B. “Ernie” Catledge, J. Powell, ‘Chapter 1 Space History’, in AU-18 Space Primer, 2009, p. 1 ss.

4

‘Navigating Space Law: Regulations and Legal Principles of the Cosmos’, ISPI, 7 December 2020, available at https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/navigating-space-law-regulations-and-legal-principles-cosmos-28605.

5

J. Larik, ‘EU law and the governance of Global Spaces: ambitions, constraints and legal creativity’, in Journal of European Integration, n. 45(8), 2023, p. 1125.

6

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘About Us’, available at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/aboutus/index.html#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Office%20for,sustainable%20economic%20and%20social%20development.

8

C. Kavanagh, ‘New Tech, New Threats, and New Governance Challenges: An Opportunity to Craft Smarter Responses?’, in JSTOR, 2019.

9

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Status of International Agreements relating to Activities in Outer Space’, available at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/status/index.html.

10

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Third United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III)’, available at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/psa/schedule/1999/unispace-iii.html.

11

M. Weinzierl, ‘Space, the Final Economic Frontier’, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, n. 32, 2018, p. 173.

12

European Commission, ‘EU Space Law – new rules for safe, resilient and sustainable space activities’, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13971-EU-Space-Law-new-rules-for-safe-resilient-and-sustainable-space-activities_en.

13

European Commission, ‘Targeted Consultation on EU Space Law’, available at https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/newsroom/consultations/targeted-consultation-eu-space-law_en.

14

“To improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the single market”.

15

European Commission, ‘Targeted Consultation on EU Space Law’, available at https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/newsroom/consultations/targeted-consultation-eu-space-law_en.

16

J.L. Dunoff et al., International Law: Norms Actors Process: A Problem-Oriented Approach, 4th ed., Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 2015, p. 105.

17

Ibid.

18

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Space Law Treaties and Principles’, available at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html.

19

Ibid. (the five declarations and principles of COPUOS: “Declaration of Legal Principles”, “Broadcasting Principles”, “Remote Sensing Principles”, “Nuclear Power Sources”, and “Benefits Declaration”).

20

Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, came into force Oct. 10, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (hereinafter “Outer Space Treaty”).

21

European Commission, ‘Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defence’, 10 March 2023, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52023JC0009.

22

The European Space Agency, ‘What is Galileo?’, available at https://www.esa.int/Applications/Satellite_navigation/Galileo/What_is_Galileo.

23

See https://www.copernicus.eu/en.

24

Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations in New York, ‘EU Statement – UN General Assembly 4th Committee: Peaceful uses of outer space’, 26 October 2022, available at https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/eu-statement-%E2%80%93-un-general-assembly-4th-committee-peaceful-uses-outer-space_en.

25

See note 9.

26

European Commission, ‘Joint Communication on a European Union Approach to Space Traffic Management’, available at https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-space/space-traffic-management_en.

27

European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) n. 696/2021, establishing the Union Space Programme and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme and repealing Regulations (EU) nn. 912/2010, 1285/2013 and 377/2014, and Decision 2014/541/EU, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2021/696/oj.

28

European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) n. 679/2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 1995/46/EC, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32016R0679.

29

European Parliament and Council, Regulation (EU) n. 868/2022, on European data governance and amending Regulation (EU) 1724/2018, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2022/868/oj.

30

European Parliament legislative Resolution of 13 March 2024 on the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on laying down harmonized rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending Union Legislative Acts (COM(2021)0206 – C9-0146/2021 – 2021/0106(COD)), available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0138_EN.pdf.

31

See above, UN Space Law Treaties and Principles.

32

Now known as the PLA Rocket Force; See RAND Corporation, ‘Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee on China’s Spacefaring Activities and Implications for the United States’, 2019, available at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA900/RRA943-1/RAND_RRA943-1.pdf.

33

Ibid.

34

Translating to “Celestial Palace” in Chinese.

35

A. Jones, D. Dobrijevic, ‘China’s space station, Tiangong: A complete guide’, Space.com, 15 August 2023, available at https://www.space.com/tiangong-space-station.

36

Ibid.

37

The US is a party to the major space treaties like the Outer Space Treaty, which emphasizes peaceful use of space and state responsibility for national activities.

38

See e.g., the Commercial Space Launch Act and remote sensing regulations.

39

See e.g., Trump Cabinet, Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, 2017; and see e.g., Biden Cabinet, Executive Order on Space-Based PNT Services, 2021.

40

G. Whitford, ‘Trouble in the Stars: The Importance of US-China Bilateral Cooperation in Space’, Harvard International Review, 27 October 2019, available at https://hir.harvard.edu/trouble-in-the-stars-the-importance-of-us-china-bilateral-cooperation-in-space/.

41

Ibid.

42

See AlvinHoi-Chun Hung, ‘Did Exclusion Ignite China's Drive to Compete in Space Station Technology? An Analysis of the Techno-Legal Implications of the Wolf Amendment (2011)’, in Journal of Law, Technology & Policy, 2022, p. 119.

43

‘Military Satellites by Country 2024’, World Population Review, available at https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/military-satellite-by-country.

44

United Nation, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Resolution 2222 (XXI), 1966.

45

United Nation, Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Resolution 2777 (XXVI), 1971.

46

See Article 1(c)(i) and 1(c)(ii), respectively.

47

J.C. Moltz, ‘The Changing Dynamics of Twenty-First-Century Space Power’, in Journal of Strategic Security, n. 12(1), 2019, p. 15.

48

C. Isnardi, ‘Problems with Enforcing International Space Law on Private Actors’, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, n. 58, 2020.

49

R.P. Rajagopalan, ‘The Outer Space Treaty: Overcoming Space Security Governance Challenges’, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021, available at https://www.cfr.org/report/outer-space-treaty.

50

Absence of national space law shifting liability to private entities.

51

Grand-Duché de Luxembourg, Loi 20 juillet 2017, n. 674, sur l’exploration et l’utilisation des ressources de l’espace.

52

Art. 16: “The operator that is granted an authorization for a mission is fully responsible for any damage caused at the occasion of the mission, including at the occasion of all preparatory works and duties.”

53

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 189.

54

The extent to which national law jurisdiction applies to outer space activities it is still widely debated. See F.G. von der Dunk, F. Tronchetti (eds.), Handbook of Space Law, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2017.

55

A. Forganni, ‘Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union in the Development of EU Space Policy’, in European Space Policy, Routledge, London, 2015.

56

K. Johnson, ‘Key Governance Issues in Space’, CSIS, September 2020, available at https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Johnson_GovernanceInSpace_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf.

57

K. Johnson, ‘Key Governance Issues in Space’, CSIS, September 2020, available at https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Johnson_GovernanceInSpace_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf.

58

L. David, ‘China’s Anti-Satellite Test: Worrisome Debris Cloud Circles Earth’, Space.com, 17 November 2021, available at https://www.space.com/3415-china-anti-satellite-test-worrisome-debris-cloud-circles-earth.html.

59

A. Carpenter, ‘Role of Galileo Satellite Technology in Maritime Security, Safety and Environmental Protection’, in European Space Policy, Routledge, London, 2015.

60

‘Earth observation, satellite navigation and communication’, Eurisy, available at https://www.eurisy.eu/satellite-applications/.

61

K. Johnson, ‘Key Governance Issues in Space’, CSIS, September 2020, available at https://aerospace.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/Johnson_GovernanceInSpace_WEB_FINAL-1.pdf.

63

‘Disasters: How Earth observation satellites help guide emergency workers’, Airbus, 6 September 2023, available at https://www.airbus.com/en/newsroom/stories/2023-09-disasters-how-earth-observation-satellites-help-guide-emergency-workers.

64

‘Satellites – the power behind our modern world’, UK Space Agency blog, 30 November 2023, available at https://space.blog.gov.uk/2023/11/30/satellites-the-power-behind-our-modern-world/.

65

S. Goguichvili et al., ‘The Global Legal Landscape of Space: Who Writes the Rules on the Final Frontier?’, Wilson Center, 1 October 2021, available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/global-legal-landscape-space-who-writes-rules-final-frontier.

67

EU space policy’, EU Council, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-space-programme/.

68

‘The Council calls for a European approach on space traffic management’, Council of the EU, 23 May 2023, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/05/23/the-council-calls-for-a-european-approach-on-space-traffic-management/.

70

V. La Regina, ‘Space as a field and tool of international relations’, in European Space Policy, Routledge, London, 2015.

71

i.e. setting a global standardization for any player that may want to deal with the European Economic Space.

72

B. Silverstein, ‘Promoting International Cooperation to Avoid Collisions Between Satellites’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 20 September 2023, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/09/promoting-international-cooperation-to-avoid-collisions-between-satellites?lang=en.

73

Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

74

See https://global.jaxa.jp/.

75

‘Kounotori Integrated Tether Experiment’, available at https://encyclopedia.pub/entry/31666.

76

See S. Kawamoto et al., ‘Current Status of Research and Development on Active Debris Removal at JAXA’, in European Space Agency, n. 7(1), 2017.

77

United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, ‘Space Supporting the Sustainable Development Goals’, available at https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/space4sdgs/index.html.

79

T. Masson-Zwaan, M. Hofmann, Introduction to Space Law, Wolters Kluwer, 2019.

80

R. Zimmerman, ‘CAPITALISM IN SPACE: Private Enterprise and Competition Reshape the Global Aerospace Launch Industry’, in JSTOR, 2017.

81

J.B. Chaben, ‘Extending Humanity’s Reach: A Public-Private Framework for Space Exploration’, in Journal of Strategic Security, n. 13(3), 2020, p. 75.

82

See Isnardi, note 48.

83

A. Chander, H. Sun (eds.), Data Sovereignty: From the Digital Silk Road to the Return of the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2023; See also G.M. Riva, ‘Metadata, Semantic Data and Their Protection: Legal Nature and Issues under the GDPR and the E-Privacy Draft Regulation’, Amsterdam Privacy Conference, 2018; L.A. Bygrave, ‘The Place of Privacy in Data Protection Law’, in UNSW Law Journal, n. 24(1), 2001, p. 277.

84

See, for instance, the ‘National Space Policy of the United States of America’, 28 June 2010, available at https://history2.nasa.gov/national_space_policy_6-28-10.pdf.