“Bundesverfassungsgericht Zur Ezb”: Another Blow to the European Union Post-Brexit?

Historical Overview of a Controversial Decision and its Implications for the Eurozone and the Future of the European Union

This paper examines the consequences and implications of the decision of the BVerfG of 5 May 2020 not only regarding EU law, but also regarding the sustainability of the Eurozone. It explores the implications of this decision at the time of the Covid-19 pandemic and how it might be an early-onset of the collapse of the Euro. Likewise, it examines the consequences that the collapse of the Euro would have for Germany. Finally, it discusses how what appears to be a bane may be a blessing in disguise and a historical tipping point that could allow for the much hoped-for and expected reform of the EU and its internal functioning. 

1.   Introduction

The Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), the German Constitutional Court, made history on 5 May 2020. It declared partly unconstitutional the European Central Bank (ECB)’s quantitative easing policy.^[1] The policy consists in the ECB buying government bonds to inject money into the economy of the countries of the Euro-area and expand their economic activity, thus absorbing the debts of the worst-off EU member states. It participates of the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). It was launched on 22 January 2015. It concerns the purchase of bonds issued by the governments and agencies of the Eurozone including bonds issued by the European institutions.^[2]

In this context, the ECB undertook to respect several requirements. One of these criteria was proportionality. Fiscally, it means, for instance, that if the ECB undertook to buy €2bn of German bonds with a 6% coupon, it would receive €120,000,000 interests annually from the Finanzagentur GmbH (FA) – the German Treasury – and would have to return this €120,000,000 annually to the Bundesbank (BB) – the German Central Bank – with the responsibility for it to remit it to the FA. The distribution of interest had to be pro rata with the national equity shares held at the ECB.^[3] This means that the ECB could not, logically, return more equity shares to a member state than it had received in the first place. Another requirement was not to purchase more than 33% of a particular issue of bonds of a central government of a member state of the Euro-area or more than 33% of its outstanding securities.^[4] Likewise, the ECB undertook not to favour any individual member state by becoming their majority creditor. This was later affirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).^[5]

However, Mario Draghi, former President of the ECB, announced in his introductory statement to the press conference held by the ECB on 10 March 2016 that the ECB had decided to increase the purchase rate from 33% to 50%.^[6] This decision followed from the European sovereign debt crisis. It purported to revitalise the most shaken EU economies and guarantee European financial stability, especially in the Eurozone. As a result, the ECB became the majority creditor of some member states. Simultaneously, it flouted the pro rata criterion. The ECB bond-buying programme led to a yearly transfer from the countries whose bonds were bought to the countries whose bond were not bought, thus leaving the most virtuous countries, especially Germany, bear the cost of the financial mismanagement of the least responsible. In so doing, the ECB engaged the national central banks of the Euro-area in loss sharing activities.^[7]

Accordingly, a group of German citizens raised a priority preliminary ruling before the BVerfG on the compatibility of the decision of the ECB with the German Constitution and the interests of the German people. They considered that their fundamental rights provided under the federal Grundgesetz had been violated by the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung for failure to take steps against the ECB’s unfair quantitative easing policy (PSPP) and for failure to bring the ECB before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) so that it could review the legality of this decision, determine the infringement of an essential procedural requirement, find an infringement of the Treaties, or identify a misuse of powers under Art. 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).^[8]

Thus, the decision of the BVerfG asserts and revives heated discussions about the supremacy of EU law over the domestic laws of its member states. Likewise, it menaces the stability and sustainability of the Eurozone as it gives carte blanche to the Bundesbank to withdraw from it or, rather, disapply the policies that are at odds with the interests of the German people and state. It is, however, doubtful that such circumstance would be beneficial to Germany. 

Against the foregoing background, this paper examines the consequences and implications of the decision of the BVerfG not only regarding EU law, but also regarding the sustainability of the Eurozone. It explores the implications of this decision at the time of the Covid-19 outbreak and how it might be an early-onset of the collapse of the Euro. Likewise, it examines the consequences that the collapse of the Euro would have for Germany. Finally, it discusses how what appears to be a bane may be a blessing in disguise and a historical tipping point that could allow for the much hoped-for and expected reform of the EU and its internal functioning. 

2.   Primacy of German Law Over EU Law: Historical Overview of the German Democratic Model

Law is the cement of social life in Germany. It is “the rule on which the whole order, the beauty, and all the agreeableness of human life depends”, to misquote Pudendorf.^[9] This is true since time immemorial. Already in 1356, when what would be Germany was no more than a mosaic of states, the Germans developed laws to hold together all forms of social life across the entities that composed it. They construed law as a basic set of arrangements devised according to necessity, reason, or principle as opposed to whim or impulse. It allows people to live their daily lives without fearing that their rights would be infringed. So much is illustrated by the Bulla Aurea, a decree issued by the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire at Nuremberg and Metz to fix for ca. 400 years, important aspects of its constitutional structure.^[10] It is the seminal document in German constitutional history. It is to German constitutionalism what Magna Carta is to English and, by extension, British constitutionalism.^[11]Another seminal constitutional text was the Augsburg Settlement (1555), an official document that ended the religious strife between Protestants and Catholics. It ascertained the permanent schism of Christianity within the Holy Roman Empire. It permitted the cohabitation of Catholics and Protestants within the same Empire and allowed princes to elect either Lutheranism or Roman Catholicism as the official confession of their state according to the rule cuius regio, eius religio.^[12] Another major document was, of course, Frederick the Great’s Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (1794), the first greatest compilation of law in the modern period after Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis. It was dedicated to the rationalisation of the exercise of power through administrative codification.^[13]

This long constitutional tradition took a whole new dimension with the advent and fall of Nazism. The latter was the decisive factor that precipitated the constitution of a definite body of fundamental principles and the establishment of precedents according to which Germany is acknowledged to be governed. It culminated in the adoption of the Grundgesetz, a basic norm, order, or rule that forms the underlying basis for German law and politics. Notably, it establishes German constitutional law above politics and other forms of governance that could pose a threat to the integrity and inviolability of Germany’s sovereignty and the rights of its people.^[14] Hence, the BVerfG has such a determining role in German social, legal, and political life nowadays. It is simultaneously the arbiter of political life, but also the mouthpiece of the democratic model that Germany endeavoured to achieve since the early-modern period. 

Consequently, the BVerfG does not tolerate any contestation of its decisions, including from the EU although EU law takes, in theory, precedence over the domestic laws of the member states. It would be tantamount to contesting German law itself and, somehow, the raison d’être of the German state, something the BVerfG cannot allow. It has always been clear. It has always held that the participation of Germany to what became the European Union is contingent on the consistency of EU law with German law, especially German constitutional law. Indeed, already in 1974, the BVerfG ruled in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft that the primacy of EU law is subject to the existence of mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights in the order of the Union equivalent to those existing in the German constitutional order:^[15] “Solange der Integrationsprozeß der Gemeinschaft nicht so weit fortgeschritten ist, daß das Gemeinschaftsrecht auch einen von einem Parlament beschlossenen und in Geltung stehenden formulierten Katalog von Grundrechten enthält, der dem Grundrechtskatalog des Grundgesetzes adäquat ist, ist nach Einholung der in Art. 177 EWGV geforderten Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes die Vorlage eines Gerichts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an das Bundesverfassungsgericht im Normenkontrollverfahren zulässig und geboten, wenn das Gericht die für es entscheidungserhebliche Vorschrift des Gemeinschaftsrechts in der vom Europäischen Gerichtshof gegebenen Auslegung für unanwendbar hält, weil und soweit sie mit einem der Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes kollidier”.^[16]

Thus, it recognised the possibility for it to review the constitutionality of the acts of the Communities (now the EU) against the Grundgesetz. Likewise, it inferred that if there were no equivalent protection of fundamental rights within the order of the EU, it would overrule the alleged primacy of EU law and would substitute domestic law for it. It established, thereby, the first general and fundamental principle of EU law. It caused the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC now CJEU) to fill the gaps of the Treaty promptly. It formed the basis for the development of principles for the protection of fundamental rights in EU law. The CJEC drew inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the member states to identify the fundamental rights of EU law.^[17] Later, it recognised in Nold (1974) that such principles also had to be derived from the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)^[18] and the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) in Rutili (1975).^[19]  This led the BVerfG to adopt a second Solange decision in 1986 in which it acknowledged that the Communities provide sufficient protection to fundamental rights equivalent to that of the German constitution.^[20] It appeared more reticent in its decisions on Maastricht (1993)^[21] and Lisbon (2009)^[22] regarding the allocation of competences between the Union and the member states. 

The decision of 5 May 2020 is the heir of this tradition. A far cry from the general assumption that it threatens the survival of the Eurozone,^[23] it merely determines that the ECB infringed the TFEU by expanding its quantitative easing policy in 2016, thus acting outside of its mandate and against the interests of the member states. The decision of the BVerfG is no more than a call to order or reminder that the Union and its institutions cannot overlook basic fundamental rights, infringe on the rights of its member states and their population, impose decisions undemocratically and, finally, decide on their own competence (see Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine).^[24]

Nonetheless, the judgement of 5 May 2020 is a declaration of war of the BVerfG on the CJEU. It contradicts the decision of the CJEU to the reference for a preliminary ruling that it had raised in which the later decided that the ECB’s policy did not infringe the Treaty and vindicated the action of the ECB.^[25] Thus, the decision of 5 May 2020 deems the CJEU equally uncaring with the German interests and regarded its judgment as a hinder to the cement of German social, political, and legal life: the Grundgesetz. Hence it opposed it with its constitutional censorship. This means that, to the BVerfG, as in 1974, EU law is only applicable to Germany if its slips past constitutional censorship. 

However, the BVerfG did not contest the participation of Germany and the German Central Bank in the Eurozone in and of themselves. It only ruled that the ECB exceeded its mandate and violated the principle of democracy. It entails sovereignty and the right for each state to decide on its budgetary policy without it being imposed. It only acknowledged that if within three months from its judgment the Federal Diet and government did not obtain from the ECB that it drew new proportionality assessments of its quantitative easing policy protecting German interests, it would prohibit the German Central Bank from maintaining its participation to the PSPP scheme and prevent it from purchasing new bonds under the scheme. Likewise, it would require that they resold the securities already held and implement their own domestic policy consistently with the German constitution.^[26] The ruling of 5 May 2020 was, therefore, not a mandate to the German Government and Central Bank to leave the Eurozone completely should the ECB not produce any new assessments.  

However, it remains no less that in adopting its ruling of 5 May 2020, the BVerfG acknowledged its supremacy over the CJEU in the construction of EU law. It cast aside the preliminary ruling it had sought in Case C‑493/17 which it deemed incomprehensible, arbitrary, and foul of the Grundgesetz.^[27] This is likely to affect the functioning of the Union. In fact, the ruling of the BVerfG has for its effect the subjugation of the ECB to German law. This is not only foul of the Treaty which explicitly provides that the latter is not subject to any national influence and is an independent body,^[28] but also it hampers the functioning of the ECB which may no longer be able to rely on its satellites, the national central banks, to fulfil its policies and support the many. 

Likewise, this judicial great feat or coup d’éclat is likely to put Germany in an awkward position vis-à-vis its European partners. Its failure to follow its European obligations by way of its constitutional court might lead to it being sanctioned by the CJEU^[29] for failure to meet its treaty-obligations and may even lead to it leaving the Eurozone fair and square in the long-run. It would have much to lose than gain from this. Thus, the German government is in a dilemma. A double-edged sword of Damocles hangs over its head. The implications of the decision of 5 May 2020 on the ECB’s policy on the development of EU law must, therefore, be studied in more details. 

3.   Implications

3.1          Consequences in the Light of the Covid-19 Pandemic

The outbreak of the new coronavirus in January 2020,^[30] declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020,^[31] compounded even more financial needs within the Union to prevent a severe economic decline and significant fall in the GDP of its member states already affected by bad public finance. Against the foregoing background, the ECB declared in April 2020 that it would pledge €750bn to fight the Covid-19 crash.^[32] At the same time, it announced that its bid would know no limitation and that it stood ready to commit even more money if required to fulfil its commitment to the Eurozone to counter the devastating effects of Covid-19 on the economy and the European single market.^[33] It acknowledged, thereby, that it would depart temporarily from the pro rata distribution key between each member state of the Euro-area. 

The ECB named this new policy Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). It entails the purchase of commercial papers (i.e., unsecured promissory notes with a fixed maturity of about 6 months) issued by large corporations. This is because closure en masse in the past few weeks worried it.^[34] This new policy also entails the easing of the rules relating to the types of interests that the ECB usually accepts as security for the loan operations that it conducts so as to allow more business financing applications and foster European stability.^[35] Hence, Christine Lagarde argued in a tweet on 18 March 2020 that^[36][extraordinary] times require extraordinary action. There are no limits to our commitment to the euro. We are determined to use the full potential of our tools, within our mandate.

Her statement is reminiscent of the ECB’s ‘Whatever it takes’ policy during the sovereign debt crisis in 2016.^[37] Thus, the ECB gave itself another mandate to explore every alternative to maintain economic stability in the Union even if it means increasing its credit-buying operations and flouting some rules. It could, hypothetically, even decide to increase its purchase rate from 33% to 50% or more as in 2016 although its communiqué does not mention that explicitly. 

Consequently, the ECB opted this time for targeted relief measures instead of general measures consisting, for instance, in lowering its base interest rate like its American^[38] and British counterparts.^[39] Its aim is truly to flood second-tier banks with liquidities they can loan to companies, corporations, and enterprises. Its policy comes at a time where securities exchange plummet,^[40] borrowing costs increase,^[41] and where the variances between the German public debt (one of the lowest) and that of other European countries keeps increasing especially in France, Spain, and Italy where it goes through the roof.^[42]

In this regard, the plaintiffs in the judgment of 5 May 2020 could rely on the ruling of the BVerfG to contest the participation of Germany to PEPP since it prompts Germany to contribute to the salvation of weaker economies while receiving very little in return. It follows from the decision of May 5, 2020, that this is contrary to the interest of the population that it serves whose welfare it must uphold under its Basic Law. Hence, the BVerfG could force Germany to opt out of the currency union unless one argues that the Union has mechanisms allowing it to compel its member states to adhere to all the rules attending to the European common monetary policy whatever happens, pace any domestic judicial ruling,^[43] especially since adhesion to the Euro was intended to be irreversible and irrevocable.^[44]

3.2          Significance for Germany and the European Union 

The decision of the BVerfG brings back an old financial antagonism within the Union which dates back to Maastricht (1992). It concerns the active hostility and opposition between those northern European countries that were cautious of their public spend and were deemed stingy (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden) and those southern European countries less cautious of their public purse and frugal (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, Greece).^[45] Over the years, it has become the symbol of a dysfunctional Europe out of touch with the people. The eleven countries who ventured in creating an economic and monetary union did not elaborate enforcement mechanism for the convergence of their budgetary and economic policies. The participating states which were at distinct levels of development remained the master builders of their own budgetary policies. However, the latter was regulated by some rules. Once in the economic and monetary union, the member states pledged to maintain their annual general government deficit below or at no more than 3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices at the end of the preceding fiscal year.^[46] Likewise, they pledged that their nominal gross government debt relative to their GDP at market prices would not exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year.^[47]

However, the Treaty was breached even before the Euro was adopted. By 1999, only six member states met the convergence criteria including Netherlands, Austria, Germany and, surprisingly, Italy.^[48]Each state acting for itself, the Treaty provided for a no-bail out clause that ensured that each country is liable for the repayment of their own debt.^[49] It purported to prevent risk premia resulting from unwise fiscal policies from affecting partner countries. Thus, the clause fostered prudent and sagacious fiscal national fiscal policies. None of these safeguards have worked in practice. This is notably because in the early years of the Euro, the member states took on high debts in spite of the convergence criteria.^[50] This created a speculative bubble, especially in the field of finance and real estate in Spain, Netherlands, Greece, and Ireland.^[51] It caused economic and financial disequilibria amongst member states. It continued to increase for want of efficient sanction mechanisms and popped in 2008. Then, it exposed the lamentable financial disequilibrium that plagued the Union. This is not surprising given the Treaty had no social aspect and did not establish any system of redistribution allowing for the correction of the divergences between member states. Likewise, the Treaty did not provide for any crisis management mechanism, especially where a state faces bankruptcy. European leaders understood this all too late when Greece nearly became bankrupt in 2010 and at the time of the sovereign debt crisis in 2012. 

These events lifted the curtain behind the economic and monetary union and revealed a fiasco. They exposed a lack of unity, the widening of the gaps between countries, the lack of solidarity between member states which is incompatible with a monetary union, and the lack of convergence whether fiscal, economic, or budgetary. Since, the member states have adopted a plethora of protocols to fill the gaps of Maastricht and strengthen economic stability; but these have only complexified European economic governance and have not helped obviate the economic divergences between member states.^[52]

While the European Commission plays a greater role in the control of the budget of the member states, it lacks any adequate criteria to identify disequilibria between states and sanction member states efficaciously even though the Maastricht criteria have been refined to account for economic change in the determination of the structural deficit of a state.^[53] Several suggestions have been made to improve European economic stability. They are summed up in three trains of thought. First, some Eurosceptics supported by the American economist Joseph Stiglitz suggest that the Treaty should be repealed and each state should recover their full monetary sovereignty.^[54] It does not take a genius to realise that this suggestion is silly and would not favour convergence but would only bring more disparities amongst states. Besides, this would not favour anyone, especially Germany who would return to the Deutsche Mark. It would not only be far higher than the Euro, but it also means that Germany could no longer be an export country par excellence because of its huge current account surplus.^[55] So, Germany has no interest in the enfeeblement and repeal of the Eurozone as its constitutional court invites it to. 

By contrast, another trend supported by better rounded German economists suggests a return to Maastricht and the adoption of true enforcement mechanisms guaranteeing the efficacy of European integration.^[56] This echoes president Steinmeier hortatory call in which he stated: “30 Jahre nach der Deutschen Einheit, 75 Jahre nach dem Ende des Krieges sind wir Deutsche zur Solidarität in Europa nicht nur aufgerufen - wir sind dazu verpflichtet”.^[57]

Finally, a more federalist trend calls for the simplification of the whole of the European monetary policies and the introduction of solidarity mechanisms to ensure European integration for instance through the creation of an European fund to provide relief to the most worse off countries in times of crisis.^[58]Another suggestion is the institution of a common European minimal employment insurance to eliminate the existing gaps between member states.^[59] Others suggest even the mutualisation of the public debts and the establishment of a common Treasury to steer the European economic policy and suppress divergences between states.^[60] The latter two movements highlight the need for a renegotiation of the Treaties or the adoption of new mechanisms to break the stalemate that the BVerfG pinpointed in its judgment. 

4.   Call for Reform

Crises have always given the EU the chance to evolve. Crises have always forced the EU and its member states to stop gazing at their navels and edge forward slowly but steadily. The EU grows in strength and wisdom crisis after crisis, jolt after jolt, and chaos after chaos. It learns from its past and always endeavours to get back on its feet. Crises are its blood line. After all, the European project is born of sustained military conflicts between European nations since the first true world war between 1756 and 1763^[61] and a sustained call for peace and stability in Europe initiated by Charlemagne^[62] and George of Kunštát and Poděbrady in their times.^[63] These foreshadowed the European Union. They have made Europe develop gradually but surely as a continent, family, and union of nations. So much is illustrated in the current period by the European debt crisis, the migrant crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic. They have forced the EU member states not to self-indulge and contemplate excessively on their single issues at the expense of a wider view, but to stick together and find common solution beneficial to all.^[64]

Regarding the current crisis of the Euro, President Macron has continually called on Chancellor Merkel to further the European construction and produce innovative ideas and solutions since his election in 2017.^[65] His calls were ignored. However, it is safe bet that the decision of the BVerfG of 5 May 2020 will force Merkel and other heads of states and governments to be less ambiguous as to the necessity to mutualise the resources of the European budget to cope with exampled crises and come up to the mark. The ball is, thus, in Germany’s court. Either it refuses to cooperate and the inertial forces within the EU will rotate in all directions and make the EU implode to no one’s interest, or it pulls itself together and acknowledges that there is an urgent need to renegotiate the treaties and come up with bespoke solutions to cope with crises. Few controvert to this.^[66] Macron’s and Merkel’s recovery initiative and release of €500bn shows encouraging signs of the beginning of this process.^[67]

5.   Conclusion

The decision of the BVerfG of 5 May 2020 is interesting in many respects. It reasserts the supremacy of German law over EU law in stark relief to the principle by which EU law takes precedence over domestic law. Similarly, it is a declaration of war to the authority of the CJEU whose jurisdiction it challenges. However, given that adhesion to the Eurozone is irreversible, there is little chance for it to cause the demise of the Eurozone. By contrast, it only calls for a much needed reform of the European monetary policy, more economic discipline, and the implementation of mechanisms to safeguard the fundamental rights of each people of the Union to ensure that none is left to bear the cost of the indiscipline of the others. It calls for a rethinking of the treaties and the development of a more virtuous Union concerned for economic stability and sound financial, fiscal, and economic management in times of prosperity as well as in times of crisis. 

* Kane joined Edinburgh Law School in 2017 to read for an LL.M. in European Law. Before joining the University of Edinburgh, he read for an LL.B. (Hons) in English and French Law and German Language and an MA in Business and Financial Markets Law at Faculté Jean Monnet–Université Paris-Saclay. He was also awarded a Certificate in Common Law by the University of London Institute in Paris. Further to his academic activity, he has provided expertise on French and English law to junior counsels and UK and French claimants in France and England & Wales. Kane is currently pursuing a PhD in Law at the University of Edinburgh. His thesis focuses on the assessment of the development of a general principle of contract based on consensus in early modern legal thought and will challenge the accepted macro-narratives of European legal history. Kane's research interests are in the areas of EU competition law, commercial law, and legal history. He has a particular interest in contract law, especially regarding formation, interpretation and breach in a historical and comparative context. Kane can be contacted at k.abry@ed.ac.uk.

[1] BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15 - Rn. (1 - 237), Judgment of Second Senate of 5 May 2020.

[2] J. Bernard, ‘War of courts at the top of the European Union: The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe’, para 1, Delcade avocats & solicitors, 12 May 2020, available at https://www.delcade.com/legal-news/competition-law/war-courts-top-european-union-ruling-german-federal-constitutional-court-karlsruhe/, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[3] European Central Bank, ‘Capital subscription’, 2012, updated 2020, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[4]  European Central Bank, Decision of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, [n. 774/2015], ECB/2015/10. 

[5] European Court of Justice (CG), Heinrich Weiss and Others [C-493/17]. See European Court of Justice (GC), Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag [C-62/14].

[6] M. Draghi, V. Constâncio, ‘Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)’, Press Conference of meeting of the Governing Council, 10 March 2016, Frankfurt, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is160310.en.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[7] M. Draghi, V. Constâncio, op. cit.; European Central Bank, ‘Monetary policy decisions’ (2015), Press Release, 22 January 2015 available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122.en.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[8] BVerfG, op. cit., II.1, para 19.

[9] S. Von Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium (1672) 3.4.2.

[10] B. Schneidmüller, ‘Monarchische Ordnungen – Die Goldene Bulle von 1356 und die französischen Ordonnanzen von 1374’ in J. Fried, O. B. Rader, Die Welt des Mittelalters. Erinnerungsorte eines Jahrtausends, Beck C. H, 2011, pp. 324-335; M-L Heckman, ‘Der Deutsche Orden und die „Goldene Bulle“ Kaiser Karls IV. Mit einer Vorbemerkung zur Herkunft der Quaternionen (mit Edition ausgewählter Stücke)’ in K. Neitmann, W. Neugebauer, U. Schaper, Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands, De Gruyter, 2006, pp. 173-226; E. Ladewig Petersen, ‘Studien zur Goldenen Bulle von 1356’ (1966) Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, Vol 22, pp 227-253; A Wolf, ‘Das „Kaiserliche Rechtbuch“ Karls IV. (sogenannte Goldene Bulle)’ in H. Coing, Jus Commune (1969) Vol 2, pp 1-32; K-F Johannes, ‘Die Goldene Bulle und die Praxis der Königswahl 1356-1410’ (2008) Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur, Vol 14, pp 179-199.

[11] A. Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK, Routledge, London, 2003.

[12] H. Olrik, Salmonsens Konversationsleksikon, 1915, Vol 5, p. 339. 

[13] Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (1794), available at https://opinioiuris.de/quelle/1621, accessed on 21 May 2020; W. W. Smithers, ‘The German Civil Code’ in, The American Law Registrar, University of Pennsylvania, 1902, p. 708, available at https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art.=6365&context=penn_law_review, accessed on 21 May 2020, Sir A. W. Ward, ‘The Cambridge Modern History’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1909, p. 728.

[14] Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949), arts. 1, 2, 20-32 available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html, accessed on 21 May 2020. 

[15] BVerfGE 37, 271 - Solange I (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel). Compare to R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport to contra Garland v British Rail Engineering [1982] 2 All ER 402, per Lord Diplock and Macarthys v Smith[1980] Case 129/79, per Lord Denning. Compare also to Constitutionnel, Décision n° 74-54 DC du 15 janvier 1975 Loi relative à l'interruption volontaire de la grossesse (IVG); Conseil d'Etat, Section, du 1 mars 1968, 62814 (Syndicat Général des Fabricants de Semoule de France); Conseil d’Etat, Assemblée, 20 October 1989 (Nicolo); Conseil d'Etat, 4 / 1 SSR, du 24 septembre 1990, 58657 (Boisdet); Conseil d'Etat, Assemblée, du 28 février 1992, 56776 56777 (Société Rothmans v Philip Morris France); Cour de Cassation, Chambre MIXTE, du 24 mai 1975, 73-13.556 (Cafés Jacques Vabre); Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 2004-505 DC du 19 novembre 2004 Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe; Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 2006-540 DC du 27 juillet 2006; Conseil d'État, Assemblée, 30 octobre 1998, Sarran et Levacher; Conseil d'Etat, 1 / 2 SSR, du 3 décembre 2001, 226514 (Syndicat National de l'Industrie Pharmaceutique (SNIP); Conseil d'État, 8 février 2007, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres; Cour de Cassation, Assemblée plénière, du 2 juin 2000, 99-60.274 (Fraisse); French Constitution, Art.s 54 and 55; Case C-6064, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.

[16] BVerfGE 37, 271, op. cit., [my own translation]: “As long as the [European] process of integration is not too excessive and Community law also acknowledges a catalogue of fundamental rights equivalent to that of the German Constitution (Basic Law), adopted by a Parliament, and adequate for Art. 177 EEC to operate. A court of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court can control the legality of these norms and overrule them if it deems them to collide with one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law. In such case, the courts will be obliged to obey the domestic law over the European”.

[17] European Court of Justice, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, [Case11/1970], para 2.

[18] European Court of Justice, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [Case 4-73].

[19] European Court of Justice, Roland Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur [Case 36-75]. See also European Court of Justice, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, [Case C-185/95 P]; European Court of Justice (First Chamber), Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, [C 36/02]; European Court of Justice, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich, [C-112/00], 2003 I-05659  Case C-112/00, Judgment of the Court of 12 June 2003, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich; European Court of Justice, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, [C-341/05], 2007 I-11767; European Court of Justice (GC), International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [C-438/05], 2007 I-10779.

[20] 2 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Solange II-decision, [n. 197/83], para 2. 

[21] Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of October 12, 1993, 89, 155. 

[22] Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 – 421). 

[23] A. Evans-Pritchard, ‘EU risks losing Germany if it picks a constitutional fight to the death, or the euro if it doesn't’, The telegraph, 17 May 2020, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/05/17/eu-risks-losing-germany-picks-constitutional-fight-death-euro/, accessed on 22 May 2020; R. McCrea, ‘German Constitutional Court is a bigger threat to EU than Brexit or Covid-19’, The Irish Times, 16 May 2020, available at https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/german-constitutional-court-is-a-bigger-threat-to-eu-than-brexit-or-covid-19-1.4254549, accessed on 22 May 2020; K. Pistor, ‘Germany’s Constitutional Court Goes Rogue’ Project Syndicate, 8 May 2020, available https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/german-constitutional-court-ecb-ruling-may-threaten-euro-by-katharina-pistor-2020-05?barrier=accesspaylog, accessed on 22 May 2020; M. Poiares Maduro, ‘The German Constitutional Court struck a blow to EU integration. This is how we can save it’, Euronews, 20 May 2020, available at https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/20/german-constitutional-court-struck-blow-to-eu-integration-this-is-how-we-can-save-it-view, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[24] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2007), art. 5, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT, accessed on 22 May 2020 

[25]European Court of Justice, Reference for a preliminary ruling — Economic and monetary policy – Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank — Validity — Secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme — Art.s 119 and 127 TFEU — Powers of the ECB and the European System of Central Banks — Maintenance of price stability — Proportionality — Art. 123 TFEU — Prohibition of monetary financing of Member States in the euro area, [C‑493/17], available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208741&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=491037, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[26] 2 BvR 859/15, op. cit., para 255. 

[27] 2 BvR 859/15, op. cit., paras 81, 120, 183, 191, and 210.

[28] Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/institutions/bank.html?locale=it, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[29] European Commission, ‘Statement by President VON DER LEYEN’, 10 May 2020, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_846, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[30]‘Rolling updates on coronavirus disease (COVID-19)’, World Health Organisation, 2020, available https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen, accessed on 22 May 2020; ‘Statement on the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)’, World Health Organisation, 30 January 2020, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov), accessed on 22 May 2020.

[31], ‘WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020’, World Health Organisation, 11 March 2020, available at https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[32] European Central Bank, ‘ECB announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)’ Press release of Governing Council, 18 March 2020, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[33] European Central Bank, op. cit., available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html: ‘To the extent that some self-imposed limits might hamper action that the ECB is required to take in order to fulfil its mandate, the Governing Council will consider revising them to the extent necessary to make its action proportionate to the risks that we face. The ECB will not tolerate any risks to the smooth transmission of its monetary policy in all jurisdictions of the euro area’.

[34] European Central Bank, op. cit., para 2, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[35] ‘Securities’ in European Central Bank, op. cit., available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[36] C. Lagarde on Twitter, 19 March 2020, available https://twitter.com/Lagarde/status/1240414918966480896, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[37] C. Alcaraz, S. Claessens, G. Cuadra, D. Marques-Ibanez, H. Sapriza, ‘Working Paper Series | Whatever it takes: what’s the impact of a major nonconventional monetary policy intervention?’, March 2019, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2249~543dd2fbd3.en.pdf, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[38] J. H. Powell, Federal Reserve Board, ‘COVID-19 and the Economy (webcast)’ Webcast, 9 April 2020, p. 2, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/powell20200409a.pdf, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[39] Bank of England, «Bank of England measures to respond to the economic shock from Covid-19», 11 March 2020, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/march/boe-measures-to-respond-to-the-economic-shock-from-covid-19, accessed on 22 May 2020. 

[40] R J Samuelson, ‘What Crash of 2020 Means’ (2020) The Washington Post, accessed on 22 May 2020, available here (EN); S. William, ‘Stock Market Crash 2020: Everything You Need to Know’, The Motley Fool, 10 March 2020, available at https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/03/10/stock-market-crash-2020-everything-you-need-to-kno.aspx, accessed on 22 May 2020; T Chenel, ‘La Bourse de Paris s'effondre à cause du coronavirus et de la chute des cours du pétrole’, Business Insider, 9 March 2020, available at https://www.businessinsider.fr/la-bourse-de-paris-seffondre-a-cause-du-coronavirus-et-de-la-chute-des-cours-du-petrole/ , accessed on 22 May 2020; Boursier.com, ‘Actualités du vendredi 22 mai 2020’ (2020) Boursier.com; BFM Bourse, ‘CAC 40 : Le CAC 40 s'effondre après les annonces de la BCE’, Boursier.com, 23 June 2020, available at https://www.boursier.com/actualites/news-du-jour, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[41] C. Emmerson, I. Stockton, ‘The economic response to coronavirus will substantially increase government borrowing’, Institute for Fisical Studies, 26 March 2020, Institute for Fiscal Studies, available at https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14771, accessed on 22 May 2020; Institute for National Statistics, ‘Public sector finances, UK: April 2020’, ons.gov.uk, 22 May 2020, available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/bulletins/publicsectorfinances/april2020, accessed on 24 May 2020.

[42] S. Fleming, M. Arnold, ‘Eurozone faces economic strains as government debt piles up’, Financial Times, 16 April 2020, available at https://www.ft.com/content/a58cbfba-9f3e-4a91-85ca-e5090d2489bd, accessed on 220 May 2020.

[43] M. D. W. Stoffels, Can the European Union Force Its Member States to Introduce the Euro?, 1^st ed., Nomos Verlag, 2019.

[44] Lord Locke LLP, ‘The Eurozone crisis - the final stage?’, Lexology, 15 May 2012, , available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a92664b9-d267-4347-a59a-6488ab3895fb, accessed on 23 May 2020; European Central Bank, ‘Withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and EMU. Some reflections’ (2009) Legal Working Paper, Series No 10, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[45] Y. Bertoncini, ‘Question d'Europe n°555’ , Fondation Robert Schuman, 20 April 2020, available at https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0555-la-solidarite-europeenne-en-temps-de-crise-un-heritage-a-approfondir-face-au-covid-19, accessed on 23 May 2020; M Lefebre, ‘ThucyBlog n° 33 – L’Europe survivra-t-elle à la crise du coronavirus ?’, Centre Thucydide, 4 May 2020 , available https://www.afri-ct.org/2020/thucyblog-n-33-leurope-survivra-t-elle-a-la-crise-du-coronavirus/, accessed on 23 May 2020; N Dubois, J Quatremer, Article published in Libération (2002) cited in В двух частях, Le français économique (2010), available at http://www.seun.ru/content/learning/4/science/1/doc/Ч2.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[46] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - PROTOCOLS – Protocols (No 12 &13) on the excessive deficit procedure, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, pp 279–280. 

[47] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, op. cit.

[48] A. Forster, Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, p. 67; V Toadera, V Gîdiua, ‘Emerging Markets Queries in Finance and Business. The study of nominal convergence in European Union’ (2012) Procedia Economics and Finance, Issue 3, pp 872, accessed on 23 May 2020, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212567112002432?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=7bb02c924a0cbac1.

[49] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJC 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 47-390, Art. 125. 

[50] J. Hopkin, ‘The troubled southern periphery: The Euro experience in Italy and Spain’ in M. Matthijs, M. Blyth, The future of the Euro, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015, p. 166 ff. 

[51] X. Chen, M. Funke, ‘Renewed Momentum in the German Housing Market: Boom or Bubble?’ (2013) EconStor, CESifo Working Paper, No. 4287, pp 8, 11, 14, , available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/77694/1/cesifo_wp4287.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020; N. Triantafy llopoulos, T. Kandyla, ‘Buyers’ behaviour and the housing bubble in Greece - European Real Estate Society Conference 2010 SDA Bocconi School of Management’, Milan, 23 – 26 June 2010, pp. 1-15, available at https://www.propertyfinance.it/sitoeres/contents/papers/id36.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[52] Stability and Growth Pact (‘Two-Packs’) (1998) available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en, accessed on 23 May 2020; Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 12-24; Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 33-40; Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 1-7; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 41-47; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 25–32; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 8-11; The European Semester (2020), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[53] For instance, the Stability and Growth Pact requires each country commits to implement yearly improvements for their structural deficit equal to minimum 0.5% of their GDP when their debt is below 60% of their GDP and 1% when it exceeds 60 %. See Stability and Growth Pact, op. cit., available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[54] C. Durand, S. Villemot, ‘Abandoning the Euro Could Help Save Europe’, Verso, 2 March 2017, , available at https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3117-abandoning-the-euro-could-help-save-europe, accessed on 23 May 2020 ; G. Jones, M. Bendeich, ‘Italy's 5-Star hails Brexit as democracy, wants Italy vote on euro’ Reuters, 24 June 2016, available at https://www.reuters.com/art./us-britain-eu-italy-5star-idUSKCN0ZA1W7, accessed on 23 May 2020; P. S. Goodman, ‘How a currency intended to unite Europe wound up dividing it’, The New York Times, 27 July 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/business/international/how-a-currency-intended-to-unite-europe-wound-up-dividing-it.html accessed on 23 May 2020 contra M. S. Feldstein, ‘The Failure of the Euro’ The Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, available at https://www.nber.org/feldstein/fa121311.html, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[55] H. Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power, Oxford Univ Pr, 2015, p. 79. 

[56] N. Winkeljohann, T. Straubhaar, M. Bräuninger, J. Hinze, H. Vöpel, ‘Der Euro in der Krise’ (2012) Studienreihe Politik und Wirtschaft pp 13ff, available at https://www.pwc.de/de/offentliche-unternehmen/assets/pwc_studie_eurokrise_april_2012.pdf,  accessed on 23 May 2020; H Reimers, ‘Targetsalden: Viel mehr als nur ein Haftungsrisiko’ (2014) Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol 94, Issue 2, p 139, available at https://core.ac.uk/reader/205245604, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[57] H Charisius, ‘Bundespräsident ruft zu Geduld und Solidarität auf’ (2020) Süddeutsche Zeitung, available at https://www.sueddeutsche.de/gesundheit/gesundheit-bundespraesident-ruft-zu-geduld-und-solidaritaet-auf-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-200411-99-669851, accessed on 22 May 2020. [My own translation]: ‘30 years after the German unity, 75 years after the end of WWII, we, Germans, are not only invited to support solidarity in Europe, but are required to do so’.

[58] G. Dufrénot, F. Jawadi, W. Louhichi, Market microstructure and nonlinear dynamics: Keeping financial crisis in context, Springer Nature, 2014, pp. 239; European Commission, «COVID-19: Commission sets out European coordinated response to counter the economic impact of the Coronavirus» (2020) available https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_459, accessed on 23 May 2020; D. Boffey, ‘EU strikes €500bn relief deal for countries hit hardest by pandemic’, The Guardian, 9 April 2020, available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/09/eu-risks-break-up-over-coronabonds-row-warns-italian-pm, accessed on 23 May 2020;, ‘Searching for meaning. The covid-19 pandemic puts pressure on the EU: An old question has resurfaced: what is the point of the bloc?’ The Economist, 14 May 2020, available https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/05/14/the-covid-19-pandemic-puts-pressure-on-the-eu, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[59] M. Beblavý, G. Marconi, l. Maselli, ‘A European unemployment benefit scheme: The rationale and the challenges ahead’, European Commission | Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, pp 1-32, January 2017, available at https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BzrCkUxJiSkJ:https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet%3FdocId%3D16884%26langId%3Den+&cd=1&hl=da&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[60] S. Tilford, ‘Why the Eurozone needs debt mutualisation’ Centre for European Reform, 28 July 2011, available https://www.cer.eu/insights/why-eurozone-needs-debt-mutualisation, accessed on 23 May 2020; A. Calvo, ‘Gurría calls for further European integration, debt mutualisation in eurozone’, Euractiv, available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/interview/gurria-calls-for-further-european-integration-debt-mutualisation-in-eurozone/, accessed on 23 May 2020; L. Molthof, ‘The EU’s southern member states have set the stage for European debt mutualisation’, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 21 May 2020, available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/05/21/the-eus-southern-member-states-have-set-the-stage-for-european-debt-mutualisation/, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[61] Seven Years’ War. See H. V. Bowen, War and British Society 1688–1815, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 7. WWI and WWII supplied the cement for the construction of European unity as well. On the ideas of European unity and the impact of European and world wars on its construction. See M. Dedman, The origins and development of the European Union 1945-1995: A history of European integration, Routledge, 2009; C. E. De Vries, ‘Don't Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation (2019) Journal of Common Market Studies (2019) pp 21-40; D. Dinan, Europe recast: A history of European Union, 2^nd edition, Red Globe Press, 2004; P. Pasture, Imagining European unity since 1000 AD, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; P. M. R. Stirk, European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period, 1^st edition, Pinter Pub Ltd, 1989; M. L. Smith, P. M. R. Stirk, Making the new Europe: European unity and the Second World War, 1^st edition, Pinter Pub Ltd, 1990. 

[62] F. L. Ganshof, ‘Le programme de gouvernement impérial de Charlemagne’ in Ganshof et al., Renovatio imperii. Atti della giornata internazionale di studio per il Millenario, 1963, pp. 63-96.

[63] A. D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, 1992, International Affairs, Vol 68, Issue 1, pp 55-76.

[64] A. Glencross, ‘The EU response to the Eurozone crisis: Democratic contestation and the new fault lines in European integration’ Europa-Kolleg Hamburg | Institute for European Integration, Discussion Paper No 3/13, July 2013, available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/82634/1/766849171.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020; European Council, Council of the European Union, ‘EU migration policy’ 2020, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/, accessed on 23 May 2020; European Council, Council of the European Union, ‘COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak and the EU's response’, 2020, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/coronavirus/, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[65] V. Hacot, P. Théveniaud, ‘«Nous avons des confrontations» : le drôle de cadeau de Merkel à Macron’ Le Parisien, 15 May 2019 (modified 16 May 2019) , , available at https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/europeennes/europeennes-le-drole-de-cadeau-de-merkel-a-macron-15-05-2019-8072877.php accessed on 23 May 2020 contra F. Collomp, ‘Comment Macron a rallié Merkel à l’idée d’une solidarité financière européenne’, Le Figaro, 19 May 2020, available at https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/comment-macron-a-rallie-merkel-a-l-idee-d-une-solidarite-financiere-europeenne-20200519, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[66] P. Kaczmarczyk, ‘To survive the COVID-19 crisis, the euro area can’t go back to business as usual’ LSE Business Review, 2020, available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/03/21/to-survive-the-covid-19-crisis-the-euro-area-cant-go-back-to-business-as-usual/, accessed on 23 May 2020; N. Raffin, ‘Renégociation des traités: Mélenchon peut-il convaincre l’Europe?’, 20 Minutes, 19 April 2017, available at https://www.20minutes.fr/elections/2052695-20170419-renegociation-traites-melenchon-peut-convaincre-europe, accessed on 23 May 2020; L. Albert, ‘Européennes : Manon Aubry veut renégocier des traités européens « problématiques »’, Les Echos, 28 April 2020, available at https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/politique/le-grand-rendez-vous-europe-1-cnews-les-echos-manon-aubry-veut-renegocier-des-traites-europeens-problematiques-1014615, accessed on 23 May 2020

[67] C Goßner, S Lawton, ‘Merkel and Macron roll out €500 billion COVID-19 recovery initiative’ Euractiv, (2020), available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/merkel-and-macron-roll-out-e500-billion-covid-19-recovery-initiative/, accessed on 23 May 2020.