Bocconi Legal Papers

Giornata del Giurista 2023

2023-03-17T11:58:50+00:00

La fedeltà alle leggi è considerata ormai da secoli come un vincolo ineludibile per il giurista, al punto tale che si tende a non concepire neppure che, al di là o al di sopra di tale limite, vi possa essere un diritto. Le leggi prevedono tuttavia norme giuridiche che, per loro natura, sono generali e astratte e sono destinate quindi a essere applicate in un “tempo ordinario”, quando le cose rientrano appunto nella norma (si dice infatti che sono “normali”).

Quando invece si verifica il caso estremo, quello dell’eccezionalità, le leggi entrano in crisi e il giurista non può più essere guidato dal rassicurante vincolo di fedeltà a ciò che è stato deciso dal potere legislativo. Le leggi mancano o entrano in conflitto con i principî del diritto. Si tratta allora di prendere una decisione concreta, con tutto il carico drammatico di responsabilità che essa comporta.

Nelle situazioni di crisi del diritto, l’appello ai principî può consentire al giurista di sottrarsi dunque al vincolo di fedeltà alle leggi? In altri termini, c’è un limite oltre il quale il giurista può (o addirittura deve) disapplicare le leggi in nome del diritto?

Questi interrogativi, i quali possono sembrare esercizi di scuola, diventano impellenti e drammatici nel momento in cui le istituzioni (nazionali e sovranazionali) si trovano a dover fronteggiare ricorrenti situazioni di crisi (da quella sanitaria alla guerra, dal terrorismo internazionale all’emergenza migratoria), in cui i presidî del positivismo giuridico si allentano, la sovranità dello Stato è inutile e i giuristi si ritrovano di fronte a tutte le loro responsabilità di interpreti del diritto.

Foto di Massimiliano Stucchi, riproduzione riservata

International Society of Public Law (ICON·S)

2023-05-10T13:21:21+00:00

Il 13 e il 14 ottobre 2023 avrà luogo presso l’Università Bocconi la quarta conferenza della sezione italiana dell’International Society of Public Law (ICON·S), dal titolo “Politica e Istituzioni tra Trasformazioni e Riforme”. In vista della conferenza, è aperta sino al 15 luglio 2023 una Call for Panels and Papers rivolta a studiosi di tutte le aree delle scienze giuridiche. I contributi dovranno trattare in prospettiva multidisciplinare il tema delle trasformazioni di fatto del diritto pubblico, anche alla luce delle prospettive di riforma, in particolare con riferimento al ruolo dell’Unione europea e della comunità internazionale, alle modifiche della forma di governo, alla separazione dei poteri, ai rapporti tra politica e amministrazione, e alla tutela dei diritti fondamentali. [spazio prima del prossimo paragrafo]
Bocconi Legal Papers è lieta di annunciare di essere tra le Riviste a cui gli Autori potranno inviare i loro contributi per potenziale pubblicazione. Il testo completo della Call for Panels and Paper è disponibile al link: https://www.icons-italia.it/conferenza-annuale/.

Quo Vadis EU (Law)? - 2022

Giorgio Hassan — 2023-03-20T14:51:37+00:00

The analysis of past and coeval approaches to European enlargement policy represents a major aspect of the current legal and political issues faced by EU. Alongside climate change, digital disruption, and governance of online platforms, revitalizing enlargement is considered as a standpoint for the development of EU law, whatever direction it ought to take. The matter was discussed in a full session hosted by Dr. Fulvia Ristuccia (Bocconi University) with Prof.s Serena Giusti (Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies), Paola Mariani (Bocconi University) and Prof. Roman Petrov (National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy) intervening.

The Big Enlargement and brewing tensions in Eastern Europe

Prof. Giusti firstly examined the recent historical developments in the outskirts of Eastern Europe and around the Mediterranean basin, assessing the matter under multiple perspectives. In this regard, the relation between NATO, the EU, and partner countries; political considerations backing enlargement processes in terms of security, responsibility, and economic integration; the impact of external tensive political issues, namely the Russian and Israel-Palestinian conflicts, were all highlighted as the main issues affecting the EU’s foreign policy.

According to Prof. Giusti’s review of recent political dynamics, ongoing tensions between the EU and Russia first arose at the time of the “Big Enlargement” and the establishment of EaP,^[1] not long before the occupation of Crimea, yet more than a decade before the current war in Ukraine. Notwithstanding external issues stemming from enlargement waves of the last decade, internal considerations similarly countered expansive thrusts towards the East and the Mediterranean. Arguably, the sectorial structure of external relation partnerships, being divided between the Eastern partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, shows the need for a functionalist approach contrasting the crisis of multilateralism. Prof. Giusti also observed that even prior to the unfortunate outcome of international relations between the EU and Russia, the interventive approach which partly influenced the “Big Enlargement” policy had also been reassessed to mitigate coeval political and ideological radicalization, by stressing the existence of shared “communitarian” democratic values between the Union and non-member partner States.

The exceptional case of Ukraine's accession to the EU and new geopolitical strategies

While still dwelling on the historical development of European international relations, Prof. Mariani especially focused on the growing relevance of internal political contexts in countries which could eventually become part of the EU. The approach towards further enlargement, prior to the invasion of Ukraine, has been carefully reassessed to emphasize democracy and rule of law as requirements for adhering, thus overturning the prior criteria, being mainly centered upon economic, security and political stability concerns. Whatever the requirement, Prof. Mariani acknowledged that the enthusiasm and timing surrounding the ongoing application of Ukraine ought to be contextualized in its intrinsic exceptionality, given the critical political situation at hand. Therefore, Prof. Mariani emphasized, the strong political will to unite with Ukraine radically differs from the cautious, suspensive approach to further enlargement the EU had adopted insofar, also considering the difficulties for applying countries to fulfil the political and economic requirements to enter.

Prof. Petrov examined the ongoing conflict in his own homeland, Ukraine, and, accordingly, suggested that any possible political outcome would depend on the eventual scenarios resulting from the war. Indeed, according to Prof. Petrov, the accession of Ukraine to the EU and NATO is conditional on a sole possible outcome: a consistent military win against Russia. He also stated that relations between the EU and Ukraine have increasingly strengthened over time. The straightforward intention to enter the Union, expressed by President Zelensky not too long after the invasion, represents the standpoint from which continuing support from the West keeps flowing by.

In conclusion, the Professors convened that the future development of EU external relations, especially in terms of future enlargement, is not only likely to be dealt with in newly developing terms, but it will also lean towards a radical revitalization of the EU’s geopolitical strategies for the future.

^[1] The Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a joint initiative involving the EU, its Member States and six Eastern European Partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, and Ukraine with the purpose of strengthening and deepening intertwining political and economic relations.

Why do Constitution-Making Processes Fail?

Gianluca Pantaleo — 2023-03-20T15:05:21+00:00

Prof. Verdugo addressed the reasons behind the failures of constitution-making processes, based on the analysis of the recent unsuccessful attempt of enacting a constitution in Chile. The discussion, moderated by Prof. Elisa Bertolini (Bocconi University) was further expanded to the other participants of the event, such as Prof.s Marta Cartabia, Graziella Romeoand Justin Orlando Frosini (Bocconi University) as well as to the lively audience.

Prof. Verdugo firstly addressed the audience with a general but hard question: “How can the constitution-making process fail?”. In recent times, stories about successful constitutional-making processes, such as the South African case, have become widely known. These attempts were considered positive outcomes because they produced a constitution that was widely accepted, and eventually relatively stable democracies were created. Nevertheless, very few studies have been carried out concerning failed constitutional-making processes. Although even processes leading to undemocratic constitutions might be considered a failure, the novelty of this approach lies in the study of those constitutions that were not able to pass.

Overall, such a negative result is generally produced when an agreement is not achieved among those who compete for power. In order to avoid this outcome, political parties must become a relevant component of the constitution-making process through the conclusion of multi-party agreements. Political parties, indeed, lower transaction costs and improve substantive representation, giving a sense of institutional continuity to the constitution-making process. The same does not happen when the spotlight is taken over by activists from single-issue matters, since they usually only aggregate preferences. If this were the case, the constitutional-making process would not likely produce a good constitution, which is what happened in Chile.

The recent history of Chile can provide the background information for understanding more contemporary events. In this regard, the first thing to consider is that the current Constitution was enacted in 1980 during the Pinochet dictatorship. General Pinochet reached this position through a violent coup-d’état, governing with a Junta made of conservative generals. The Constitution, approved by the people in a referendum, embodied several conservative ideals, for instance the prohibition of abortion, and the idea of a “protected democracy”, namely an illiberal democracy supervised by the army. After the dictatorship came to a conclusion, the Constitution remained. Overall, the transition to democracy in Chile was arguably consensual since it came along with the participation of parties from the opposition. Instead of being replaced, this Constitution was heavily amended through a slow transition: more than 60 amendments were approved over the years. Many themes were changed, including the praxis of politics and courts. Specifically, a multi-party system was established, changing the previous system composed of two major coalitions. A relevant constitutional review and justiciable social rights were also introduced, something unheard of before in the Chilean political landscape.

However, such a copious amount of amendments was not enough in order to have a well-functioning democratic system. On the contrary, the concept of a “Cheating Constitution” became widespread, since the right wing had veto powers in key areas, such as constitutional amendments. This was indeed a system originally established in order to protect the political project of Pinochet.

After several attempts to replace the Constitution, a new constitutional-making process started between 2019 and 2022, in a time of severe social outbreaks aggravated by the pandemic. The claims of the protesters were wide and different, ranging from demands about a better healthcare system and security, to requests concerning environmental and family reforms. One important element to consider is that these groups were not backing the idea of changing the Constitution. However, as the situation grew increasingly chaotic, politicians agreed to open a new constitution-making process, in order to placate the protests. Rising expectations about a new Constitution were then ignited, but the task at hand was far from being a simple one. Indeed, not only the constitutional text had to be changed, but also the production of long-term social reforms was needed.

In November 2019, the parties agreed on a constitution-making process that would foster their interests in finding an intermediate solution, but they were disagreeing on vital issues. The agreement was initially claimed to lack legitimacy, and more demands were made for the inclusion of gender parity, special rules for independents and reserved seats for indigenous people. Shortly after, a plebiscite was held, containing two questions: the first concerning the agreement to draft a new constitution, and the second concerning what body should draft it (i.e., either an elected convention or a mixed convention composed also by sitting legislators). The majority of the people voted for an entirely elected convention to draft the new Constitution. After the election, a balanced composition was reached, and the right wing lost its veto power. In addition, many social movements representatives and independents advocating for single-issue matters became part of this body, including those whose political slogan was to kill the current President of Chile.

Over time, the expectations of the Chilean people changed due to the inefficient functioning of the committees within the Convention, the political scandals that occurred, and the unreasonable proposals that were made. The Convention began thus to lose credibility as a legislative body. Moreover, after the right-wing split, it was excluded altogether from the constitutional-making process. This made the Convention’s efforts even more controversial, given that the right-wing represented more than 40% of the population. At the end, the final constitutional proposal was still too far left leaning for the interests of the population. In this regard, many have also argued that the Convention created a new political regime, while failing to fix the main problem of Chile: the party system. As a matter of fact, in the body of the draft the words “political party” were avoided. In September 2022 Chile saw its highest turnout in the so-called exit plebiscite, where 61% of voters rejected the text. Arguably, this event can be considered the result of the disregarded expectations of the population towards that specific text.

From Prof. Verdugo’s perspective, the failed Chilean constitutional attempt represents an opportunity to reflect on the important role of political parties. The Convention was not approached as an opportunity to fix the party system, and thus it lost control of the constitution-making process. Moreover, the possibility of broad multiparty agreements was rejected by the Convention. Overall, the Chilean Convention was turned into a unilateral body that excluded important sectors of society - generally represented by political parties – and whose outcome corresponded to a proposal far away from the preferences of the median voter.

Several interventions took place after Prof. Verdugo’s speech. Prof. Cartabia highlighted the importance of time in enacting successful constitutional reforms. Indeed, enacting a constitution in a time of crisis, such as the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, might have achieved a more successful outcome. Prof. Frosini stressed on the importance of maintaining a high level of transparency during the constitution-making process especially considering that certain decisions must be taken regardless of the voters’ opinion. Prof. Romeo brought up the experience of the “Conference on the future of Europe”, which represented an essential constituent moment characterized by a bottom-up process. As a matter of fact, it included the creation of panels of citizens and had no clear constitutional mandate. On the other side, Prof. Verdugo argued that a group of people alone cannot undertake a constitutional-making process: political parties are fundamental in this sense, because they represent certain positions in society.

Quo Vadis EU (Law)? - 2022

Marco Alibrando — 2023-03-20T20:36:37+00:00

A regulatory sandbox is defined as a tool allowing businesses to explore and experiment with new and innovative products, services or businesses under a regulator's supervision. Its main goal is providing innovators with incentives to test their innovations in a controlled environment: while doing so, it also allows regulators to better understand the technology and fosters consumer choice in a long-term perspective. However, regulatory sandboxes can pose a significant problem as they come with a risk of being misused or abused: therefore, they need the appropriate legal framework to succeed. To further explore this topic from a European perspective, the Bocconi Faculty of Law invited Prof.s Laura Zoboli (Bocconi University) and Marie Skłodowska-Curie (University of Turin) who were also joined by Prof. Cristina Poncibò (University of Turin) and Dr. Gabriele Mazzini (European Commission).

The delicate balance between consumers' interests and competition

Prof. Poncibò discussed about regulatory sandboxes, focusing mainly on competition and consumers' interests. Firstly, regarding competition, whereas public authorities’ reports on sandboxes are positive because they allow to simultaneously put and balance different goals (such as fostering innovation, regulating market for new services, driving competition law, protecting consumer and, more recently, fostering sustainability), according to Prof. Poncibò it is not always possible to manage all these things together. For instance, there could be some cases where there may be the need to restrict competition in order to foster sustainability.^[1]

In any case, to understand the impact that sandboxes could have on promoting competition in the digital market, it would be useful to first look at the current status quo. Nowadays, a violation of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU^[2] triggers an ex-ante sanctioning system based on asymmetric regulation of a specific sector, in this case pro-competitive asymmetric regulation.

However, there are two issues to consider. The first one is whether sector-specific asymmetric regulation really promotes competition in the markets for new digital services. According to Prof. Poncibò, this solution does not work, because the law assumes that competition is more likely to come from services that are perfect substitutes for the incumbent. However, in digital markets competition takes place through tools and services that innovatively develop the incumbent's offer and take it towards a new direction. An example of this is rise of TikTok which, despite offering different services, was still able to undermine Meta’s dominant position. In addition, there are the risks and perils of overregulation which helps only lawyers and auditors, disadvantaging small and new market entrants. The second issue to consider is whether regulatory sandboxes offer alternatives and/or complementarity to sectorial regulation in promoting competition. They certainly do at first when a new service is being tested, but this is part of a broader theory, namely the theory of experimental regulation.^[3]

The cooperative approach of the Financial Conduct Authority in the UK

Prof. Poncibò additionally discussed some interesting scenarios deriving from the combination of regulatory sandboxes and consumer protection. In the UK, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) allowed firms to test innovative propositions in the market with real consumers. Contrary to EU law’s idea of a “weak consumer”, a confused and vulnerable individual who must be protected, in this case the consumer was an active part of the testing. Thus, a new way of seeing the consumer as an important part of the design of rules is arising. This cooperative approach paves the way for the emergence of a light touch regulation: indeed, during the testing period, the huge regulatory framework for consumer protection would not apply. Nevertheless, as everything happens under the constant check of public authority, which stresses the need to provide redress mechanisms in case something goes wrong, consumers can still obtain compensation. As a matter of fact, light touch regulation does not mean a "wild west" of experimentation to the detriment of citizens.

The Artifical Intelligence Act proposal

Dr. Mazzini provided an overview of Articles 53-54 of AI Act,^[4] which are the relevant norms concerning regulatory sandboxes. The AI Act’s main goal is to foster trust among the population, but excellence is also an important component of the whole strategy, and the sandboxes play a bridging role between these two sections. Dr. Mazzini initially focused on Recital 72 from which a double dimension transpires: on one hand the companies wishing to participate in the sandbox want some guarantees on how to apply the legal framework, while on the other hand the authorities need to tailor their resources. Furthermore, he highlighted an interesting element added in Recital 72, namely that the conduct of participants in the sandbox should be considered in determining whether to impose added compliance pursuant to Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR). Indeed, even though sandboxes should not represent a free pass for non-complying with the applicable norms, at the same time there should be a signal that if a company makes an extra effort to participate in a sandbox and to comply with the guidance, there will be some tolerance.

In relation to the key features of the AI Act, the premarketing phase turns out to be the core: specifically, high-risk systems must comply with specific requirements and a procedure to ensure compliance before they enter the market. This phase lasts for a limited time, and it also allows for testing under real world conditions. Article 53 provide the sandboxes’ governance framework, which should be established at a national level by national competent authorities.^[5] Moreover, the AI Act applies irrespectively of who the provider is, including law enforcement authorities, if they are developing in-house AI systems, and EU institutions. In addition, participating in a sandbox does not mean that companies do not comply with the relevant law: on the contrary, the goal of participating in the sandboxes is to properly foster compliance. Nevertheless, there is a margin of discretion and flexibility as the authority can decide how compliance should be met by the participants in the sandbox.

Article 54 establishes a special regime regarding the re-use of personal data. Generally, the use of personal data is subject to the GDPR, however the GDPR foresees that it is possible to have a national law regulating the further processing of personal data to pursue certain public interest objectives. This is exactly the origin of Article 54: it is not lex specialis but essentially provides a legal basis for the re-use of personal data and sets several safeguards and conditions.

Lastly, Dr. Mazzini examined the current status of the AI Act: the proposal was presented by the Commission in April 2021, and now, according to the Ordinary Legislative Procedure, it’s being discussed by the Council, under France presidency, and the Parliament: it is expected that negotiations within Parliament will not finish before March 2023.

[1] The most recent and clear example about this case is the sandbox realized by the Hellenic Competition Commission (HCC).

[2] Under Article 101 TFEU, agreements restricting on competitions are prohibited. Under Article 102 TFEU prohibits abusive conduct by companies that have a dominant position on a particular market.

[3] C. Sabel, J. Zeitlin, Experimentalist Governance, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010.

[4] The Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) is a Regulation proposed on April 21, 2021 by the European Commission which aims to introduce a common regulatory and legal framework for artificial intelligence.

[5] Specifically, the AI act foresees three categories of authorities: the Market Surveillance Authorities, the National Supervising Authority and the Notifying Authority.

Quo Vadis, EU (Law)? - 2022

Mariano Andrea Morabito — 2023-03-20T20:42:16+00:00

During the pandemic, the need of sensibilization about new technologies significantly increased since online platforms have become more famous, more important, and especially more powerful. The issue grows even more problematic considering that, nowadays, online platforms are employed by individuals to exercise some of their fundamental rights – such as freedom of expression. In tackling this topic, some important aspects to consider are which pieces of legislation have been enacted in the past by EU institutions, what can be classified as an online platform and whether it would be possible to balance all the interests at stake under a constitutional point of view. To give proper answers to these questions, the Bocconi Faculty of Law invited as a guests Prof. Alexandre De Streel (University of Namur), Prof. Alina Tropova (Nottingham University) and Prof. Oreste Pollicino (Bocconi University).

The Digital Markets Act

Prof. De Streel started his speech by pointing out that the main reason behind the current regulatory push is the concentration of economic, innovative, and informational powers among some happy few. Most of the added value is captured by few innovative firms that have become more powerful, less transparent, and increasingly difficult to regulate. This led to a loss of autonomy of citizens, business users and States. Consequently, a need to take control back emerged: in particular, this need has been firstly pursued by the EU with the Digital Markets Act (DMA), about contestability and fairness.

Prof. De Streel’s argument was that the Digital Markets Act can be transformative in Europe. To deepen this concept, he went further analyzing the objectives of the Act, which can be drawn as:

i) market contestability, pursued by lowering entry barriers and creating new opportunities;

ii) fairness, pursued by ensuring balance between right and obligation of business users and regulated gatekeepers;

iii) internal market, in order to achieve maximum harmonization.

However, the Digital Market Act has had some difficulties of enforcement. Size, global reach and diversity of digital gatekeepers, large informative asymmetry between platforms and enforcement authorities, complexity and innovation are some of the DMA’s most significant problematics that make its enforcement not obvious at all. How can these problems be solved? Prof. De Streel’s main take on this was that cooperation is the key. The enforcement must be participatory: platforms, national authorities, national courts, business users and end-users must cooperate with the Commission, which is the main authority in charge and has to orchestrate all the actors. Accordingly, the revolution must be grounded on traditions, and it will not bring outstanding results in the short term, because of the steep learning curve. On the other hand, in the long term, starting from a permissionless regime, it is possible to reach a deeply regulated environment.

The Digital Services Act

Prof. Tropova’s speech focused on the successive act adopted by the EU after the DMA: the Digital Services Act (DSA). It is an enormous document which updates the e-commerce directive and whose aims are to guarantee a safe, predictable, and trusted online environment and to facilitate innovation and fundamental rights protection. The act draws a pyramidal structure of the online platforms it is addressed to. The bigger category is represented by intermediary services, followed by hosting services (where the data are stored) and online platforms, which are a subcategory of hosting services that don’t only store data but also disseminate information to users (i.e. Twitter). Finally, the last category is represented by very large platforms. When an online platform falls under the scope of application of the DSA, it is subjected to the obligations imposed by it. The real novelty of the act is the obligation of due diligence imposed on online platforms and the intensity of the responsibility varies according to the category the platform falls within. In a nutshell, the bigger a platform is, the wider its responsibilities are, and therefore the more are the requirements it must comply with.

However, being the DSA a horizontal piece of legislation, which co-exists with legislations revolving around specific services, the coordination of this entire area of law can represent a problematic issue. In conclusion Prof. Tropova agreed with Prof. De Streel on the necessity of increased cooperation. Indeed, acts must be combined since fragmentation in this area is unavoidable given its complexity and innovative capacity.

Global challenges posed by online platforms

Prof. Pollicino then took the floor to analyze the matter focusing on its global dimension. He initially wondered whether online platforms are taken away from the constitution and his opinion was that it depends on whether individuals have the possibility to enforce their fundamental rights against online platforms or not.

The approach is horizontal since some platforms have adopted a business model that pursues the creation of a community of ideas. This directly impacts the constitutional framework, raising some issues related to fundamental rights – especially to free speech. The problem has a global dimension given that platforms operate all around the world; nonetheless, different cultures have different values, and therefore they adopt different approaches in trying to solve the problem. For example, free speech is a core value of the US legal system, and it can never be limited. On the other hand, in Europe, freedom of expression, despite being a fundamental right, can be limited pursuing a balance among different interests. The main question then becomes how to find the best balance in this context.

In this regard, Prof. Pollicino explained that, even though the problem represents a novelty, there is no need for new categories when dealing with digital rights. On the contrary, a back-looking approach is necessary, leading to the application of shared principles to arising problems. For instance, technology will never be able to change the value-based structure of Europe. Indeed, during the pandemic in Europe, no GPS was used to control people, as it happened in Asian countries, because that would have been a disproportionate intrusion into the citizens’ fundamental rights.

Quo Vadis EU (Law)? - 2022

Valeria Romana Sgobbi — 2023-03-20T20:46:48+00:00

Facing harsh times caused by, among others, the Russian war which brought about the energy crisis, the European Union, determined to continue with the transition towards a greener Union, has enacted some acts which lay in the broader framework of the EU Green Deal. The roundtable between Prof. Leigh Hancher (University of Tilburg), Dr. Ioanna Hadjiyianni (University of Cyprus) and Dr. Max Munchmeyer (European University Institute) focused on the trade-off between these environmental ambitions and the current energy crisis.

European enviromental ambitions...

Prof. Hancher remarked that, according to the European Green Deal, the desired targets require the reduction of carbon emissions at least by 55% before 2030. As a matter of fact, the aim is to become net zero over the whole territory of the European Union. The goal set out by the European Commission is certainly ambitious, especially considering that the intention is to reach the aim while leaving nobody behind. The European Green Deal has triggered two consequences which are respectively the adoption of the European climate legislation and the revision of the existing legislation adopted in the last decade. Both these courses of action will have a noticeable impact as they will impose a general revision and reordering of the legislation regarding the green transition and the energy crisis, especially in the present times where order in these fields seems more necessary than ever.

Despite the crisis, the underlying idea is to directly connect the sources of production to the sources of consumption, pursuing models of Regulations previously enacted in this field and applying them to the market-based energy trading created in the last thirty years. Therefore, the RePowerEu Plan proposed by the European Commission in March 2022 identified a roadmap to reduce the dependence on Russian fossil fuels and to fasten the energy transition. This roadmap was originally focused on three main pillars which are energy saving and energy efficiency, a massive acceleration of investment in renewables and diversification of energy supplies. A de facto fourth pillar was later included providing for gas and electricity price caps and market design reforms aimed at fighting the high prices. The latter have become crucial in light of the energy crisis.

...and currently enacted policies

At the moment, even the European Commission President Ursula Von der Leyen seems to have abandoned her previous faith in the market, due to the high political pressure from the Member States asking for a unified intervention on gas prices. There is much debate inside the Commission on whether to eventually move to a gas cap, thus adopting a positive action instead of leaving the energy market to adjust itself. Indeed, the adoption of an imminent regulation dealing with the gas market appears to be more and more likely.

Prof. Hancher made a thoughtful consideration on how important it is to take a step back and analyse the present crisis with a critical eye. As a matter of fact, despite enormous investments of funds into the green transition, there are still many measures aimed at protecting fossil fuels. This is perceived as a sort of paradox and the question that spontaneously arises is what the longer-term impact of the Commission’s response would be.

Furthermore, over the last months there has been a great pressure on the storage of energy. Indeed, in the framework of the Green Deal up until 2019, encouraging storage of energy would have given a negative signal in terms of pursuing a green transition. In the UK storage facilities were shut down and in France state aid was provided to maintain the storage structures (it is doubtable whether such aids were compatible with the EU law treaties). Nevertheless, during the current energy crisis, it was noticed that these storage facilities were almost empty and controlled by gas firms, thus the fear of being out of gas seemed to be real.

Therefore, the Commission enacted in 2022 a Storage Regulation, amending the previous one. The main trajectories of this Regulation were to ensure the compliance of the Member States in filling the targets and a common burden sharing between the Member States. The Regulation provides for several exemptions but strictly requires that the storage facilities placed in the EU Member States must be filled by 85%. Not every country possesses such storage structures, thus in these cases it is required a burden sharing among Member States. The underlying idea is that Member States should reduce in the next future the demand of gas by 15% (and in doing so they would have discretion) but if the Commission launched an alert, Member States would be compelled to reduce according to the requested percentage.

Energy solidarity and the need for increased cooperation

The context described by Prof. Hancher requires coordination and solidarity between Member States. Regarding this theme, Prof. Muchmeyer explained the role of solidarity in the European energy governance. In particular, the notion of solidarity is an intuitively positive but extremely broad concept. Nevertheless, the borders of the notion of solidarity in the energy governance are easily trackable. Indeed, art. 194 TFUE explicitly requires that the Union policy on energy shall be operated in the spirit of solidarity but the Member States have the right to determine the conditions for exploiting their own energy resources and have the choice between different energy sources and the general structure of their energy supply. Solidarity seems then to guide the European energy policy making but it does not really have a legal basis.

The idea that the principle of solidarity lacks an explicit legal basis has been countered by many judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which changed the point of view. Indeed, the Court of Justice in the Case C-848/19 P Germany v Poland underlined that energy solidarity is a justiciable principle under EU law, entailing reciprocal obligations between Member States and between the latter and the European Union. It must be noted that energy solidarity is not a principle that must be confined to emergency situations, and neither should be deemed as a synonym for energy supply. Member States have the duty to cooperate, but they retain a margin of discretion in the choices concerning the energy field as it is evident from art. 194 TFUE.

A piece of evidence showing the attempt to work in synergy according to the solidarity principle can be found in the fact that by June 2023 each Member State must submit a draft of its national energy and climate plans. These drafts must reflect the way Member States want to achieve the targets set for 2030. This requirement triggers a process of cooperation where the Commission evaluates the drafts and produces feedbacks, addressing the Member States with a language of solidarity.

I Diritti Collettivi per i Lavoratori Autonomi

Mariano Andrea Morabito — 2023-03-20T20:49:41+00:00

Nelle prime fasi del percorso di integrazione europea la dimensione sociale fu trascurata in quanto si partì dal presupposto secondo cui la creazione di un mercato unico avrebbe automaticamente giovato anche ai lavoratori. Tuttavia, questa premessa non tenne conto delle esigenze di tutela dei lavoratori, che si ritrovarono in un mercato del lavoro in cui l’offerta era significativamente inferiore rispetto alla domanda. Il naturale risultato di questa disproporzione fu che nella maggioranza dei casi il datore di lavoro (i.e. la domanda) poteva scegliere tra più lavoratori (i.e. l’offerta); ne conseguiva che il datore di lavoro godesse di un maggiore potere contrattuale che comportava degli importanti squilibri. Ciò indusse a ritenere necessaria l’adozione di misure che andassero in favore della dimensione sociale del lavoratore: per sopperire allo squilibrio nacquero quindi l’aggregazione dei lavoratori e, conseguentemente, i contratti collettivi. Tuttavia, è proprio come conseguenza di questo scenario che sono emersi profili di contrasto tra l’esercizio di diritti sociali e il diritto della concorrenza: pertanto diviene fondamentale adottare una prospettiva interdisciplinare.

A tal riguardo, la Prof.ssa Maggiolino ha a sua volta evidenziato come anche l’approccio economico sia mutato nel tempo: si è smesso infatti di guardare al mercato del lavoro come se fosse concorrenziale, cominciando a considerarlo monopsonistico. Gli economisti, rendendosi conto dei problemi che sorgevano con riguardo alla disciplina dei contratti collettivi, hanno cominciato ad abbracciare la narrativa dei giuslavoristi e hanno trascinato nel dibattito anche quelli specializzati nella materia dell’antitrust che fino a quel momento non ritenevano necessario intervenire.

Contratti collettivi e art. 101 TFEU nella giurisprudenza della Corte di Giustizia

Un contratto collettivo è un accordo che restringe la concorrenza tra i lavoratori cui sono applicate condizioni di lavoro omogenee. Attraverso questo strumento, i datori di lavoro determinano insieme il costo del lavoro e non possono competere tra loro giocandovi al ribasso. La problematicità della questione emerse, a livello europeo, per la prima volta nel caso Albany,^[1] in cui la Corte di Giustizia escluse che i contratti collettivi potessero rientrare nell’ambito di applicazione dell’art 101 TFEU^[2] al fine di non eliminare uno strumento fondamentale per la tutela dei lavoratori. Successivamente, nel caso FNV Kunsten^[3] la Corte fu chiamata a chiarire se un contratto collettivo sottoscritto sia da lavoratori subordinati che da rappresentanti di lavoratori autonomi rientrasse nell’ambito di applicazione dell’art 101 TFEU. Nella decisione fu specificato che i lavoratori autonomi rientrano nella nozione di impresa ai fini dell’applicazione dell’articolo in questione e che quindi gli accordi collettivi che li includono violerebbero l’art. 101. Tuttavia, secondo la Corte, questo ragionamento non si applica per quei lavoratori che si trovano in una situazione simile a quella dei lavoratori subordinati e che costituiscono la categoria dei falsi lavoratori autonomi. Con questo termine la Corte di Giustizia mirò a identificare tutti quei lavoratori che, nonostante fossero formalmente qualificati come lavoratori autonomi, non godevano di autonomia nell’organizzazione del lavoro, non determinavano le modalità di esercizio della professione (le quali dipendono dal committente) e non sopportavano dei rischi per la loro attività economica. Nondimeno, la soluzione adottata dalla Corte espone il fianco ad alcune critiche: innanzitutto non viene chiarita la definizione di falsi lavoratori autonomi; non si comprende se la Corte abbia creato una terza categoria, discostandosi dalla tradizionale bipartizione tra lavoratore subordinato e lavoratore autonomo e ci si interroga infine se sia corretta la conclusione per cui i lavoratori autonomi siano da considerarsi imprese.

Proseguendo il discorso, la Prof.ssa Maggiolino ha fatto notare come la Corte di Giustizia sia precisa, in Albany, nel sottolineare che questo tipo di accordi non rientra nell’ambito di applicazione dell’art 101 TFEU e che quindi non viola la disciplina sulla concorrenza. Al contrario, qualora la Corte avesse seguito la linea argomentativa per cui gli accordi, pur violando la disciplina sulla concorrenza, apporterebbero un miglioramento alle condizioni di vita dei lavoratori e dunque diventerebbero leciti ex art. 101(3) TFEU, avrebbe dato all’articolo una forza politica non indifferente. Tuttavia, l’intenzione della Corte era quella di dare rilievo economico alla disposizione in questione: venne ricercata l’efficienza e non la tutela dei lavoratori. A differenza della sentenza Albany, in FNV Kunsten si verificò un confronto con il diritto antitrust e con il suo ambito di applicazione. Il diritto antitrust considera infatti i lavoratori autonomi come imprese: secondo la disciplina è “impresa” chiunque sia in grado di ledere il gioco concorrenziale.

La Corte di Giustizia, al fine di tutelare i lavoratori, ha dunque creato la terza categoria dei falsi lavoratori autonomi che non sono considerabili come imprese e sono esclusi dall’ambito di applicazione della normativa antitrust. Tuttavia, questa argomentazione appiattisce il concetto di impresa alle nozioni di lavoratore autonomo e dipendente, nonostante questo prescinda dai metodi utilizzati dai giuslavoristi. Lavoratori subordinati e datori di lavoro sono visti dal diritto antitrust come un’unica unità economica perché hanno unità di interessi (corrispondente alla volontà di offrire servizi a terzi). Nondimeno, la teoria non tiene conto delle relazioni interne tra i due soggetti in questione: semplificando, non vi è unità di interessi quando datore di lavoro e lavoratore subordinato, ad esempio, negoziano lo stipendio.

Le Linee Guida della Commissione Europea

A fronte di questi problemi è intervenuta la Commissione Europea, che ha chiarito la sua posizione interpretativa con delle Linee Guida in cui riconosce che alcuni contratti collettivi sottoscritti da alcuni lavoratori autonomi sono validi in quanto volti a garantire delle condizioni di lavoro corrette e trasparenti. Sul piano giuslavoristico, viene dato rilievo al fatto che solo i contratti collettivi sottoscritti da lavoratori autonomi che contano prevalentemente sul loro lavoro e sono in una condizione simile a quella dei lavoratori subordinati sono considerati fuori dall’ambito di applicazione dell’art 101 TFEU. Rientra in questa definizione il lavoratore che: i) è economicamente dipendente, in quanto più del 50% della sua attività dipende da un unico committente; ii) che lavora side-by-side; iii) che lavora a favore di piattaforme digitali che fanno intermediazione tra servizi e consumatori (i.e. gig workers). Tuttavia, nemmeno le Linee Guida sono esenti da critiche: esse escludono gli accordi con cui i lavoratori si astengono dal rendere la prestazione per un certo tempo e per un determinato datore di lavoro (rectius: diritto allo sciopero).^[4]

In conclusione, secondo la Prof.ssa Maggiolino, le Linee Guida hanno il pregio di portare ordine e coerenza nella disciplina in quanto individuano chiaramente gli accordi che non rientrano nell’ambito di applicazione della normativa antitrust. La Commissione Europea ha riconosciuto che nel mercato del lavoro non c’è unità di interessi e che di norma nella nozione di impresa non rientra lo squilibrio tipico del mercato del lavoro. È da condividere la creazione di un limite esterno, che non stravolge la nozione di impresa come avrebbe fatto un limite interno, e che è utile ai lavoratori in quanto consente che siano riconosciuti loro diritti sociali.

[1] Nel caso Albany la Corte di Giustizia è stata chiamata a esprimersi circa la validità di un contratto di lavoro alla luce dell’articolo 101 del Testo sul Funzionamento dell’Unione Europea (TFUE), volto a garantire la concorrenza.

[2] L’articolo 101 TFUE mira a tutelare la concorrenza. Al paragrafo uno dichiara nulli gli accordi volti al limitare la concorrenza, fatta eccezione per alcuni tipi enunciati al paragrafo tre.

[3] Il caso FNV Kunsten ha riproposto la problematica evidenziata in Albany con la differenza che in questo caso il contratto collettivo di lavoro in questione era stato firmato anche da lavoratori autonomi.

[4] La ragione è da ricondursi al fatto che in merito a questa tematica molto complessa, secondo le guidelines è necessario svolgere un’analisi caso per caso. Tuttavia, gli ordinamenti nazionali sono molto cauti nell’indagare le ragioni dello sciopero: questo gioca un ruolo molto importante nella contrattazione collettiva, essendo uno degli strumenti di protesta e contrattazione più efficaci per i lavoratori.

Cripto-attività: La Nuova Disciplina Europea

Luca Crepaldi — 2023-03-20T20:51:32+00:00

Il convegno si è concentrato sui novelli regolamenti in merito di digital finance – e in particolare su quello relativo ai mercati delle cripto-attività (MiCA), quello concernente un regime pilota per le infrastrutture di mercato basate sulla tecnologia di registro distribuito (DLT) e un altro relativo alla resilienza operativa digitale per il settore finanziario (DORA), di prossima emanazione. Questi testi normativi riassumono l’iniziativa della Commissione Europea resa nota sul finire del 2020 circa la necessità di regolare il mercato e la negoziazione di cripto-attività. Lo scopo principale è quindi quello di tutelare il consumatore attraverso un’uniformità all’interno del mercato comunitario; quest’ultimo aspetto risulta, ad oggi, un caso unico a livello globale, difatti nemmeno gli Stati Uniti sono riusciti ad avere una legge federale che rendesse uniforme il mercato americano delle cripto-attività.

Il Regolamento MiCA e la circolazione comunitaria delle cripto-attività

I lavori della Commissione, coerentemente con le intenzioni iniziali, muovono anzitutto dall’importanza di inquadrare la struttura tecnologica sottostante i prodotti finanziari digitali, tenuto conto dell’enorme valore economico e innovativo che le è ormai proprio. In questo senso, la crescente popolarità delle DLTs e della a tecnologia blockchain ha spinto il legislatore ad adottare riforme di diritto societario non tradizionali, tali da permettere alle società operanti nell’UE di emettere e negoziare strumenti finanziari digitali. Anzitutto, la tecnologia blockchain – da Bitcoin in poi – consente una forma di dematerializzazione che prescinde dalla presenza di un depositario centrale (es. la Monte Titoli), che è anzi sostituita da forme di registrazione orizzontali delle transazioni ad opera degli stessi utenti attraverso un registro condiviso. Quest’ultimo, chiamato anche DLT - distributed ledger technology – risulta essere innovativo per la sua entità totalmente digitale e delocalizzata, capace di connettere utenti in ogni parte del mondo, per qualsiasi specie di transazione ivi compiuta. Le cripto-attività, inoltre, spaziano anche a settori che non sono legati a prodotti finanziari, come gli NFT che tutelano l’autenticità di determinati prodotti elettronici, ad esempio opere d’arte.

MiCA tenta di colpire l’autonoma circolazione delle cripto-attività ma non va a toccare le cripto-attività in quanto tali. La regolamentazione delle forme di quest’ultime viene lasciata alle leggi nazionali, che diventano quindi il presupposto necessario per la corretta applicazione del regolamento MiCA ed altri. Germania, Francia e Lussemburgo sono stati i primi a muoversi a riguardo; all’appello però manca lo Stato italiano, che non ha ancora attuato riforme per disciplinare all’interno dell’ordinamento fattispecie relative alle cripto-attività, rischiando così di far mancare la base di partenza per l’utilizzo del regolamento MiCA. Interessante vedere come in questo contesto, date anche le recenti vicissitudini in materia di cripto-attività, la Commissione abbia “chiuso” i paesi dell’Unione adottando un piano regolatorio – il MiCA, appunto – che inquadra l’UE come primo player globale a disciplinare l’ambito blockchain, senza la cooperazione degli USA o di Singapore, né di altri paesi europei extra UE (Inghilterra e Svizzera, tra gli altri). Un modello che quindi risulta essere tutto comunitario.

L’ambito di applicazione di questo Regolamento riflette la tripartizione di cripto-attività sviluppata dal mercato che include:

i) payment tokens, tra cui monete elettroniche incorporate in cryptoasset (cd. “e-money tokens”);

ii) asset reference tokens”^[1], tra cui le cd. “stablecoins”;

iii) utility tokens, strumenti teoricamente slegati da interessi di investimento e volti, più che altro, allo scambio verso servizi nell’economia reale, ad esempio l’emissione di biglietti per un concerto.

Financial tokens regolati dal MiCA

il Regolamento lascia fuori le azioni dematerializzate con tecnologia DLT (in altre parole, azioni “tokenizzate”), quantomeno nei paesi dell’Unione in cui la disciplina legislativa nazionale ne prevede l’ammissibilità – governandone in toto l’applicazione. Ad oggi, quindi, i financial tokens di questo tipo rientrano nel perimetro della sola direttiva MIFID, integrata dalla disciplina nazionale. A cadere fuori dall’ambito di applicazione del MiCA – oltre i financial tokens - sono anche l’eurodigitale, su cui l’Europa non ha ancora chiarito molto a riguardo. MiCA, in sostanza, serve a regolare token di pagamento o di utility che pongono e hanno già posto rischi significativi all’interno del mercato, in modo tale che chiunque offra o emetta tali prodotti debba sottostare alle regole del MiCA. Si badi che la contemporanea presenza deila MiFID (che disciplina appunto i mercati finanziari) e del MiCA ha dato adito a notevoli critiche per l’atteggiamento iper-regolatorio dell’Unione, ma che comunque, secondo quanto sostenuto dal Professor Annunziata, sembra necessario visto che ad esempio certi crolli aziendali come quello di FTx (azienda per lo scambio di cripto-valute) non si sarebbero realizzati sotto il regolamento MiCA. In applicazione del Regolamento MiCA, dovrebbe essere l’EPA ad avere funzioni regolatorie e di vigilanza diretta sulle monete elettroniche – sostanziandosi, addirittura, in un organo quasi centralizzato, a tutela dell’effettività delle politiche economiche dell’Unione.

Il DLT Pilot Regime

Il DLT Pilot Regime, che sarà in vigore dal marzo 2023, regola invece le piattaforme di trading di token e le possibilità di settlement diretto – cioè, disintermediato – di transazioni tra cryptouser. Peraltro, l’art. 3 della Central Securities Depository Regulation (CSDR) impone la presenza di un depositario centrale per la circolazione di prodotti finanziari in trading venue europee. La presenza di un depositario centrale però è proprio ciò che la cripto-attività mira ad eliminare ed è per questo che il DLT Pilot Regime, pur con limiti quantitativi rilevanti, permette ad emittenti che adottino tecnologie DLT l’esenzione dall’ambito di applicazione dell’art. 3 CSDR per un periodo massimo di 6 anni.

In conclusione, l’Unione Europea si pone l’obiettivo di essere il pioniere nel regolare un mercato ormai più che emergente, cercando di renderlo il più uniforme possibile, con lo scopo ultimo di proteggere i suoi consumatori.

[1] Il tentativo di regolare i prodotti finanziari sub b) riprende le iniziative dal progetto LIBRA introdotto da Facebook (Meta), e poi abbandonato per le controversie (allora) relative alla disintermediazione finanziaria.

Il Fondo di Garanzia per le PMI al Tempo del COVID-19

Student Writings — 2023-03-31T10:02:36+00:00

1. Introduzione

Durante la pandemia di COVID-19 uno dei temi più delicati affrontati dal legislatore, italiano come europeo, è la – ove generica, ove specifica – attenuazione degli effetti economici negativi dovuti all’emergenza sanitaria, così come lo stimolo ad una futura, auspicabile, crescita. Tra le conseguenze macroeconomiche negative vi è la diminuzione di liquidità delle imprese, effetto di vari fattori, tra cui le restrizioni di movimento delle persone fisiche – risultando in una contrazione della domanda effettiva – e le chiusure ex lege di certe filiere produttive ed esercizi commerciali.

Nella prassi, quando le imprese si ritrovano ad avere bassi livelli di liquidità a causa della perdita di reddito – e particolarmente vulnerabili al riguardo sono le piccole e medie imprese (PMI) – di frequente attingono all’istituto giuridico del contratto di finanziamento. Questo, che può essere di varia natura, consiste essenzialmente nell’ottenere mezzi finanziari da parte di un altro soggetto. Sovente utilizzato è il contratto – reale – di mutuo, regolato espressamente dal codice civile all’art. 1813, col quale “una parte [mutuante] consegna all'altra [mutuatario] una determinata quantità di danaro […] e l'altra si obbliga a restituire altrettante cose della stessa specie e qualità”. Il mutuo, nella sua disciplina generale, si presuppone oneroso (c.d. mutuo feneratizio).^[1] Ictu oculi i mutui risultano essere, dal punto di vista economico-aziendale, dei finanziamenti a titolo di capitale di terzi, in particolare di istituti di credito. Questi ultimi, in veste di mutuanti, si espongono al rischio di credito, ossia alla eventualità (rectius, probabilità) che il mutuatario – impresa – non adempia all’obbligazione contrattuale. L’inadempimento può avvenire in toto o parzialmente, o anche semplicemente non rispettando i tempi e modi di restituzione previsti negozialmente. Gli istituti di credito svolgono quindi, nella prassi, valutazioni del c.d. merito creditizio, ossia effettuano un giudizio di solvibilità della controparte volto ad asserirne il livello di affidabilità (c.d. classe di merito).

Data la particolare natura del mutuatario – impresa – la capacità di restituire il capitale e gli interessi è strettamente legata all’andamento economico della società,^[2] sul quale influiscono variabili dipendenti dalla gestione dell’attività economica ma anche variabili esterne e indipendenti, come possono essere cicli economici negativi, i quali colpiscono indifferentemente molteplici settori e imprese (basti pensare, a titolo di esempio, alla crisi economico-finanziaria c.d. dei mutui subprime). Nell’ottica della banca finanziatrice, le prime sono affrontabili attraverso specifiche clausole contrattuali, quali i cc.dd. financial covenants. Questi, sviluppatisi nella prassi contrattuale nordamericana al pari di molti altri istituti oggi ampiamente utilizzati in Italia,^[3] in nuce permettono al finanziatore di ingerirsi nella gestione dell’impresa, con attribuzione di certi diritti e poteri che, se violati, possono arrivare a consentire alla banca di attivare una clausola risolutiva espressa con decadenza del beneficio del termine e susseguente immediata esigibilità delle somme ancora dovute dal debitore.^[4]

I covenants vengono ricondotti alla categoria delle garanzie cc.dd. atipiche, ferma restando la possibilità per l’istituto di credito di ottenere garanzie reali (rectius, diritti reali di garanzia), come ipoteche su cespiti immobiliari dell’impresa, o personali, come la fideiussione da parte di soci solvibili in ambito di impresa in forma societaria.^[5]

Di fronte alla pandemia di COVID-19 soluzioni quali i covenants comunque assicurano una più attenta e conservativa gestione dell’impresa, ma non sono certo le garanzie più adatte all’uopo essendo l’emergenza epidemiologica una variabile esterna.^[6]

Ipoteche e fideiussioni restano senza dubbio possibili, ma richiedono in primis la presenza di immobili o soggetti idonei, e in secondo luogo attente valutazioni da parte dell’istituto di credito, comprensive di diverse perizie, e dunque tempi non brevi. Al contrario, le ripercussioni sulle imprese dell’emergenza sanitaria rendono necessarie immediate iniezioni di liquidità.

Nella strutturazione di una risposta normativa all’emergenza sostanziale, un mezzo idoneo è stato individuato dal legislatore in una particolare tipologia di rapporto trilatero tra Stato, banche e imprese. In questo senso il Governo ha ritenuto di intervenire per incentivare le banche a fornire finanziamenti, offrendo, a certe condizioni, garanzie pubbliche fino al 100%. Di fatto, così facendo, lo Stato solleva dal rischio di credito le banche, che vedono in esso un garante solido e fortemente solvibile, salvo default del Paese. Nell’ottica emergenziale si è ritenuto di favorire automatismi e soluzioni cc.dd. a pioggia, che consentono di intervenire rapidamente. Tuttavia, interventi del genere portano con sé le loro problematiche genetiche: impediscono di concentrare gli sforzi nei settori più in crisi e rendono verosimilmente possibili casi di moral hazard.^[7]

2. Disciplina temporanea del Fondo

In ragione del veloce dilagare della pandemia di COVID-19, da un punto di vista legislativo lo strumento che ha trovato predominante utilizzo è il decreto legge. Questo, infatti, è di per sé progettato per situazioni di straordinaria necessità ed urgenza, per quanto resti opinabile che il loro utilizzo negli ultimi decenni sia stato limitato a tali contesti.^[8]

In primo luogo, col D.L. 18/2020 (c.d. Decreto Cura Italia) il Governo ha potenziato il Fondo centrale di garanzia per le PMI e per i Professionisti. Questo è uno strumento istituito con Legge 662/1996 art. 2, comma 100, ed è operativo dal 2000.^[9] Il Fondo si occupa, utilizzando risorse statali ed europee, di fornire agevolazioni del Ministero dello sviluppo economico nella forma di garanzie attivabili a fronte di finanziamenti stipulati con banche, società di leasing e altri intermediari finanziari.^[10]

L’art. 49 del suddetto decreto ha introdotto, per un periodo limitato a nove mesi, diverse novità. In particolare: la gratuità della concessione della garanzia, l’elevazione dell’importo massimo garantito per singola impresa a 5 milioni di euro (contro i precedenti 2,5), l’ammissibilità alla garanzia delle operazioni di rinegoziazione dei finanziamenti erogati dalla stessa banca e l’estensione della durata della garanzia per i finanziamenti, già garantiti, che vedono una sospensione del pagamento delle rate di ammortamento o della quota capitale, purché in connessione agli effetti della pandemia.^[11]

In secondo luogo, l’art. 13 del D.L. 23/2020 (c.d. Decreto Liquidità), comma dodicesimo, ha abrogato espressamente il sopra enucleato art. 49 del D.L. 18/2020, riprendendone però le misure con ulteriori estensioni e rafforzamenti, semplificando l’accesso al fondo. È opportuno sottolineare che anche questo secondo intervento normativo è connotato da temporaneità, restando una deroga alla disciplina ordinaria del Fondo di cui alla L. 662/1996 fino al 31 dicembre 2020.^[12]

L’art. 13 del Decreto Liquidità innalza le soglie percentuali di garanzia pubblica massima, arrivando al 100% per i finanziamenti inferiori a 25.000 euro, e amplia la platea dei soggetti idonei: non esclusivamente le PMI, bensì, ex art. 13 comma primo lettera b), tutte le imprese con meno di 500 dipendenti.^[13]

Inoltre, in sede di conversione del Decreto Liquidità (in Legge 40/2020) sono state apportate alcune modifiche: in presenza di tre soglie di prestiti – ossia 25.000, 800.000 e 5 milioni di euro – il legislatore ha innalzato la prima soglia a 30.000 euro e, per quella, ha esteso la durata massima, che passa da 6 anni a 10 anni, sempre comprensivi di un preammortamento biennale.^[14] Ancora: l’Allegato alla legge contiene un ampliamento della platea beneficiaria, comprendendo le associazioni professionali e le società tra professionisti, nonché gli agenti di assicurazione, subagenti di assicurazione e broker iscritti alla rispettiva sezione del Registro unico degli intermediari assicurativi e riassicurativi.^[15]

Infine, il D.L. 104/2020 (c.d. Decreto Agosto) amplia nuovamente l’elenco di categorie idonee, comprendendo novità all’interno di due tipologie, ma limitatamente alla prima soglia di garanzia, ossia 30.000 euro. Vengono infatti inclusi gli enti non commerciali, compresi gli enti del terzo settore e gli enti religiosi civilmente riconosciuti, e, con riguardo alle attività finanziarie ed assicurative, si apre a tutte le imprese individuali, i professionisti e gli studi professionali che svolgono attività ausiliarie dei servizi finanziari e delle attività assicurative, in aggiunta a ciò di cui all’Allegato della L. 40/2020.^[16]

È da rimarcare la temporaneità di queste novelle. Tuttavia, si profila una proroga nel disegno di legge di Bilancio 2021, che prolungherebbe la disciplina straordinaria fino al 30 giugno 2021.^[17]

3. Requisiti oggettivi e soggettivi per la malleveria

Il finanziamento garantito dal Fondo di Garanzia per le PMI vede quindi come principali beneficiari imprenditori di piccole e medie dimensioni, persone fisiche esercenti arti o professioni, società tra professionisti – fenomeno di società senza impresa – e agenti di assicurazione. Questi soggetti dovranno dichiarare, tramite autocertificazione del titolare o del legale rappresentante, l’avvenuto danneggiamento della loro attività come conseguenza diretta del propagarsi dell’epidemia in corso, tendenzialmente risultante in carenze di liquidità.

Il legislatore individua tuttavia dei limiti riguardanti fattori che incidono sul merito creditizio. Infatti, secondo il comma quarto dell’art. 56 del Decreto Cura Italia, convertito in L. 27/2020, conditio sine qua non del finanziamento è che i soggetti richiedenti non abbiano esposizioni debitorie classificate come esposizioni creditizie deteriorate. Queste si distinguono in tre sottoclassi. In primo luogo le sofferenze, ossia “il complesso delle esposizioni creditizie per cassa e fuori bilancio nei confronti di un soggetto in stato di insolvenza (anche non accertato giudizialmente) o in situazioni sostanzialmente equiparabili”.^[18] La seconda categoria è quella delle inadempienze probabili, ossia linee di credito per le quali l’intermediario finanziario con propria valutazione, indipendentemente dalla presenza di eventuali importi (o rate) scaduti e non pagati, reputa come improbabile che le obbligazioni da esse scaturenti siano integralmente adempiute dal debitore senza l’escussione di eventuali garanzie.^[19] Infine le esposizioni scadute e/o sconfinanti deteriorate, ossia “esposizioni creditizie per cassa, diverse da quelle classificate tra le sofferenze o le inadempienze probabili, che, alla data di riferimento della segnalazione, sono scadute o sconfinanti”.^[20]

Il momento di analisi della presenza di questi ultimi requisiti è naturalmente la data di richiesta del finanziamento. Sono tuttavia ammessi beneficiari che presentino esposizioni classificate, secondo la sopracitata disciplina della Banca d’Italia dettata tramite circolare 272/2008 parte B paragrafo 2, come unlikely to pay o come esposizioni scadute e/o sconfinanti deteriorate purché a suddetta data non siano più classificabili come deteriorate ai sensi del regolamento EU 575/2013 (“CRR”) all’art. 47-bis paragrafo quarto, ossia se sono compresenti i tre seguenti requisiti.^[21] In primis, l’esposizione deve soddisfare i criteri applicati dall’ente affinché l’esposizione possa cessare di essere classificata come esposizione che ha subito una riduzione di valore ai sensi della disciplina contabile applicabile e come esposizione in stato di default ai sensi dell’art. 178. In secondo luogo, la situazione del debitore deve essere migliorata in tale misura da rendere l’ente certo che vi sarà il rimborso integrale alla scadenza. Infine, il debitore non deve avere importi arretrati da più di 90 giorni.^[22]

Come accennato supra, il prestito che la garanzia coprirà vede una prima soglia massima generale pari a 30.000 euro. L’importo effettivo sarà calcolato in misura del 25% dei ricavi dell’attività nell’anno 2019.^[23] È liberamente percorribile un’alternativa a questo metodo di calcolo, basata sul doppio della spesa salariale sostenuta nell’anno 2019 comprensiva di oneri dovuti agli enti previdenziali ed assicurativi e del costo del personale che lavora nel sito dell’impresa ma che figura formalmente nel libro paga dei subcontraenti.^[24]

Il finanziamento è previsto per una durata massima di 10 anni.^[25] Inoltre, è stato chiarito dalla Associazione Bancaria Italiana (ABI) che i suddetti finanziamenti per essere coperti da garanzia devono necessariamente prevedere un periodo di preammortamento biennale dalla erogazione degli stessi, ovverosia un periodo nel quale i clienti non saranno tenuti alla restituzione del capitale, bensì solo degli interessi, come infatti previsto ex art. 13 comma primo lettera m) del Decreto Liquidità.^[26] La ratio sottostante, con nuances di favor del legislatore nei confronti delle imprese, è consentire un minore onere iniziale in capo ad esse, così da permettergli di avere una maggiore liquidità nell’immediato e, dunque, meglio perseguire i fini della novella.

Il tasso di interesse che si applicherà al mutuo deve tenere conto “della sola copertura dei soli costi di istruttoria e di gestione dell'operazione finanziaria” e non dovrà essere superiore al “tasso di Rendistato con durata residua da 4 anni e 7 mesi a 6 anni e 6 mesi, maggiorato della differenza tra il CDS banche a 5 anni e il CDS ITA a 5 anni, come definiti dall'accordo quadro per l'anticipo finanziario a garanzia pensionistica di cui all'articolo 1, commi da 166 a 178 della legge 11 dicembre 2016, n. 232, maggiorato dello 0,20 per cento”.^[27]

Inoltre, sono presenti nel Decreto Liquidità due ulteriori soglie di prestito: fino a 800.000 euro e fino a 5 milioni di euro. Nel primo caso si riserva l’accesso alle imprese che sono posizionate al di sotto della soglia dei 3,2 milioni di euro di fatturato e che abbiano meno di 500 dipendenti. Queste potranno avere accesso al finanziamento con lo Stato garante al 90% ed un terzo soggetto, quali i consorzi fidi privati (Confidi), al 10%.^[28]Infine, il prestito fino a 5 milioni di euro è garantito anch’esso al 90% dallo Stato, ed è indirizzato a imprese con meno di 500 dipendenti. L’ammontare finanziato deve essere al massimo pari al 25% dei ricavi del 2019. In alternativa è possibile accedervi per un ammontare non superiore al doppio della spesa per i salari sostenuta nel 2019, comprensiva degli oneri sociali e del costo del personale che lavora nel sito dell'impresa ma che figura formalmente nel libro paga dei subcontraenti.^[29]

Dalla garanzia risultano inevitabilmente escluse le imprese che hanno per intero utilizzato la capacità di accesso al Fondo, pari a 5 milioni di euro.^[30]

4. Litigiosità della normativa

Nel corso dei mesi si sono dipanate diverse vicende processuali tra imprese e banche relativamente al rigetto da parte di queste ultime di talune domande di finanziamento connesse alla garanzia fin qui enucleata.

Alcuni soggetti privati, infatti, hanno ritenuto che l’art. 13 del Decreto Liquidità – e in precedenza l’art. 56 del Decreto Cura Italia – ponesse in capo a loro il potere (stricto sensu) di ottenere il finanziamento della banca dietro mera presentazione di una autocertificazione sui ricavi, senza – secondo loro – potere la banca opporre una valutazione negativa del merito creditizio.

Le sopracitate novelle prevedono in effetti un procedimento alquanto semplice e immediato in tema di ottenimento della garanzia. È infatti richiesto che l’impresa, per ottenere che il finanziamento sia coperto da garanzia, autocertifichi l’avvenuto danneggiamento della propria attività economica in conseguenza dell’epidemia di COVID-19. Al di sotto della prima soglia di credito la banca potrà a quel punto, dopo la sola verifica formale dei requisiti di ammissibilità, procedere anche senza aspettare l’esito dell’istruttoria del gestore del Fondo, essendo il rilascio della garanzia automatico e gratuito.^[31]

Tuttavia, la lettera della legge non è chiara riguardo alla presenza di una restrizione alla facoltà della banca di eseguire comunque una valutazione di merito creditizio, e dunque potenzialmente rigettare la domanda di finanziamento.

Alcuni aspiranti mutuatari che si sono visti opporre il rifiuto dell’istituto di credito hanno susseguentemente adito l’autorità giudiziaria ex. art. 700 c.p.c. domandando quindi un provvedimento giudiziale cautelare d’urgenza che obbligasse il rigettante a fornire i mezzi finanziari richiesti.^[32]

La questione ha visto, in alcuni casi concreti, un virgulto di giurisprudenza nelle aule dei tribunali di primo grado.

Una pronuncia giudiziale, nella forma di ordinanza, del Tribunale di Caltanissetta dell’8 luglio 2020 ha ritenuto negata dalla lettera della legge la facoltà in capo alle banche di vagliare il merito creditizio dei richiedenti finanziamento dietro garanzia ex Decreto Liquidità. Il giudice ha ritenuto presente oltre al fumus boni iuris anche il periculum in mora e ha dunque ordinato l’erogazione del finanziamento.^[33]

Va ricordato che la dimostrazione dell’imminente danno, in tema di obbligazioni pecuniarie, non può essere raggiunta dalla mera diminuzione patrimoniale richiesta come presupposto per la garanzia pubblica, bensì è necessario dimostrare che dal prolungarsi della situazione fattuale il ricorrente subirebbe un pregiudizio grave e irreparabile che vede come antecedente logico necessario l’adempimento oggetto di cautelare.^[34] In particolare, l’irreparabilità va intesa come considerevole scarto tra il beneficio fruibile mediante l’immediato soddisfacimento ed i risultati raggiungibili con i rimedi ordinari.^[35]

Il Tribunale di Bologna, con ordinanza del 2 ottobre 2020, di fronte a un attore – società di capitali – richiedente una rinegoziazione coperta da garanzia come prevista dall’art. 13, si è espresso affermando che “la norma va interpretata nel senso che alla banca non è stato sottratto il diritto di accettare o meno la rinegoziazione in relazione alla valutazione del merito creditizio, tanto più considerando che tale valutazione è doppiamente necessaria al fine di garantire non solo gli interessi della banca ma il buon uso del denaro pubblico, di cui la predetta disposizione consente l’utilizzo e la destinazione, secondo apprezzamento squisitamente fondato sull’affidabilità e solidità dell’operatore economico”. Il Tribunale ritiene dunque che le banche preservino – anche di fronte all’introduzione dell’art. 13 – il diritto insindacabile di valutazione del merito creditizio, aggiungendo come, ove siano presenti limitazioni della libertà negoziale delle parti, queste devono essere espressamente previste, applicandosi altrimenti la disciplina generale e dovendosi escludere interpretazione estensiva – e a fortiori analogica – della disposizione normativa. Al contrario, pur prevedendo il nostro ordinamento delle limitazioni alla libertà negoziale, queste devono considerarsi norme eccezionali da interpretare restrittivamente.^[36]

Infine, a questa ordinanza va affiancata – contrapponendosi più da vicino all’ordinanza del Tribunale di Caltanissetta – una ordinanza del Tribunale di Napoli. Quest’ultimo ha rigettato una richiesta di provvedimento cautelare, che nell’accoglimento delle pretese attoree avrebbe coartato l’istituto di credito a concedere il finanziamento agevolato di 25.000 euro.^[37] Il convenuto replicava alla domanda del ricorrente sostenendone la mancanza di fondamento e affermando il proprio diritto a sindacare il merito creditizio del richiedente, in ossequio al principio di sano e prudente svolgimento dell’esercizio dell’attività creditizia, a prescindere dalla possibilità di accesso alla malleveria del Fondo di Garanzia. L’organo giudicante sottolinea anch’esso il principio di libertà negoziale delle parti, che va inserito nel contesto di specie, dove l’istituto di credito deve comunque attenersi a criteri di diligenza professionale, restando, in difetto, potenzialmente esposto al rischio di perdere la garanzia di Stato e di essere chiamato a rispondere, virtualmente, per quanto attiene ai reati fallimentari e per responsabilità extracontrattuale.^[38] Il Tribunale nel caso di specie, escludendo il fumus boni iuris, rigettava con provvedimento la domanda attorea, senza mancare di far intravedere il rischio di spreco del denaro pubblico ove non si affianchi una valutazione creditizia agli interventi cc.dd. a pioggia.^[39]

5. Conclusioni

Il legislatore, nel decidere come rispondere alle difficoltà poste da un evento eccezionale quale è la presente pandemia, ha implementato, tra le molte, scelte indirizzate al sostegno delle variegate attività economiche. L’ampliamento e potenziamento del Fondo è, in particolare per la realtà delle PMI, un importante strumento che permette la iniezione di risorse vitali. Al 2 dicembre 2020 sono pervenute, per le sole garanzie fino a 30.000, più di un milione di domande.^[40] Se ciò di cui al disegno di legge di bilancio 2021 sarà promulgato, l’estensione temporale si amplierà notevolmente e dunque si permetterà a diverse altre realtà imprenditoriali colpite dall’emergenza una continuità, che altrimenti avrebbe sofferto di una soluzione.

Questo intervento non ha mancato di sollevare le criticità che qualsivoglia normativa comporta, specialmente se non cristallina: dubbi interpretativi che vedono soluzioni giurisprudenziali contrastanti e che, data la temporaneità dei provvedimenti, difficilmente vedranno il formarsi in tempo utile di una solida dottrina e giurisprudenza. Avendo prospettato alcune opposte soluzioni messe in campo da giudici di primo grado, si ritiene che la posizione più condivisibile, segnatamente in un’ottica di risparmio del denaro pubblico, di libertà negoziale delle parti e comunque considerando l’esigenza di erogazione rapida e pervasiva di liquidità, sia quella che ritiene presente in capo alle banche la facoltà, e non l’obbligo, di procedere ai finanziamenti. In ogni caso, di fronte al prolungamento della emergenza, risolutore sarebbe un intervento del legislatore.

* Studente al V anno del Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Giurisprudenza presso l’Università Bocconi.

[1] Codice civile, articolo 1815, Interessi.

[2] Ove trattasi di impresa in forma societaria.

[3] A titolo di esempio: leasing e factoring.

[4] M. Cisolla, ‘COVID-19, deterioramento del merito creditizio e finanziamenti garantiti da covenants’, Diritto Bancario, 30 aprile 2020, disponibile su https://www.dirittobancario.it/approfondimenti/credito/covid-19-deterioramento-del-merito-creditizio-e-finanziamenti-garantiti-da-covenants

[5] ibid.

[6] Nella prassi, sovente si utilizzano i cc.dd. waivers, modifiche bilaterali del contratto di finanziamento che rimodulano in particolare i covenants.

[7] A. Toniolo, ‘Covid-19: garanzia pubblica sui prestiti bancari alle pmi e conversione in finanziamenti a fondo perduto. Un confronto tra Italia e US.’, Diritto Bancario, 14 maggio 2020, disponibile su http://www.dirittobancario.it/content/covid-19-garanzia-pubblica-sui-prestiti-bancari-alle-pmi-e-conversione-finanziamenti-fondo-perduto-un-confronto

[8] Costituzione, articolo 77.

[9] Ministero dello sviluppo economico, ‘Fondo di Garanzia per le PMI’, disponibile su https://www.mise.gov.it/index.php/it/incentivi/impresa/fondo-di-garanzia-per-le-pmi

[10] Ministero dello sviluppo economico, Fondo di Garanzia, disponibile su https://www.fondidigaranzia.it/conosci-il-fondo/

[11] D.L. 17 marzo 2020, n. 18, in materia di “Misure di potenziamento del Servizio sanitario nazionale e di sostegno economico per famiglie, lavoratori e imprese connesse all'emergenza epidemiologica da COVID-19”.

[12] D. L. 8 aprile 2020, n. 23, in materia di “Misure urgenti in materia di accesso al credito e di adempimenti fiscali per le imprese, di poteri speciali nei settori strategici, nonché interventi in materia di salute e lavoro, di proroga di termini amministrativi e processuali”.

[13] ibid.

[14] L. 5 giugno 2020, n. 40, in materia di “Conversione in legge, con modificazioni, del decreto-legge 8 aprile 2020, n. 23, recante misure urgenti in materia di accesso al credito e di adempimenti fiscali per le imprese, di poteri speciali nei settori strategici, nonché interventi in materia di salute e lavoro, di proroga di termini amministrativi e processuali”.

[15] ibid.

[16] D. L. 14 agosto 2020, n. 104, in materia di “Misure urgenti per il sostegno e il rilancio dell'economia”.

[17] A. Bonifazi, ‘La legge di Bilancio 2021 proroga le garanzie del Fondo PMI’, Ipsoa quotidiano, 20 novembre 2020, disponibile su

https://www.ipsoa.it/documents/finanziamenti/imprenditoria/quotidiano/2020/11/20/legge-bilancio-2021-proroga-garanzie-fondo-pmi

[18] Banca d’Italia, circolare 30 luglio 2008, n.272, “Matrice dei conti”.

[19] ibid.

[20] ibid.

[21] Banca d’Italia, circolare 272/3008. Si veda anche Regolamento (UE) n. 575/2013, come modificato dal Regolamento (UE) n. 2019/630.

[22] Regolamento (UE) n. 575/2013, come modificato dal Regolamento (UE) n. 2019/630.

[23] Art. 13 comma primo lettera m) del D. L. 23/2020.

[24] ibid.

[25] L. 40/2020, Allegato.

[26] ABI, comunicato stampa 16 aprile 2020, si veda anche D.L. 23/2020.

[27] Art. 13 comma primo lettera m) del D. L. 23/2020.

[28] M. Bonucci, ‘Come il coronavirus cambia il Fondo di garanzia per le PMI’, FASI, 17 novembre 2020, disponibile su https://www.fasi.biz/it/notizie/approfondimenti/21849-come-il-coronavirus-cambia-il-fondo-di-garanzia-per-le-pmi.html.

[29] ibid. Si veda anche art. 13 comma primo lettera c) numero 1 D. L. 23/2020.

[30] Ministero dello sviluppo economico, Fondo di garanzia, disponibile su https://www.fondidigaranzia.it/dl-liquidita-le-misure-per-il-fondo-di-garanzia/.

[31] F. Sorge, ‘Finanziamenti garantiti al 100%: ampliata la platea di beneficiari’, Finanziamenti News, 19 novembre 2020, disponibile su https://www.finanziamentinews.it/article/14157/finanziamenti-fino-25mila-euro-chiarimenti.

[32] Codice di procedura civile, articolo 700, Condizioni per la concessione.

[33] Redazione Giornale Nisseno, ‘Pronuncia del Tribunale di Caltanissetta in merito ai finanziamenti alle imprese causa Covid’, Giornale Nisseno, 22 ottobre 2020, disponibile su https://www.giornalenisseno.com/pronuncia-del-tribunale-di-caltanissetta-in-merito-ai-finanziamenti-alle-imprese-causa-covid/.

[34] Tribunale di Bologna, sez. III civile, 2 ottobre 2020, n. r.g. 9552/2020.

[35] P. Balducci, ‘Il ricorso ex art. 700 c.p.c.: la tutelabilità dei diritti patrimoniali’, IusLetter, 21 settembre 2015, disponibile su https://iusletter.com/archivio/il-ricorso-ex-art-700-c-p-c-la-tutelabilita-dei-diritti-patrimoniali/

[36] Tribunale di Bologna, sez. III civile, 2 ottobre 2020, n. r.g. 9552/2020.

[37] S. Santi, ‘Decreto Liquidità: l’imprenditore può chiedere un provvedimento cautelare ex art. 700 c.p.c. per ottenere l’erogazione del finanziamento negato dalla banca nonostante la garanzia statale?’, Diritto.it, 26 agosto 2020, disponibile su https://www.diritto.it/decreto-liquidita-limprenditore-puo-chiedere-un-provvedimento-cautelare-ex-art-700-c-p-c-per-ottenere-lerogazione-del-finanziamento-negato-dalla-banca-nonostante-la-garanzia-stata/.

[38] ibid.

[39] ibid.

[40] Ministero dello sviluppo economico, Fondo di garanzia, disponibile su https://www.fondidigaranzia.it/

The Governance of Data by Big Tech Companies Between Public Regulation and Private Powers

Giovanni Marenco — 2023-04-10T15:28:49+00:00

The event, funded by the governmental program PRIN 2017,^[1] represented the final part of a research project conducted by Prof. Graziella Romeo (Bocconi University) on the opportunity to merge competition law and constitutional law based on the mutual and ambivalent relationship these two branches of law entertain with State power. Prof. Romeo’s intuition can be understood by bearing in mind that both competition and constitutional law are, on one hand, interested in controlling and delimiting State power and, on the other, deemed to accept it as a fundamental as well as necessary element. To further expand on these premises, the Bocconi Faculty of Law invited as guest speakers Prof.s Inge Graef(University of Tilburg) and Anna Tzanaki (Lund University).

The power of Big Tech companies and the need for further public regulation

Prof. Graef pointed out how digital platforms are increasingly acting as private regulators – a trend that carries many risks for market control. Indeed, by gaining increasing shares of market – and, thus, power – Big Tech companies are in the position to arbitrarily set terms and conditions without fearing any retaliation on consumers’ and competitors’ side. As a result, competition is adversely affected. Not to mention the impact their services have on fundamental rights such as, in particular, privacy. In this regard, Prof. Graef cited some recent case law where it is evident that Big Tech companies have a great impact on determining what is the minimum standard of privacy that has to be respected in order to be part of the market: hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp (2019) and Epic Games v. Apple (2020) are clear examples of this.^[2]

Therefore, in a world where corporations are replacing the legislator’s work in setting minimum fundamental rights standards, concerns arise on whether they are doing this not in name of the common interest – which is the ultimate goal pursued by democracies - but rather in their own self-interest. Should this be true, who can guarantee that Big Tech companies, under different circumstances, would abide by their previous standards and not change them according to what is temporarily more convenient?

As a consequence, public regulation is clearly necessary because establishing a minimum common standard would prevent companies from choosing it themselves, this resulting in a claim of protection of fundamental rights that in reality masks an exclusionary behavior. The legitimacy of any standard going beyond the minimum should be appreciated in relation to its necessity and proportionality, always bearing in mind a case-by-case approach.

The problematic lack of democracy in digital markets

Prof. Tzanaki’s speech, instead, was more focused on the connection between markets and democracy and on their so-claimed symbiotic but unbalanced relationship, as democracy needs markets, but markets don’t need democracy to properly function. In this context, Prof. Tzanaki analyzed the challenges represented by the pervasiveness of digital platforms. In particular, the interplay between markets and democracy is made even more difficult and tricky by the rise of these new platforms, as they have a dual nature: they are both an economic marketplace and a political forum. In this respect, they have a hybrid structure, in the middle of market freedom and de facto hierarchies at whose top are placed owners of abundant data, who, by virtue of their position, can easily set regulatory norms.

Digital platforms are redefining the role markets and law will play in the future. While the first ones have the mission to safeguard civil and economic liberties and private rights against State power as well as promote economic growth and innovation, the second will keep on supporting property rights and, at the same time, enforcing ex-ante regulation, required to keep this new phenomenon under control. However, one thing is for sure: given their relevance, not only under an economic but also socio-political perspective, digital platforms cannot be ignored by the legislator. It is crucial to re-establish the broken link between digital markets and democracy, for example via a multilevel/multistakeholder governance able to make Big Tech companies fully accountable of their actions.

[1] The program PRIN (Progetti di Ricerca di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale) is sponsored by the Ministry of Education and provides funds for university level research projects.

[2] In hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., the Ninth circuit held that selectively banning potential competitors from accessing and using data that is publicly available could be considered unfair competition. As a result, LinkedIn was prevented from denying hiQ access to LinkedIn's publicly available LinkedIn member profiles. In Epic Games v. Apple one of Apple’s main arguments against Epic Games’ allegations of unfair conduct was that its policies protected security and quality of the App Store and the privacy of its users.

Leggere la Cultura Pop Attraverso le Tradizioni Giuridiche del Diritto Pubblico

Mariano Andrea Morabito — 2023-04-10T16:04:38+00:00

Le radici della Law and Literature sono da ricondurre alla seconda metà del secolo scorso. Infatti, nonostante altri autori si fossero interessati in precedenza alle relazioni tra diritto e letteratura, Il filone venne inaugurato da un articolo pubblicato nel 1983 da Robert Cover, Professore all’Università di Yale, intitolato Nomos and Narrative.^[1] Nel testo, il termine nomos veviva utilizzato al fine di indicare il fenomeno giuridico per come è rappresentato all’interno della narrative, nozione che individuava invece il racconto dei fenomeni giuridici in questione. La dottrina si sviluppò in seguito passando tramite i contributi di vari studiosi, tra cui Richard Posner, autore di Law and Literature, e François Ost che scrisse Raconter la loi, un’opera volta a evidenziare come questo segmento di disciplina fosse fortemente trasversale, includendo lo studio del diritto d’autore, le manifestazioni di pensiero che eccedono il buon costume, il diritto costituzionale e il diritto amministrativo. Nell’opera di Ost venne inoltre approfondito sia il linguaggio del diritto e gli effetti performativi dei testi giuridici (i.e. droit comme littérature), che la capacità della letteratura di studiare i problemi della giustizia e il processo in generale (i.e. droit dans la littérature). Al tal riguardo il Prof. Ferrari ha sottolineato come sia importante prestare attenzione anche ai tantissimi letterati che durante la loro formazione hanno svolto studi giuridici, in quanto è possibile ritrovare tracce ed influenze di quelle conoscenze nei loro testi.^[2]

All’interno della disciplina della Law and Literature si sviluppano filoni interni, tra cui quello della cancel culture che si occupa, in alcuni casi, di ricostruire il significato delle opere del passato in un’ottica più vasta che considera anche altri lavori letterari o il contesto politico del tempo. Ad esempio, Walt Disney fu accusato di essere antiamericano e sovversivo perché in molti dei suoi film lo spettatore è indotto a simpatizzare con personaggi ritenuti, da alcuni, sovversivi.^[3] Durante lo sviluppo della materia, la Professoressa Nan Goodman ha individuato tre metodi di approccio alla Law and Literature: l’approccio semi-ottico, che studia il significato dell’uso dei termini giuridici nella letteratura; il metodo trasmissivo, che pone sotto la lente di ingrandimento le modalità di trasmissione del messaggio allo spettatore e infine il metodo istituzionale, che guarda tanto all’emissione dell’opera quanto alla ricezione del suo messaggio da parte dello spettatore.

Le molteplici forme di letturatura nella cultura popolare

Una volta comprese le origini del movimento e i suoi obiettivi, diventa quindi necessario adottare un’ottica contemporanea per arrivare a una definizione attuale di letteratura che, al giorno d’oggi, non può essere ridotta alle forme della poesia e del romanzo come veniva fatto in passato, perché nel tempo sono emerse e si sono affermate altre espressioni creative come il cinema, il fumetto, la televisione e la musica. Al giorno d’oggi per letteratura si intende pertanto la sommatoria di parole ed immagini volta a una rappresentazione creativa. In particolare, il Prof. Ferrari ha suggerito una tassonomia della cultura popolare articolata in diverse sezioni: la prima è quella delle rappresentazioni letterarie applicate all’età contemporanea o al passato recente ma in proiezione verso il presente. Questo gruppo comprende sia la letteratura poliziesca di Arthur Conan Doyle che il genere spy story, denso di richiami istituzionali. Ne fanno parte anche i thriller legali, le serie poliziesche e i political drama come The Crown, serie a metà tra il genere pedagogico e quello narrativo. Un’altra sezione racchiude invece la narrativa collocata in una data età storica (i.e. romanzo storico). Centrali in questa categoria sono le opere di Alessandro Manzoni, Alexandre Dumas e Umberto Eco, ma vi rientra anche la fumettistica di Tex Willer. Un’ulteriore sottocategoria ingloba il genere fantasy, caratterizzato da uno spazio temporale immaginario. Vi rientrano sia le opere fantasy in senso stretto, come Il Trono di Spade o Il Signore degli Anelli, ma anche i cartoni animati. L’ultima sezione racchiude opere ambientate in dimensioni spazio-temporali vicine al genere fantasy. In questo gruppo si possono annoverare sia le opere sui supereroi, tipiche della cultura statunitense, che quelle di Jules Verne e Mary Schelling.

Il mondo giuridico nella letteratura

Seguendo questa classificazione, il Prof. Ferrari si è quindi interrogato sul framework di regole giuridiche che caratterizzano ciascun modulo di rappresentazione letteraria e sulle ragioni per cui determinate opere hanno più successo in determinati periodi storici piuttosto che in altri.

Nelle detective stories, ad esempio, si ha una finalità positiva e generale rispetto al funzionamento del sistema giuridico, anche se talvolta i protagonisti si muovono in modo sospetto adottando condotte ai confini della legge. In questo scenario, spesso il protagonista colpevole è tutelato in quanto ha agito per intenti moralmente apprezzabili, quasi che si ricercasse l’equità e non la giustizia da un punto di vista giuridico.^[4] Nel genere fantasy, del quale Trono di Spade costituisce un esempio emblematico, i personaggi spesso appaiono irrispettosi di principi umani. Il successo di questa categoria di opere può essere spiegato interpretando il fantasy come mezzo di mera e pura evasione, utile per estraniarsi dal presente. Il romanzo storico ha invece una doppia valenza in quanto in alcuni casi ha assunto una funzione legittimante del passato,^[5] mentre in altri è stato utilizzato in un’ottica surrettiziamente contestativa.

Discorso a parte va fatto per la categoria dei supereroi, soggetti che vivono in uno spazio urbano contemporaneo conducendo una vita normale dalla quale escono per risolvere dei momenti di crisi con i loro poteri. Si può dunque ritrovare una valenza educativa sia esplicita che subliminale; tuttavia, è lecito chiedersi quale sia il bisogno dell’intervento di un salvatore in un contesto contemporaneo dove la democrazia dovrebbe essere autoprotettiva e capace di risolvere le questioni emergenziali da sé. Sotto questo punto di vista, guardare al periodo in cui i supereroi sono stati ideati può essere risolutivo perché spesso coincidente con periodi di particolare acuzie del super-ego americano: Batman ha visto la sua prima pubblicazione nel 1939, anno in cui la Seconda guerra mondiale era imminente; Spiderman invece è stato introdotto nel 1962, anno dell’apogeo della guerra fredda. Secondo il Professore, gli elementi caratterizzanti del genere (i.e. nazionalismo e teologia) rappresentano uno dei principali motivi del suo successo.

In conclusione, la disciplina della Law and Literature può essere una risorsa per gli studi giuridici perché permette di individuare le contaminazioni del diritto nelle opere più amate dal pubblico e contemporaneamente di comprenderne gli effetti e le influenze.

[1] L’articolo è disponibile su: https://openyls.law.yale.edu/bitstream/handle/20.500.13051/2047/Nomos_and_Narrative.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

[2]Il caso più interessante è quello di Dante: molti studiosi, alla luce delle opere di Boccaccio e della permanenza del Poeta a Bologna, ritengono che egli avesse studiato giurisprudenza.

[3] Si pensi alla Sirenetta, in cui il fallimento di un accordo di pace causa un atteggiamento sovversivo nel mondo marino.

[4] Si pensi a Tex Willer che, una volta diventato capo dei Navajo, utilizza, seppur a fin di bene, metodi oltre i confini della legge senza rispettare il due process.

[5] Un esempio è The Crown, serie inglese a sfondo politico in cui la monarchia viene valorizzata agli occhi dello spettatore.

Autoriciclaggio: Snodi Teorici e Controversie Applicative

Silvia Dalla Quercia — 2023-04-10T18:28:29+00:00

L’attenzione dei relatori si è focalizzata sull’esame critico della norma che punisce l’autoriciclaggio (art. 648-ter.1 c.p.):^[1] la disposizione infatti non si distingue per eccelsa chiarezza e lascia quindi aperte questioni interpretative rilevanti per la pratica penale.

La destinazione dei proventi criminosi

Il Prof. Basile ha inizialmente approfondito il tema della destinazione dei proventi criminosi. L’articolo 648-ter.1 del Codice penale punisce “chiunque avendo commesso o concorso a commettere un delitto non colposo, impiega, sostituisce, trasferisce, in attività economiche, finanziarie, imprenditoriali o speculative, il denaro, i beni o le altre utilità provenienti dalla commissione di tale delitto, in modo da ostacolare concretamente l’identificazione della loro provenienza delittuosa”. Affinchè si configuri la condotta di autoriciclaggio, i proventi ricavati dalla commissione del delitto devono quindi essere impiegati in attività economiche, finanziarie, imprenditoriali e speculative. Questa locuzione presenta ampi dubbi applicativi in quanto non permette di individuare un fine specifico. Usando i termini “attività economiche” e “attività speculative”, il legislatore non li ha infatti utilizzati come filtro selettivo tra le possibili destinazioni possibili. Ci si domanda quindi se tra questi, ad esempio, possano rientrare le destinazioni ludiche: laddove infatti il denaro venga impiegato in attività quali il gioco d’azzardo, sarebbe lecito classificare questa condotta come attività ai sensi della norma o si tratterrebbe di una destinazione estranea?

Il Prof. Basile ha in seguito affrontato un ulteriore tema controverso: se, qualora il provento ottenuto dall’atto illecito fosse impiegato nell’acquisto di cripto-valute, la condotta debba comunque configurarsi come autoriciclaggio. In una recentissima sentenza^[2] la Corte di Cassazione qualifica le cripto-valute quali prodotti finanziari: da ciò consegue l’ammissibilità del loro utilizzo con finalità di investimento e pertanto il loro impiego permetterebbe la configurazione della fattispecie. La Corte, infatti, ha chiarito come coloro che, nel caso di specie, avevano acquistato i coin (i) avessero erogato capitali (sotto la forma di Bitcoin), (ii) con l’aspettativa di ottenere un rendimento (costituito dalla corresponsione di altre valute virtuali), e (iii) avessero assunto su di sé un rischio connesso al capitale investito.

Secondo la Suprema Corte, l’utilizzo dei coin presenta dunque una natura speculativa. Un’ulteriore interrogativo da porsi potrebbe essere poi se il Bitcoin, cripto-valuta usata nel caso di specie, sia in grado di ostacolare concretamente l’identificazione della provenienza delittuosa del provento illecito. A prima vista parrebbe paradossale che una tecnologia conosciuta per la sua indiscutibile trasparenza nel rintracciare i trasferimenti possa essere funzionale ad integrare la condotta; diventa quindi necessario chiarire che ci possono essere fasi in cui questo mezzo presenta dei caratteri di opacità. In effetti, nelle operazioni condotte nella fase iniziale o terminale non è sempre possibile conoscere chi ha immesso o chi ha ricevuto la valuta virtuale; l’investimento è dunque opaco. Una situazione analoga si crea quando il provento ottenuto dal fatto illecito viene trasferito ad un exchanger di cripto-valute all’estero: poiché in questo scenario non è possibile identificare l’effettivo titolare dei Bitcoin, la Corte di Cassazione ha configurato questa condotta come autoriciclaggio in quanto viene ostacolata l’identificazione del beneficiario finale.^[3]

Nel complesso, l’orientamento interpretativo adottato dalla Suprema Corte tende all’incriminazione dell’impiego del provento quando il fine è stato quello di conseguire un utile e perciò condanna in generale le attività speculative. Il Prof. Basile ha avvertito però che questo indirizzo interpretativo porta a togliere rilevanza al filtro selettivo comprendente anche l’impiego in attività economiche, finanziarie, imprenditoriali (oltre a quelle speculative). Sarebbe pertanto auspicabile un ripensamento dell’interpretazione dell’art. 648 ter.1 c.p., al fine di evitarne la riduzione.

La prescrizione del reato presupposto

Il Prof. Civello ha affrontato invece la questione della prescrizione del reato presupposto e degli effetti conseguenti sulla persecuzione del reato di autoriciclaggio. La Corte di Cassazione si è pronunciata sul tema^[4] stabilendo che sussiste il reato di autoriciclaggio anche quando il reato presupposto è prescritto. La dottrina, però, ritiene che questa posizione sia rischiosa: infatti se venisse permesso di perseguire il reato di autoriciclaggio anche laddove il reato presupposto fosse già prescritto si permetterebbe alle corti di perseguire fatti illeciti prescritti, con una conseguente violazione della certezza del diritto. Al tal proposito, il Professore ha sollevato l’attenzione sull’ultimo comma dell’articolo 648 c.p. nel punto in cui prevede che “le disposizioni di questo articolo si applicano anche quando l’autore del reato da cui il denaro o le cose provengono non è imputabile o non è punibile ovvero quando manchi una condizione di procedibilità riferita a tale reato”. Si tratta di un esempio pratico in cui, nonostante il reato presupposto non sia punibile per l’assenza di una condizione di procedibilità, il reato subordinato di ricettazione può comunque configurarsi.^[5] Inoltre, ai sensi dell’articolo 170 c.p., la res proveniente dal reato presupposto non perde la sua illeceità quando il reato presupposto si prescrive, né cessano quindi gli effetti penali. Va infine considerato che sebbene l’ordinamento sia di norma indifferente al fatto illecito prescritto, in casi specifici ricollega a questo degli effetti: per esempio, per configurare la recidiva, il legislatore processuale ha tenuto conto dei reati prescritti.

Nonostante la normativa citata risulti dunque coerente con la pronuncia della Suprema Corte, il Prof. Civello si è chiesto quali potrebbero essere le ragioni per cui un giudice che abbia perso i poteri decisori per il reato presupposto possa recuperare il potere nel caso in cui il PM esercitasse l’azione penale per il reato di autoriciclaggio. Nella pratica questo, infatti, comporterebbe la liceità di una condanna di autoriciclaggio per un reato finanziario commesso dieci anni prima e dunque prescritto. Laddove questo fosse possibile, secondo il Professore, il sistema finirebbe per mancare di coerenza, con importanti conseguenze sulla certezza del diritto e la tutela degli interessi del patrimonio privato e pubblico.

La qualificazione giuridica del terzo

Infine, il Prof. Dell’Osso ha approfondito il tema della qualificazione giuridica del terzo che interagisce con l’autore del reato di autoriciclaggio. In particolare, si è interrogato su quale sia la responsabilità del soggetto extraneus che abbia fornito un contributo concorsuale casualmente rilevante alla condotta di autoriciclaggio posta in essere dal soggetto intraneus. Il Codice penale individua e incrimina due condotte; quella di riciclaggio e quella di autoriciclaggio, l’ultima introdotta solo nel 2014. Come si deve qualificare quindi il contributo del terzo quando il reato contestato sia l’autoriciclaggio?

La dottrina è intervenuta per offrire una soluzione alla questione e due sono i principali orientamenti: il primo ha riconosciuto che il concorso di persone debba risolversi nel senso che l’extraneus che concorre con l’autoriciclatore debba rispondere non di concorso di autoriciclaggio bensì di riciclaggio. Secondo questo orientamento l’elemento specializzante della nuova norma non atterrebbe, infatti, alla condotta quanto invece alla qualificazione soggettiva dell’autore. In altri termini, sarebbe possibile la configurazione della condotta come un reato di mano propria con la conseguenza che la personale esecuzione dell’intraneus diverrebbe condizione essenziale perché possa consumarsi l’offesa del bene giuridico. Il secondo orientamento dottrinale, invece, risolve la questione con il concorso apparente di norme. Infatti, la condotta del terzo ricade sotto due norme incriminatrici integrando plurisoggettivamente il reato di autoriciclaggio e monosoggettivamente quello di riciclaggio; di fronte a tale conflitto sarà però solo quest'ultima norma a prevalere, in applicazione del principio di sussidiarietà.

La questione è stata definitivamente risolta dalla Corte di Cassazione la quale si è pronunciata nel senso che il soggetto che ponga in essere la condotta tipica di autoriciclaggio, pur non avendo concorso nel delitto-presupposto non colposo, contribuisca comunque alla realizzazione da parte dell'intraneus delle condotte tipizzate dall'art. 648-ter.1 c.p., e pertanto debba continuare a rispondere del reato di riciclaggio ex art. 648-bis c.p. e non di concorso nel (meno grave) delitto di autoriciclaggio ex art. 648-ter.1.c.p. Nel predetto caso, soltanto l'intraneus risponderà del delitto di autoriciclaggio.

In conclusione, il Prof. Dell’Osso ha rimarcato come la questione discussa sia nata dalla tecnica legislativa scelta per introdurre il reato di autoriciclaggio; in particolare dalla scelta di mantenere la clausola di riserva in apertura dell’articolo 648-bis c.p. Infatti, la scelta più semplice sarebbe stata la mera eliminazione di questa, anche se così facendo si sarebbero sollevante questioni quali la possibilità di aggravio per ciascun delitto suscettibile di ingenerare proventi illeciti riciclabili.

[1] Inserito dall’art.3, comma 3, L. 15 dicembre 2014, n.186]

[2] Cass., 22 novembre 2022, n. 44378.

[3] Cass., 25 gennaio 2022, n. 2868.

[4] Cass., 14 ottobre 2019, n. 42052.

[5] In effetti, dallo studio degli atti preparatori del Codice penale, risulta chiaro che la prescrizione del reato presupposto non rientra tra le cause di non punibilità del reato poiché in caso contrario il Legislatore lo avrebbe esplicitamente specificato.

Comprehensive Review of Data Regulation: The Past and the Future of European Union Data Sharing Legislation

2023-04-14T11:11:06+00:00

1. Introduction

Within a seminar-based overview on data regulation and policies, this paper represents the choral work of six LLM candidates in European Business and Social Law at Bocconi University.^[1]Given the recent innovations on the technological side, data-driven activities play a pivotal role in the development of efficient business strategies. The implementation of regulations and policies in this field has progressively become an arduous challenge to be accomplished by business actors. For these reasons, this paper aims to provide a clear, organic and consistent review of what is the current legislation available in this sense, what are its advantages and disadvantages, as well as how to apply that legal framework. Collecting and analysing the academic contributions of many prestigious scholars, this work is meant to represent an overview of the implementation of the pre-existing legislation. Nonetheless, the ultimate goal of this paper is to provide an innovative approach in order to inspire future modifications and improvements in the European Union (EU) system. In order to do so, three main pillars of data regulation and policies will be taken into account: business-to-government (B2G) data sharing, business-to-business (B2B) data sharing and data portability.

2. Business-to-Government (B2G)

B2G data sharing is defined as the process in which a company or other private organisation transfers its data to the public sector for a public interest purpose.^[2] B2G data sharing and its public benefits progressively became more and more relevant, as the modern world challenges seem to be only solvable by using real-time big data. Since a government cannot produce this kind of information and it is institutionally obliged to solve large problems, it is only reasonable that it aims to increase B2G data sharing. Among the many benefits for the government is the ability to make data-informed decisions and predictions that affect the citizens. It helps increase efficiency not only in response to drivers such as financial crises, pandemics, ecological disasters but also in planning urban development or fighting crime. Furthermore, the harmonisation of this sector constitutes the biggest step to be taken towards a single digital market which, in turn, represents one of the most arduous challenges for the European Commission but a crucial aim, nonetheless. From the private sector side, there is a benefit to businesses in improving Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) index and employer branding. As will be discussed later, businesses might also benefit financially from such exchange.

Despite these clear benefits, current obstacles exist – such as lack of structural support and oversight of B2G data sharing, lack of willingness of companies to share data due to cultural and organisational reasons, lack of clearly defined incentives, large legal and compliance costs, and dissimilar conditions prevalent in each Member State.

The paper gives an outline of the major issues that businesses point out in the Data Act consultation when explaining why they do not currently share data.^[3] The goal of the future Data Act proposal is to provide a harmonised framework for data sharing, conditions for access by public bodies, international data transfers, cloud switching, and interoperability.

3. EU Data Strategy

The European Union intends to acquire a leading role in the data economy, an achievement that could benefit both businesses and the public sector. Data protection, fundamental rights, and cybersecurity will be the pillars of a strong legal framework.^[4]The European Commission’s communication on the data strategy outlines policy measures and investments which, coupled with a better use of data, could lead to greater productivity, improvements in well-being, environment, transparent governance, and convenient public services.^[5]Data usage can benefit several aspects of daily life, ranging from more conscious energy consumption and product, material and food traceability, to healthier lives and better healthcare. The Data Governance Act proposal (2020)^[6]seeks to strengthen various data-sharing mechanisms. The goal is to promote the availability of data in order to power applications in artificial intelligence, personalised medicine, green mobility, smart manufacturing, and numerous other areas. Moreover, every public body allowing this kind of reuse would be technically equipped to ensure privacy and confidentiality. The proposal would also bolster data altruism, making voluntary data sharing easier for companies and individuals. Ad hoc entities, such as data altruism organisations, could be established in order to collect data for common interest purposes. A thriving data economy will indeed boost European competitiveness on the world stage. As of now, few Big Tech companies hold a large part of the world’s data, possibly reducing incentives for data-driven businesses to emerge. The EU lags behind big players like the US and China. The Commission’s data strategy aims at finding the right balance in order to preserve safety, privacy and ethical standards. Since 2014, many steps have been taken in this direction: the Regulation on the free flow of non-personal data (FFD)^[7], the Cybersecurity Act (CSA)^[8], the Open Data Directive^[9], and, most notably, the General Data Protection Regulation^[10](GDPR).

4. Shortcomings of the Current Framework

Within the scope of B2G data sharing, there is a lack of public trust for several reasons. For the purpose of this paper, the lack of technical resources and human capital will be analysed. Furthermore, the incentives to fix the aforementioned shortcomings will be discussed in order to reach a conclusion.

4.1 Lack of Technical Resources

Firstly, the absence of technical resources to ensure a safe space gives rise to many different issues. Currently, B2G data sharing is done through contractual agreements. However, these are somehow restrictive and limit the way data can be used, as well as complicate the process of tracking down and monitoring the usage of businesses’ data. Also, other actions may be prohibited such as merging, structuring, cleansing, and decompiling.^[11]These agreements often miss fair compensation on investments, which can be due to the operational barriers.^[12]Given that it is very complex to set up these contractual agreements,^[13] the costs end up being very high; moreover, as there are not specialised governmental units to cover these costs, businesses are not willing to take part in these contracts.

Furthermore, B2G data-sharing agreements are not sustainable initiatives but rather standalone pilot projects given that there is no institution to tackle them. This means that the experience is not shared, thus entailing that new entrants into these partnerships will have to invest time and money in restructuring and addressing operational and legal issues that may have already been addressed by others. The absence of a comprehensive and integrated framework leads to a lack of European culture of data sharing that promotes experts and role models. Currently, some Member States are beginning to put in place structures and procedures that provide guidance for both businesses and governments of how this data can be shared in a way that is beneficial to both parties involved.^[14] However, this is not a consistent approach, leading to the issue of lack of harmonisation, as previously discussed.^[15]

Looking at more than just the agreement, sharing data entails many risks to businesses, such as the possible leakage of the data provider’s trade secret, which can potentially open a window to cyberattacks. Moreover, companies may be violating the customer's privacy rights if there is no system to ensure a safe transfer of data. This implies that the existence of trust between the private company and the public sector when transferring the data is necessary and thus a reliable system for exchange of information is needed in the Member States.

The magnitude of this issue has led to many discussions on how to solve it. The obvious choice is for Member States to create specialised bodies in charge of supporting both public organisations and private companies when entering into data sharing partnerships and facilitating the sharing of good practises. The idea is that these bodies potentially become third parties in the agreements. This also means that the costs are covered to an extent by the institution, which incentivises businesses to enter into these agreements, as they will not have to cover such high costs. These bodies will also be responsible to ensure that the collection of data is done legally, without damaging either the company or the public interest. Lastly, these structures are important in the case that a dispute arises with each party. Through the use of this specialised body to deal with such disputes, businesses will feel more safeguarded to enter into agreements and will avoid costs. Furthermore, in order for B2G collaborations to work, governments should be clear about their existence and purpose. In particular, data sharing agreements, as well as B2G algorithms and results, should be easily accessible. To this end, the European Commission has already created the Support Centre for Data Sharing (SDCS). The SCDS is a new initiative funded by the European Commission to further support the development of the Digital Single Market. Its goal is to allow data sharing, either as a free or paid service, among different public and private organisations which will increase trust between the parties.

4.2 Human Capital

The lack of digital skills necessary to carry B2G data sharing transactions in both the public and private sectors is a big concern and creates a lack of public trust for many different reasons.

The International Data Corporation (IDC) reported that there were 7.2 million data professionals in 2018, representing 4.3% of the EU workforce.^[16] It has been predicted that there will be over 1.5 million unfilled positions in the 27 Member States by 2025.^[17] These figures show the lack of preparation and personnel available to deal with B2G data sharing issues. The absence of an authoritative figure and public and private sector professionals with the relevant skills to work towards the achievement of a safe environment for B2G data sharing transactions makes it not appealing for companies to take part in it. Research carried out by CapGemini Consulting showed that 76% of companies have not fully integrated their data sources in their organisation and of those only 35% have solid processes for data curation, validation, retention and capture. Moreover, 54% of companies do not have joined teams where business and IT executives collaborate on the establishment of data initiatives. Lastly, 46% followed a decentralised model for analytics or have dispersed resources.^[18] Looking at this data, the lack of care and attention to data sharing initiatives in companies can be seen. This leads to inefficient data sharing from businesses to governments due to the absence of experience and centralised systems. In order to properly engage in B2G data sharing collaboration, professionals from both ends need to be skilled.

Technical tools and methodologies are paramount in implementing B2G data sharing. In this regard, the need for the players involved in B2G data sharing to acquire digital skills in order to make use of these tools and methodologies is critical. A solid starting point would be to create teams of data stewards with experts in order to facilitate and coordinate B2G data sharing. Member States should recognize the function of data stewards, which would be in charge of systematising the process of partnering and helping scale efforts when there are fledgling signs of success. Even though some of these tasks may already be carried out by employers internally, it is important that Member States provide such data stewards to further guide them and ensure a fully qualified team. They should work within companies and in the private sector to maximise transparency and efficiency of B2G data sharing. Through this, businesses will feel like their data is protected and be able to share it freely without concerns of breaching privacy rules or putting themselves in a risky position against competitors.

Finally, unless there are professionals with the appropriate digital skills, public-sector bodies will not be able to reap the benefits from the use of private-sector data and develop a safer and more trusted system for businesses.

4.3 Public Trust

B2G data sharing entails cooperation between public and private sectors, which heavily relies on goodwill and transparency. Rules about transparency shall be set out in terms of how governments decide to engage with private entities or choose a specific data provider. At the same time, private companies and civil society need to be open and straightforward about the kind of data available for B2G data sharing. This mainly focuses on observed data (data that has been obtained by the controller while the data subject uses the service or the device) and inferred data (data that is generated by the data controller as part of processing). In the current situation, transparency cannot be achieved because of both lack of trust and the absence of widespread information on the matter. Society is generally unaware of B2G data sharing potential. As a result, businesses are reluctant to take part in such a collaboration. Lack of transparency can also lead to misinformation, which could further damage the reputation of all public parties involved. It is worth noting that people are not fully aware of how much data they produce and their rights over personal data (i.e., art. 20 GDPR).

It is evident that mutual trust is an essential component of a functioning public - private partnership. Success of data sharing depends on good practices, technology, and legal frameworks. The European Commission should therefore settle on common good ethical standards for the collection and handling of data. In doing so, the Commission can draw inspiration from the UN development group^[19]or the FATEN (fairness, accountability and autonomy, trust and transparency, equality and beneficence, non-maleficence) principles. Digital ethics is a relatively new field and, as of now, ethical use of data can only lean on uneven national initiatives. So far, these actions have not been replicated at EU level. On one hand, common guidelines on ethical data sharing could help governments pursue public interest; on the other, there is a risk of data bias. If no ethical framework on B2G exists, the collection and transfer of data could be used to benefit groups or individuals. In conclusion, B2G guidelines should focus on ensuring the security and privacy of all shared data.

5. Incentives for the Private Sector

In light of economic barriers, it is no surprise that business-to-government data sharing is staggering; coupled with the issues covered above, businesses simply do not see clear motivations and purposes in sharing data. Adding to the mix the liability in case of sharing erroneous or private data, the risk-to-benefit ratio is skewed towards risk.^[20] Notwithstanding the goodwill of companies, without a precise incentive scheme in place, one can expect no significant progress in B2G sharing in the years to come. However, as Klein and Verhulst point out, there are at least 5 tangible benefits for companies originating from B2G sharing, such as generating additional revenue, learning new statistical skills, meeting regulatory compliance, improving reputation, and proving corporate social responsibility.^[21]

5.1 Monetary Incentives

Monetary incentives are the most apparent and foolproof method of encouragement used for balancing any risk-to-benefit ratio. It shall come as no surprise, therefore, that a straightforward payment to businesses is an often-cited approach concerning B2G data sharing. Data is an asset and as such, it has a transactional value; companies incur costs to make data available to governments and should be compensated for its generation. There is little that hinders governments from viewing data as an object of government procurement. Indeed, some governments are already acquiring data from private businesses.

For instance, Telefonica, a Spanish multinational telecommunications company, implemented a licence-based Smart Steps’ sharing program that delivers – for an appropriate fee – anonymous aggregated mobile data from its network of operators. Even though Smart Steps is aimed at sharing data with other businesses, according to Klein and Verhulst public infrastructure agents “use Telefonica’s data analysis to improve policy”^[22]in demographic segmentations or commute patterns.

Likewise, according to the Department of Treasury of the United States of America, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Criminal Investigation’s unit has been purchasing GPS location data from Venntel, a computer service company based in Virginia. Similarly, as the Wall Street Journal reports, the Trump administration bought access to commercial databases mapping the movements of millions of mobile phones in America to enforce US law at the border and monitor immigration.^[23]Surprisingly, the firms entering B2G transactions are not necessarily large entities. In 2020, a Muslim prayer and Quran app with more than 98 million downloads worldwide sold their data to the counterterrorism and overseas special forces US military divisions.^[24]

The legal difficulties stemming from the above-specified cases arise from the violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Patriot Act which require the police to obtain a warrant to collect historical mobile site location information. Notwithstanding the legal particularity of the data purchased, however, it is clear that B2G money-incentivized transactions already take place, albeit at a low scale. The Venntel case mentioned above consisted of a one-year subscription for $19,872; compared to the estimated economic value of data, this is just the tip of the iceberg. Yet the European Union can learn from these cases – if there is money to be made, it will be made. If the EU is seeking to correct a market failure, one way is to pay. Despite the clear benefits to enterprises, government procurement for data implies some obstacles; potential issues currently stem from the limited number of suppliers.

Firstly, because data is an intangible asset, its price can be derived in numerous ways. In a business transaction, the value of a dataset is the market price which takes into consideration the ultimate use of the data; if the buyer’s use is essential to its service, the bargaining power lies with the supplier and the price is inflated accordingly.

Accordingly, the final report prepared by the High-Level Expert Group on Business-to-Government Data Sharing admits that in instances of highly specialised datasets, only one supplier might be in the possession of such data and as such can impose monopoly prices.^[25]This may be more accurate for data than any other kind of product or service which begs the question of whether the government should pay the market price, the marginal cost, or should get a preferential rate below the market price. Any solution should keep in mind that businesses incur a cost to generate data and make it available; as such data production is no different than that of a pen or paper, and it is not market practice to offer products at discount to the government.

Yet, the preceding discussion relies on a limited supplier pool in the market. Whereas it may be reasonable for highly specialised datasets to be generatable by one and only one company, data overall is considered a replicable asset. Perhaps just as in cases of electric cars, once the demand and clear incentive schemes are in place, the supply will follow.

5.2 Tax Incentives

Bearing in mind the previous discussion, one may additionally look towards non-monetary benefits the government might use to boost B2G data sharing. Among the many proposals put forward by the High-Level Expert Group on Business-to-Government Data Sharing, tax incentives and “public-recognition programs enhanc[ing] a company’s reputation” are relevant.^[26]They are, at least in theory, able to achieve the same level of encouragement of monetary benefits without creating an undue expenditure for the government. However, that is not to say that monetary and non-monetary incentives cannot go hand in hand.

Indeed, utilisation of tax incentives to promote new areas of economic activity is not new. In 2006, the Commission released a communication intended to support R&D investment and innovation. The Commission recognised that “well-designed tax incentives are [...] simpler and more predictable than grants”^[27]and asserted that “«tax incentives have grown to become one of the major instruments used by many Member States to increase business”.^[28] Despite tax incentives being an important policy tool, tax regimes cannot be harmonised at the EU level. The Commission may identify and promulgate best practises, but it is upon each Member State to internalise such guidelines and put forward satisfactory tax incentives in national law. As the European Law Institute concludes, currently existing R&D incentives are not always adequate, and different national definitions lead to an uncertain legal environment.^[29]Considering that the first Commission’s communication on R&D tax incentives was over 15 years ago, it is understood that an adequate tax framework for B2G data sharing is lightyears away from us.

5.3 Corporate Social Responsibility

Even though CSR started as a “voluntary form of private regulation, governments [have] gradually become more involved”.^[30]Because of its soft-law capabilities, the government can encourage companies to meet higher than minimum standards. One of the incentives may be CSR awards constituting incentives for the private sector, insofar as they elevate the corporate image and reputation of the winner.

Despite the link between CSR and a firm's value being unclear, many large companies follow CSR guidelines to shape a positive image of their brand that creates a “reservoir of public goodwill, [...] that is particularly valuable in times of corporate crises”^[31].

Admittedly, according to Directive 2014/95/EU^[32],since 2014 all large public-interest companies with more than 500 employees – that is, about 12,000 companies in the EU – have to produce annual CSR reports. Bearing in mind that in April 2021 the Commission has adopted a Proposal^[33] to amend the previous Directive, which – if adopted – would effectively extend the obligation to all large entities, CSR incentives could prove to be beneficial to increasing the amount of B2G data sharing. Indeed, there have already been successful government-induced CSR initiatives, for instance in preventing discrimination and promoting equal pay.

Additionally, public-recognition programs could work in conjunction with the CSR reporting to provide an elevated corporate image. Similarly to the European Capital of Innovation Awards, which aims at rewarding the most innovative city practises, or the European Public Sector Award, rewarding public sector entities, one can imagine an award for companies meeting the highest standard of B2G data sharing.^[34]Indeed, there are already public-recognition programs aimed at private rather than public entities such as the European Business Awards for the Environment or the general European Business Award about which the former EU Trade Commissioner said: “it is important that we showcase our most exceptional businesses, share knowledge and generate debate around the creation of a stronger European community”.^[35] Following this stream of thought, it seems more than conceivable to develop an award specific to B2G data sharing.

6. Interim Conclusion

6.1 Lack of Knowledge of Businesses

Even if one can assume all incentives for the private sector are in place and businesses are prepared to share data with the government, it is reasonable to imagine they are unaware of the possibility to do so. Mass media informational campaigns are usually considered to be powerless in achieving substantive outcomes; however, there is little debate that public information campaigns might be, in the present case, a valid policy tool. With this in mind, government-sponsored communication campaigns could be executed to make businesses aware of the opportunity to share data. Such campaigns should clearly describe benefits for the private sector and consultations with members of the target population should precede any operations. Despite the shortage of data, it is reasonable to expect that a joint effort with professional associations aimed at small and medium-sized enterprises focused on partnerships with strictly business-oriented media channels could be a reliable approach to raise awareness of B2G data sharing among private sector players.

To conclude, B2G data sharing is currently plagued by the general lack of data-sharing culture and the absence of a uniform EU framework harmonising the fragmented legislations applicable in each Member State. Despite these obstacles, adequate incentives schemes coupled with efforts to increase visibility and transparency of B2G data sharing can overcome these challenges.

7. Business-to-Business (B2B)

Another powerful tool to increase overall digitalisation of the EU is represented by B2B data sharing. B2B has strong similarities to B2G data sharing, such as the great potential to impact the digital economy and rather complicated and fragmented legislation and the even more obscure implementation of these legislations.

B2B data sharing is defined as the process in which a company shares data with another company for its own business purposes.^[36] As mentioned in the general introduction, data has lately become the lifeblood of economic development. However, a study for the European Commission by a consultancy agent, Everis Benelux, found that European businesses were not taking into account the full value of data.^[37]Only thirty nine percent of European Businesses were realising the potential of sharing data for economic growth and to address specific market failures. To address the major obstacles of B2B data sharing, such as cultural concerns regarding sharing data of (perceived) rivalrous nature and the associated absence of certainty of undistorted competition, the Union has set up a strong legal framework for this essential area of business development. The following section will explore this framework and the potential for improvements by comparison with developments in other jurisdictions.

7.1 B2B Data Sharing in the Data Governance Act

The European Commission has sought input on the Data Governance Act,^[38] a proposal that, among other things, aims to increase data sharing, potentially including sectoral data sharing between companies. This proposal for regulation stems from the experiences lived during the Covid-19 pandemic in terms of the essential role of data use for crisis management. The Commission wishes to encourage more data sharing in order to ensure that both public and private actors benefit from techniques such as Big Data and machine learning. In this regard, the Commission has conducted studies on how to accelerate the growth of the data economy and support the development of business-to-business platforms in Europe, mainly focusing on two sectors: automotive and healthcare. Small and medium-sized enterprises could take full advantage of the so-called fourth industrial revolution to maximise innovation and ultimately foster growth and employment.

7.2 B2B Data Sharing in the Context of Consultations of the Data Act

European lawmakers are also examining ways to unlock the latent value of shared data. The EU's data strategy aims to establish practical, fair and clear rules on data access and use. B2B data sharing is growing in Europe, several challenges still need to be overcome to fulfil the Union’s potential and to become a global leader. In December 2019, the European Round Table for Industry launched the B2B Data Sharing Taskforce in order to deepen its cross-industry understanding of data sharing and the use and reuse of that data in a B2B context. The Task Force's mission is to explore the business potential and business model of industrial data sharing, identify bottlenecks to its development in Europe and provide recommendations to overcome them. The Commission has also proposed the creation of data spaces, arguably the most interesting B2B data sharing mechanism in development, for crucial sectors like health, energy, and agriculture. To this end, two policy measures that seek to encourage B2B data sharing are working their way through the European legislative process: the aforementioned Data Governance Act and the Data Act. In particular, the consultation on the Data Act proposal’s content seeks to address specific issues concerning new prospects in B2B data sharing:

a) specific transparency obligations for manufacturers of connected objects on the rights to access and use non-personal data of users;

b) B2B fairness rules for access and use of data, possibly complemented by model contract terms recommended by the Commission;

c) data access permitted on the basis of fair, reasonable, proportionate, transparent and non-discriminatory terms for non-personal data;

d) harmonisation of general principles for data access, while potential sector-specific data access would be established by sector-specific rules;

e) adaptations of the Database Directive (Directive 96/9/EC) to facilitate data access and use, in particular clarification of the relationship between the sui generis rights and machine-generated data;

f) technical specifications for portability rights under the GDPR (e.g., makers of home appliances, wearables and home assistants could be obliged to provide technical interfaces that allow real-time portability of data collected by their devices);

g) introduction of safeguards for easy cloud service portability by prescribing Standard Contractual Clauses or providing legal requirements;

h) definition of essential requirements for smart contracts;

i) protection of data in cloud computing against access from non-EU governments by introducing an obligation to: notify users of a request for access to data by foreign authorities; inform the Commission of different laws of non-EU jurisdictions with extraterritorial effect; take appropriate measures to prevent access to non-personal data of EU companies from third countries’ governmental authorities.

In conclusion, the Data Act’s main objectives are the promotion of fairness, legal certainty, and data portability. The Commission is carrying consultations in order to get responses from the full spectrum of stakeholders concerning the issues identified by the Inception Impact Assessment^[39]. The results will help the Commission strike the balance between rights and interests of data users and data holders on the one hand and competitiveness in the EU single market on the other hand. The consultation includes:

a) questions about the factors relevant when determining fair, reasonable, proportionate, transparent and non-discriminatory conditions to increase data sharing;

b) questions exploring the contractual ability of the owners/users of connected objects and manufacturers to use data generated by connected objects;

c) questions which explore the relevance of laws of trade secrets and rights under the Database Directive to access and use third-party data or protect own data;

d) questions on whether and how portability between cloud service providers should be facilitated.

8. B2B Data Sharing Mechanisms

8.1 The Need for Intermediaries

With a growing availability worldwide, data has a key position in B2B interactions and more generally in every industry sector. The COSIP framework provides a good example of the wide range of data transactions that take place in the specific case of B2B trade processes: contract (C), order (O), shipment (S), invoice (I) and payment (P). In this context, data-sharing mechanisms facilitate data flow between companies while ensuring the reuse and efficient process of the generated and accumulated data.

B2B data-sharing is a much-needed interaction between businesses that has several assets. Among those assets lies an important competitive aspect. In fact, by sharing their data, businesses will be able to create new business models, reduce costs as well as improve their services. To that end, the Commission has recognised that “Given the specificities of online platforms, it is necessary to both continue enforcing competition rules and to complement and complete the toolbox to make the most out of online platforms and the data economy”.^[40]

But by nature, competition “encourages companies to offer consumers goods and services on the most favourable terms. It encourages efficiency and innovation and reduces prices. To be effective, competition requires companies to act independently of each other, and subject to the pressure exerted by their competitors”.^[41] As a consequence, competition brings along a fair share of distrust from businesses regarding B2B data sharing.

In order to address the issue, better information about businesses is certainly necessary. Mostly, however, the EU has brought into relief the place of intermediaries in its Digital Governance Act of 2020. Data intermediaries can be defined as third parties that offer B2B data-sharing services or personal data spaces through platforms. As third-party enablers they can play an important role in B2B transactions by ensuring safe and secure collection, storage and sharing of data. If well-framed, these platforms can be a functional solution to the lack of trust. However, framing such intermediaries is not free of challenges.

In fact, B2B data-sharing intermediaries are an abstract concept that is not yet precisely defined. It appears that platforms aimed to B2B data-sharing do not correspond to platforms as they are intended for platform-to-business relations by the Regulation (EU) 2019/1150. As such, what are the elements that distinguish B2B data-sharing platforms and thus which regulations come into effect? B2B data-sharing platforms can take a wide variety of forms and can have different roles with regard to B2B data-sharing. Technically, they can be private or governmental. In the same way, the business models followed by these platforms can be different. In fact, some platforms could make revenue from data exchanges, from fees or from the technical assistance they provide to companies that wish to share data, while others may contribute to B2B data sharing for free. Given the extent of this notion, the lack of definition of B2B data-sharing platforms can be seen as a legal obstacle that provides uncertainty.

Additionally, to enable efficient B2B data sharing, those platforms need to go through standardisation, which refers to the process of converting data to a common format to allow users to process and analyse it. Building standards is, along with the lack of trust and the definitional shortcomings, one of the main challenges in B2B data-sharing. In fact, it has been pointed out that standardisation can be too general or that the standards’ development is a too long process when compared to the rapid evolution of technologies. In the final report of the study on data sharing between companies in Europe prepared for the European Commission DG Communications Networks, Content & Technology by Everis, several companies such as HERE, Enedis or Airbus affirmed that the lack of data standardisation and interoperability was a blocking factor to B2B data-sharing since it made difficult and costly for them to combine the available datasets and be able to extract their value efficiently.

So, intermediaries will be a good solution for B2B data-sharing at the EU scale but only if the EU successfully manages to frame those intermediaries, considering that new approaches to B2B data sharing may still emerge. The EU has put forward the idea of intermediaries in the form of certified data spaces. Even though in its Data Strategy the Commission has limited data spaces to 9 key domains (including Mobility, Health, Finance and Energy), it will be interesting to see how those spaces will be framed to (i) respect the fundamental European values; (ii) create transparent and efficient data-sharing mechanisms and (iii) address the above-mentioned technical and legal challenges. The limitation to 9 sensitive sectors is an interesting first step that, if successful, will be helpful to implement these mechanisms in other sectors.

A legislative framework for the governance of common European data spaces will allow the creation of transparent and efficient data-sharing mechanisms in order to benefit from the data economy.

8.2 The European Data Spaces

Data spaces are defined as “a type of data relationship between trusted partners, each of whom apply the same high standards and rules to the storage and sharing of their data. However, of key importance to the concept of a data space is that data are not stored centrally but at source and are therefore only shared (via semantic interoperability) when necessary”.^[42]

In order to develop such data spaces, the European Commission has provided fundings to various projects through Horizon 2020, the EU’s financial instrument oriented at sustaining innovation. These innovative propositions tackle the challenges expressed earlier while taking into consideration the various regulations and recommendations that transversally apply to data spaces.

One of the European projects is Trusted Secure Data Sharing Space (TRUSTS). This intermediary can be defined as a marketplace for data exchange that aims at allowing personal and non-personal data to be “traded and exchanged in a trustworthy and secure way providing clear legal and ethical frameworks.^[43]

Another project that can be mentioned is KRAKEN (BroKeRage and MArKet platform for pErsoNal data) which focuses on personal data by creating a user-centric platform. However, a data marketplace implies data monetisation and, in this case, personal-data monetisation. This can look like property rights over personal data, which is not allowed under the GDPR. This raises the question of how the EU would implement such a platform in its forthcoming regulations. Each of the propositions offers a different structural model of data space but they all respond to the EU data strategy which aims at increasing trust in data sharing. With that in mind it is important to stress that these platforms need to be (i) neutral and (ii) compliant with EU regulations.

Even though there is still no data space regulatory framework, there are some transversal measures that have been adopted in the EU. One of them is the General Data Protection Regulation. But it is also interesting to mention the eIDAS Regulation (Electronic IDentification, Authentication and Trust Services), the PSD2 (Payment Services Directive), the European Blockchain Service Infrastructure and Context Broker.

Nonetheless, the legal compliance requested from European data spaces could be challenging as it implies that the platform can be subject to EU regulations. For example, the GDPR applies to (i) companies or entities which process personal data as part of the activities of one of their branches established in the EU, regardless of where the data is processed and (ii) companies established outside the EU that offer goods or services or that are monitoring the behavior of individuals in the EU. But a potential regulation on common European data spaces would also include non-personal data. So, would companies established outside the EU that process non-personal data of individuals in the EU be subject to EU regulations? This level of protection is understandable in the context of personal data, but non-personal data cannot necessarily justify the extraterritorial application of EU law. So, the idea of at least having a representative of the data space in the European Union if the platform is not physically installed in the Union could be a good compromise and a guarantee of legal certainty.

9. Comparative Analysis with Other Legal Systems

Although the causes for Europe losing its competitive advantage in the digital sector and Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning space is beyond the scope of the paper, one of such reasons can be identified as lack of culture of B2B data sharing. Even though no country is an expert in incentivizing B2B data sharing,^[44] we may look at other economies in digital markets and examine what could be replicated in Europe.

9.1 India - An Example of Data Nationalisation

In 2020, the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology of India issued a report by the Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework.^[45] The resulting recommendation calls for “enabl[ing] members of the public, start-ups, researchers, the government and other entities to request companies’ data for national security, economic, and public interest purposes”.^[46] The underlying idea of data nationalisation is that near-monopolies in the digital sphere currently deny access to their databases to competitors due to fears of losing their competitive advantage and in hopes of securing their dominant position in the market. By using highly data-driven technologies and establishing strong network effects, they can ensure that no new entrant meets the industry’s high barriers to enter. As was previously established, however, data has the particular characteristic of having the ability to be reused for completely different purposes by various market players. Therefore, such fears are largely unfounded; B2B business sharing can be most beneficial when non-competitors share data. With the introduction of mandatory B2B data sharing in India, smaller businesses could benefit from having access to larger businesses’ databases, and large companies would gain access to government data. The idea of mandatory data sharing is not new: it has been empirically proven that mandatory open data policies can increase both the frequency and quality of data sharing; yet, borrowing this idea from the realm of scientific research to check replicability of results and extending it to B2B data sharing is new.^[47] Mandatory data sharing, according to the report, will spur innovation in the market, promote the growth of smaller enterprises, and maximise overall welfare.

Even so, it is currently understood that the European Commission does not want to regulate the B2B data sharing market directly and has a strong preference for non-binding guidelines and incentives programs. This can be inferred from the lack of an enforceable regulatory framework, be it in progress or already established.^[48] It seems, however, that the approach of India may prove to be beneficial for understanding different concepts of B2B regulation. It is indeed theorised that data is a public good and as such should not have legal restrictions on access. India’s approach might be one way to make theory practice. Despite this, the data nationalisation program has been met with criticism – data spaces are largely considered to be optimal when voluntary and it is hypothesised that indeed mandatory distribution of data to competitors may destroy value for businesses and ultimately make some countries less appealing to foreign investors.^[49]

9.2 Possible Developments in the United States

With the growth of the sharing economy, numerous traditional smaller firms are either struggling or, in part due to the pandemic, declaring bankruptcy. The concern is that companies operating in the sharing economy tend to be large and, due to their market size and exploitation of consumer data, the concentration trend is progressing. An adequate example might be UberEats: restaurants that traditionally knew their clients and were able to predict and adjust to consumer preferences are being replaced by the algorithms of UberEats and other food-delivery services that collect and monetize data about their customers.

To oppose this trend, some jurisdictions in the United States, including California and New York City, suggested forcing the tech food delivery platforms to share some of the data they collect. This would mean that, for example, UberEats would have to share data with participatory restaurants.

Accordingly, the NYC bill was enacted in August 2021 and states that: “This bill would require third-party food delivery services, entities that provide food service establishments with online order and delivery services, to share monthly information on customers who have placed a food or beverage order with an establishment, if that establishment requests the information”.^[50]

Similarly, the California bill, when introduced in February 2020, had a provision on mandatory data sharing if requested by a participating food facility.^[51]Both of these bills were introduced with the hope of limiting the concentration trends in the tech industry and letting smaller businesses breathe. However, as Eff points out, “these policies would make it so that sharing data with one company means that data will automatically end up in the hands of several downstream parties» which may be a concern from a personal data point of use”.^[52]

Nonetheless, such proposals are currently directed at specific market segments. There have been no data nationalisation programs like in India. On the contrary, it seems that the purpose of such B2B mandatory sharing requirements in the US is to stop tech giants from unduly exploiting smaller restaurants rather than to spark innovation as is the case in the EU. Despite this, it is clear that some forms of mandatory data sharing are already on legislators’ minds.

However, this is not to say that concentration trends are not worrisome for European regulators. For example, the German Federal Ministry of Finance asked researchers from the University of Tilburg and CenterData to “develop a suitable approach to data governance” and “develop a methodology for measuring the data-driven nature of a market”.^[53]In data-driven markets, the researchers suggest, an introduction of mandatory data sharing of raw user-generated data for all providers with a market share of at least 30% would result in a maximum of three providers per market that have to share data. This shows that, despite the general goal of innovation, competition concerns in tech / data-driven markets are important to European regulators.

9.3 Health Data for Research Purposes in the EU

Despite the general lack of regulatory pressure in the EU for B2B data sharing, a harmonised approach towards mandatory health data sharing might be on the cards. As was evident during the Coronavirus-19 (Covid-19) pandemic, health data-sharing can significantly contribute to research and drug development, introduce new services, and speed-up high-level decision-making. The Commission recognised the need for a harmonised approach and, indeed, the creation of a European Health Data Space is one of its priorities for 2019-2025.

Artificial intelligence and machine learning models are only possible with a vast amount of data. A testing set and a training set are required to perform any kind of analysis and such testing of the algorithm can only be achieved by continuously feeding it new kinds of data. Despite great algorithms that can detect dermatological issues or predict schizophrenia, data sharing in the health sector is limited. Jeremy Rollison (senior director of EU affairs at Microsoft) stated “It’s very unlikely that any one entity on their own has enough data to be successful at artificial intelligence development”.^[54]

Unlike the eHealth Digital Service Infrastructure (eHDSI), which aims at G2G data sharing for ePrescription, for instance, the kind of algorithms described previously are often developed by innovative and fast-growing private businesses (start-ups). Therefore, as it stands, the health data used by the artificial intelligence is subject to a secondary use for the scientific and historical research; secondary since the personal health data was data initially collected for another purpose. This kind of data sharing between researchers based in not-for-profit organisations and researchers based in industry or commercial research organisations can be classified as B2B data sharing. Surprisingly, GDPR may not be a strong limitation if Article 6(4), setting out the purpose limitation principle, is read in conjunction with Article 5(1)(b), which establishes a privileged position for research. Nonetheless, a major source of uncertainty for the industry is the appropriate legal basis for processing data in the absence of explicit consent.^[55]Generally, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, it can be expected that a European Health Data Space will be developed as one of the first data spaces.

9.4 Interim Conclusion

In light of Covid-19, the need for data-sharing has become more evident than ever. The European Union has used the opportunity to accelerate the data economy and explore the potential business models that can be taken through the Data Governance Act and the Data Act.

The range of data sharing mechanisms and modern business needs through the COSIP framework has highlighted the necessity for intermediaries to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Despite the benefits of intermediaries, they can also bring legal challenges due to the lack of definition of B2B data sharing platforms and standardisation. This being said, the creation of the data spaces and KRAKEN and TRUSTS projects mitigates some of the aforementioned problems. The level of protection required is significant and potentially unrealistic. Therefore, it is necessary to look to other jurisdictions for comparative points. India’s Data Nationalisation projects and the US’s markets show the difficulties and potential benefits that different strategies can bring, depending on the business structures and economic makeup of a nation.

10. Data Portability

The right to data portability is one of the most important rights under the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).^[56]^[57] Under this right, individuals are able to obtain and reuse their personal data for their own purposes across different services.^[58] This means that individuals are allowed to move, copy, or transfer personal data easily from one place to another in a safe and secure way. This translates into individuals having greater control over their data and greater competition between companies and, therefore, into promoting innovation and the development of new Services.^[59]

The right to data portability is relatively new within the EU data protection framework, given that there are no references to it in the Data Protection Directive^[60]or in any other areas of law.^[61]

11. Relevance of the Right to Data Portability

In the recent guidelines on the right to data portability of Article 29 Working Party (WP29), the potential benefits to individuals between these types of portability and the new personal data portability are highlighted.^[62] Within the field of personal data protection, portability has been encouraged previously to the approval of the GDPR. The WP29 believes that data portability has the potential to enable businesses and data-subjects to maximise the benefits of big data in a more balanced and transparent way. Furthermore, it will also minimize unfair and discriminatory practices while reducing the risks of the use of inaccurate data for decision-making purposes. Data portability can be used as an additional safeguard applied by data controllers with the purpose of empowering data subjects, allowing for a successful balancing test between data controller’s legitimate interests and data protection rights of subjects. The WP29 emphasised the importance of data portability by stating that it should be part of the general availability of workable mechanisms for the data subjects to access, modify, delete, transfer or otherwise further process their own data.^[63]

The WP29 further highlighted that data portability should not only be a data protection right but also an economic right. Other benefits of a full portability of personal data includes the empowerment of data subjects, the increase of a more competitive market environment, and, lastly, the development of additional value-added services by third parties who may be able to access the customers’ data at the request and with the consent of the consumers. Thus, it can be seen that data portability is not only important in the area of data protection but also for competition and consumer protection^[64]. With this in mind, the European Data Protection Supervisor also saw this right as a strategic element, as it is the gateway in the digital environment to the user control which individuals are now realising they lack.^[65]

12. What is the Current Regulation: Article 20 GDPR

Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation lays out the definition of the right to data portability. This states that “[T]he data subject shall have the right to receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided”.^[66]

This article reflects that within the right to data portability there are three rights: the right to receive data concerning data subjects which they have provided,^[67] the right to transmit those data to another controller^[68]and the right to have the personal data transmitted directly from one controller to another.^[69] The three requirements under Article 20(1), are used to facilitate the interoperability of the data provided by the data controller. The use of the words machine-readable can be inferred from the field of public sector information, and has brought many issues, which will be later discussed. Furthermore, the European Commission defined interoperability of systems as the ability of disparate and diverse organisations to interact towards mutually beneficial and agreed common goals, involving the sharing of information.^[70] This definition and the problems that arise from it will be further discussed in the paper. It is also important to understand that under this article, unless there is consent from third parties, the scope of data portability is limited only to the data concerning exclusively the data subject. Article 20(3) states a prevalence of the right to erasure on the right to data portability. It clarifies that data portability shall not apply to processing necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller. The root of this is the necessity to empower control rights of individuals in the private sector, where competition among private data controllers is present. Lastly, paragraph 4 states that the rights in paragraph 1 shall not affect the rights and freedoms of others. However, it does not grant full prevalence of other rights on data portability, rather only a non-prevalence rule between conflicting rights.

13. Definitional Concerns

As briefly mentioned above, the definition provided by Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation for data portability is highly controversial and rather unclear. This definition appears to be of general scope and leaves many questions unanswered, including which data must be shared with the provider in case of request and what is the actual meaning of the machine-readable formula. Given the lack of definitions of GDPR in this sense, WP29 attempted to answer these (and more) questions by sharing guidelines to help the comprehension of the regulation. EU-wide Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has now been replaced by the new European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and, in the case of the UK, by the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). However, the lecture of the GDPR cannot prescind from the WP29’s guidelines.

13.1 The Structured, Commonly Used and Machine-Readable Format

One of the first points touched by Article 20 of the GDPR and, consequently, by the WP29’s guidelines, is the “structured, commonly used and machine readable” requirement for data portability.^[71]Beside this wording, the GDPR does not provide any explanation of what criteria should data satisfy in order to be machine-readable and, thus, be valid under the provision of the GDPR. In this circumstance, the WP29’s guidelines come to our rescue specifying that this requirement, together with the terms structured and commonly used, consists in a “set of minimal requirements that should facilitate the interoperability of the data format provided by the data controller”.^[72]However, this specification is still very broad, so it is necessary to resort to Recital 21 of the Directive 2013/37/EU which defines machine-readable as: “[A] file format structured so that software applications can easily identify, recognize and extract specific data, including individual statements of fact, and their internal structure. [...] Machine-readable formats can be open or proprietary; they can be formal standards or not. Documents encoded in a file format that limits automatic processing, because the data cannot, or cannot easily, be extracted from them, should not be considered to be in a machine-readable format”.^[73]

In order to complete this eclectic framework, it is essential to mention Regulation 1025/2012 Annex II which provides, for the EU system, a standard setting based on a few principles including “openness”, “consensus”, and “transparency”.^[74]Additionally, a further (and maybe better) overview on what is considered a machine-readableformat comes from the UK. Specifically, the Open Data Handbook states that machine-readable data is “[d]ata in a data format that can be automatically read and processed by a computer”.^[75]

Furthermore, Regulation 2 of the Re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations 2015 provides ulterior details, stating: “A file format structured so that software applications can easily identify, recognise and extract specific data, including individual statements of fact, and their internal structure”.^[76]Moreover, the UK’s independent authority ICO opens the machine-readable data to the possibility of being directly available to applications that request that data over the web. This is undertaken by means of an application programming interface (API).^[77]

However, this combination of different sources only gives partial foundation to the enforcement of data portability, given that the machine-readable requirement must be read in combination with the two other requirements mentioned by Article 20 of the GDPR: structured and commonly used. For both these terms, the GDPR does not provide any clear explanation but, once again, the WP29 intervenes to clarify the extent of those requirements. By requiring data, the GDPR means that “data controllers should provide as many metadata with the data as possible at the best possible level of granularity, which preserves the precise meaning of exchanged information”.^[78] Furthermore, the WP29 indicates, as an example, how a .pdf is considered not sufficient because it does not guarantee the effective re-use of data. Moving on our second requirement, it is possible to extract a definition of what it is considered “commonly used” by interpreting the words of Article 20 of the GDPR, in the sense that as long as the format makes the transmission of data from one controller to another “technically feasible”,^[79] it must be considered commonly used. However, practically speaking there are no concrete examples in the EU system to show data controllers what data should look like when subject to portability. Once again, it is the ICO that suggests three data formats: Comma Separated Values (CSV), JavaScript Object Notation (JSON), Extensible Markup Language (XML), thus specifying that this is not an exhaustive list.

It goes without saying that, on one hand, the same typology of examples we find in the English system is desirable on a EU level, in order to give data controllers a useful guideline to base their actions on. However, on the other hand, such specification could potentially constitute an infringement of the rule of technological neutrality. In essence, should laws be technology specific or technology neutral?^[80]Acknowledging the impossibility of providing an univocal answer to this question, it must be recognized that, beside the disadvantages that a technology neutral rule brings, in the EU system it was specifically designed to cover new technologies as they develop.^[81]To sum up, data portability requires specific technologies for its implementation but so far only little guidance has been provided to data controllers with regards to compliance. Even regarding interoperability, Article 20 is lacking a mandatory provision although WP29 states that “interoperability and the production of interoperable systems are only desired outcomes”.^[82]

As a matter of fact, making data interoperable across different platforms is a key step to reach the actual implementation of data portability. At the moment, the only foundation to interoperability is constituted by the framework directive 2002/21 EC rec. 31^[83] which, dealing with interoperability of digital interactive television services and digital television equipment, was rather outdated and therefore, abrogated by the Directive (EU) 2018/1972. Following the EU Decision 2015/2240, interoperability is defined as: “[T]he ability of disparate and diverse organisations to interact towards mutually beneficial and agreed common goals, involving the sharing of information and knowledge between the organisations, through the business processes they support, by means of the exchange of data between their respective ICT systems”.^[84]

Although the structure of interoperability in the EU is quite embryonic, an actual development in this sense is pivotal in order to promote competition by allowing various systems to communicate with one another. This could be potentially done through real-time data sharing across services (e.g., having a single account log-in across multiple different online services).^[85]Advancing the awareness of businesses and consumers on interoperability and portability is expected to greatly benefit both the market and the consumer protection and it is, therefore, more than desirable.

13.2 What Data Fall within the Scope of Application of the GDPR?

Briefly recalling the guidelines provided by EU-wide Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29), it must be observed how they provide a broad range of data that are supposed to be included in a potential response to the request of a data provider. Pursuant to Article 20, three conditions must be satisfied to see those principles of interoperability and portability - we have largely discussed - applied:

a) personal data concerning the data subject;

b) data provided by the data subject;

c) shall not adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.

Specifically, the first condition implies that only personal data are subject to data portability.^[86] The term personal data and its definition are key issues to the application of the General Data Protection Regulation. The term is defined in Article 4 (1) as “any information which are related to an identified or identifiable natural person”.

The second condition narrows the application of Article 20 to those data “actively and knowingly provided by the data subject as well as data gathered by virtue of the use of the data controller’s service or servicing device”.^[87]Traditionally, we identify those data as account data (e.g., mailing address, user name, age). However, those personal data that are generated by and collected from the activities of users must be included.^[88]

What is clearly missing in this description is the category of inferred data. Inferred data (or derived data) are typically not considered as “provided by the data subject” and include personal data that are generated by a service provider (e.g., algorithmic results).^[89] Certainly, the lack of this kind of data reduces the scope of the GDPR but, nonetheless, its inclusion would constitute an infringement of companies’ right to property.

Moving to the third condition, it is stated in order to avoid the transmission of data belonging to non-consenting data subjects. Even whenever personal data of third parties are included in the data set with consent, transmitted from a data subject to a data controller, another legal process must be identified.^[90]

All the conditions mentioned above are expressly meant to protect both the actors of data portability; however, in order to complete the framework of consumers’ rights, it is worth mentioning the right to transparency. As a matter of fact, consumers should have knowledge of how the data is processed. Companies that are transparent about the information they gather and how they process them give customers control and awareness of their personal data. Making the exchange transparent will be increasingly important in building trust between consumers and company, paying off – on the long term – with a greater loyalty to the company and the service offered.^[91]

14. Efficacy of Data Portability

14.1 Data Subjects’ Awareness

As it was already mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, Article 20 of the GDPR states that the right to data portability allows individuals to “receive the personal data concerning him or her, which he or she has provided to a controller, in a structured, commonly used and machine-readable format and have the right to transmit those data to another controller without hindrance from the controller to which the personal data have been provided”. ^[92]As a consequence, the awareness of the individual subject to this right is the key to an efficient portability. In fact, data subjects can greatly be empowered by data liquidity. Not only will they be able to strengthen their control over the data they share with companies, but they will also, by exercising this right, promote competitiveness, innovation, and security.

By definition, data portability is tightly linked to the users’ ability to obtain and transfer their personal data in an organised and machine-readable format to another data controller. So, contrary to interoperability that refers to the ability of software and computer systems to exchange information, portability has a strong human dimension and must be user-proof (Users being generally understood as humans that don’t have a legal and technological background).

In a study in 2019, scholars from the University College London reviewed 160 privacy policies across the world from Internet of Things vendors to “est the availability of information provided to users on the RtDP”.^[93] Such policies should specify which data are being collected, on what basis (justification), how they are processed and how long they will be held. Additionally, and always on the basis of the GDPR, vendors should inform the users of their right to have the data removed or provided to them and consequently they should tell the users who can be contacted. Finally, the information provided to users on the RtDP needs to be understandable. The study shows that only 63% of the 160 privacy policies referenced to data portability explicitly and among those, 56 stated that the users had a RtDP without further development. And if 23 of those 63 privacy policies mentioned the right to transmit data to another data controller under Article 20 of the GDPR, none of them gave further information about how to request this transmission. The analysis concluded that data subjects’ awareness was limited by the lack of clear information and the use of complex legal language directly copied from the GDPR most of the time.

Given the fact that a lot of users don’t read privacy policies, it would be interesting to make a first step toward not only making the privacy policies GDPR-compliant but also toward building interest and trust by, for example, publishing portability impact assessments. In fact, a lack of interest and trust from users could damage companies in the long run since “preserving [this] right (…) requires providers to keep switching costs for consumers low, while data portability implementation and maintenance costs for online services rise”.^[94] To conclude, enforcing data portability implies taking user-centric legal and technical measures but also addressing the challenges encountered by companies.

14.2 Enforcement: How to Strengthen It

With 331 breach notifications per day and a total of 158.5 million euros between January 2020 and January 2021,^[95]DLA found that the compliance culture to GDPR is positively evolving. In fact, the efficiency of portability is first and foremost linked to culture and so, more generally, to awareness and information. The first step to increase efficiency and make progress is thus to educate companies (codes of conduct and impact assessments) and mostly small and medium enterprises and start-ups, as they have less revenue and may not see the benefits of implementing portability. Information campaigns should also aim at educating data subjects as they are the centre of portability.

Other soft measures include preparing GDPR-compliant templates that ensure a clear and transparent information of users and the development of new portability-related human figures. With the birth of GDPR new roles have been created and should be implemented in relation to portability. The Data Protection Officer mentioned in the GDPR is a good example of the new figures that are needed to advise companies and supervise the application of the GDPR. A growing number of training courses are preparing individuals to be certified data protection officers. Certification of these new actors could be an added value in the portability process as it can increase the trust of data subjects as well as warrant a human interaction in this process.

In order to strengthen data portability and attract users, legal measures should also be taken to clarify the definitional limits mentioned earlier. However, regulations and legislative measures also need to develop how data portability interacts with other fields of law such as property law, which varies greatly between the Member States of the EU.

However, to enhance data portability and truly benefit from data liquidity, technical enforcement measures also need to be taken. The Data Transfer Project (DTP) is a good example of technologies developed to increase secure and direct transfer of data between two service providers. This project uses open-source code to transfer the data from one platform to another, thus enabling a RtDP at the click of a button. This idea of a simpler user-experience in terms of portability has been pushed further with the proposition of a “continuous data portability”.^[96]

Such mechanisms would ensure real time data transfer and attract consumers but on the condition that proper standards are developed. Furthermore, portability compliance and particularly the technologies mentioned above require considerable expenses due to staffing and technology costs. As a consequence, economic incentives to companies in the form of aids or a reduction in taxes would be a considerable additional measure.

14.3 Interim Conclusion

As it was detailed above, the EU General Data Protection Regulation grants the right to data portability. The ability to move, copy and transfer personal data represents a revolutionary step towards data interoperability since it creates a society where individuals have greater control and innovation is propelled by companies competing. Article 20 GDPR and WP29 show the right to data portability is not only concerned with data protection, but also economic rights. Therefore, it is a powerful tool for European citizens which is, however, not yet properly developed. To enforce data portability, technical measures must be taken - for example, the Data Transfer Project, which increases the security and efficiency of data transactions through an open source which features data portability between online platforms, but it is currently partnered by a limited number of companies.

In conclusion, it is certainly easy to agree that a similar system would create a simpler user experience. However, the current portability rules are insufficient and must be further clarified on their application before actually providing benefits through their enforcement.

15. Conclusion

The aim of this paper was to consistently argue on three of the main issues in the regulation of data driven activities: B2G and B2B data sharing, as well as data portability. The analysis of the current regulatory framework led the authors of this paper to acknowledge and, in turn, highlight the main lacks and uncertainties in such regulations, which still hold a notable margin of improvement before being effective in their enforcement. On a general point of view, what is common to these three fields is certainly the lack of data culture. Most of the actors of the data scene are still not perfectly aware of their rights and duties as well as the potential of data transactions. In particular, in relation to data sharing, the European Union is attempting to ensure that European businesses are up to date with the economic opportunities available with data sharing. The Data Act and the Data Governance Act are meant to ensure fairness, legal certainty and data portability in relation to all stakeholders. However, the need for standardisation and lack of a legal definition for data-sharing platforms and intermediaries has caused shortcomings. Data space projects such as KRAKEN and TRUSTS have offered an interesting structural model for increasing trust in response to the EU data strategy and regulations, but they are still not properly regulated. Looking at other jurisdictions mentioned in the paper, India’s unique Data Nationalisation and, on the other side, the US’s push to control large companies show the international need for legally semi-mandatory data sharing systems which could inspire (given the fact that they cannot be fully adopted in our continent) a proper European system. As a matter of fact, by comparing these systems, the Union can come to a conclusion about the direction of its own data sharing approach. In conclusion, business to government data sharing and business to business data sharing can bring a large array of potential public benefits which has been shown to aid governments in response to ecological and metrological crises, as well as national health crises like Covid-19. However, not only do nations and their citizens benefit from data sharing, but so do businesses, both in the B2B and B2G formula. The private sector can benefit both financially and from an innovation point of view, as a result of the data shared.

At the present moment, businesses point towards issues (that are evident from the Data Act consultation) in relation to why they do not share data. The fear of a distorted competition resulting from this practice and a consequent loss for the business itself still hold companies from committing to data sharing. However, despite media information campaigns, it is questionable as to whether businesses are correctly informed on why and how to share data. The lack of knowledge on the best practises to safely and profitably exchange data, prevent many companies from engaging in data exchanges, or at least limits this exchange to those companies which have the financial and legal means to actually implement this practice. A similar lack of knowledge is also acknowledged in the data portability field, where most of the data subjects are not aware of this right granted to them by the GDPR, as well as companies are not aware or do not know how to implement their duty towards data subjects on data portability. Certainly, it would be useful to educate companies and mostly small and medium enterprises and start-ups (through codes of conduct and impact assessments) to the implementation of data portability, but this issue, in addition to the definitional concerns largely discussed in the paper, makes data portability hardly applicable at the moment.

In conclusion, many steps must still be taken towards the concrete application of all the various possibilities that data driven activities offer. However, the authors of this paper strongly believe that the current activity of the European Union is headed in the right direction: to finally overcome the issues analysed above and create an environment in which data’s potential is exploited at its maximum.

16. Ex-Post Review

An addition must be added to this paper concerning the Data Act Proposal. Since the writing of this paper, there has been a vital update to data regulation within the European Union. The European Union responded to the position of the private sector through the Proposal on harmonized rules on fair access to and use of data^[97] published on the 23^rd of February 2022.

The Data Act Proposal addresses how, and which stakeholders can access data produced in all economic activities within the European Union. This draft is complemented by the Data Governance Act.^[98]The Data Act Proposal harmonizes the rules on fair access to and use of data. It ensures maximization of the economic value of data through ensuring control over one’s own data and by enabling data to be used for innovative purposes. To reach this goal there needed to be fair access to and use of data, this proposal addresses this concern particularly by increasing regulation on data generated from smart devices. Smart connected devices such as mobile phones, electric cars and laptops are the most common data producing devices. This builds onto a key area of an ideal multiple-sector governance framework. It would encourage data sharing horizontally between private economic actors and the Union or member state governments, meaning that the data can be used in legislating on issues impacting these private economic actors. The draft legislation would aim to pinpoint data transfers to non- Member State governments, making them illegal. The regulation may prohibit this type of sharing however it will push economic actors, such as Tech Giants, to share more data. As such, this would create a ‘rulebook’ for economic actors in relation to data.^[99] The Commission puts forward that, the rights of those using the smart connected devices will be increased by ensuring additional rules are placed on the corporations which control and own the creation of such devices. The users will gain more access to the data generated by their devices, more control over whether third parties can access such data, and if so, which third parties are allowed. This ensures that the user, or data generator has full say and knowledge of where their data is used. Users can disallow an unknown third party but can consent to others such as repair services. In this way the aim of fairness is achieved.

The proposal has been met with opposition from tech giants and lobbyists such as Brussels tech lobby CCIA and German engineering lobby VDMA. They stress the lack of contractual freedom for companies, and the economic pitfalls of the regulation disallowing sharing in the event of an access request from Non-member state countries. For example, a study done by CCIA found that these restrictions could cost 0.6% of the European Unions’ GDP.^[100] On the other side, this proposal is not only achieving the aim of fairness, but it also increases quality of data. Despite the opposition by tech lobbyists, it is particularly necessary when considering B2G data sharing in the case of emergencies.^[101] In light of, the COVID-19 Pandemic, the European Union must consider how best to prepare for pan-European disasters. In this digital world, if another disaster on the scale of the pandemic occurred, consider if the Ukrainian-Russian war impacted European Member States, then effective B2G data sharing is essential. Therefore, despite the concerns of lobbyist the Commission has continued with this proposal.

Overall, the proposal aims to unlock the data potential of the Union.^[102] It allows for non-binding contractual terms for startups and small companies to ensure the allowance of innovation and good competition. It creates better clarity on data from smart connected devices. It sets rules for member states to ensure that all Union members are governed by the same regulatory framework. Therefore, this proposal is a welcomed step in the European data regulation framework and serves towards the goal of efficient data portability.

* LLM Candidates in in European Business and Social Law at Bocconi University.

**Adjunct Professor at Bocconi University.

^[1] ‘Data Regulation and Policy’, Prof. L. Zoboli, seminar offered within the LLM in European Business and Social Law at Bocconi University.

^[2]‘Business-to-government data sharing: Questions and answers’, European Commission, 18 November 2021, available at https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/faqs/business-government-data-sharing-questions-and-answers#ecl-inpage-business-to-government-(b2g)-data-sharing.

^[3] ‘Public Consultation on the Data Act’, European Commission, available at https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/public-consultation-data-act-summary-report.

^[4] The European Union has already undertaken steps in the G2B sector. Directive 2019/1024 on open data and the re-use of public sector information, also known as the Open Data Directive, encourages Member States to share material held by public sector bodies at national, regional, and local level. This includes material held by ministries, state agencies, municipalities, and organisations under the control of public authorities. The Directive’s scope falls within three main areas: data which public undertakings make available for re-use, research data resulting from public funding, and transparency requirements for public–private agreements (as to avoid exclusive arrangements). So far, 19 Member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Spain, Estonia, Croatia, Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Netherlands, Austria, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Finland, and Sweden) have not yet implemented the Directive. On September 30, 2021, the European Commission sent a letter of formal notice, the first step in the infringement procedure, to the Member States in question. The Open Data Directive also requires the adoption by the Commission, via a future implementing act, of a list of high-value datasets to be provided free of charge.

^[5] ‘A European Strategy for Data’, European Commission, available at https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/strategy-data.

^[6] Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on European data governance, COM/2020/767 final, (2020).

^[7] The FFD (Regulation 2018/1807) aims at removing obstacles to the free movement of non-personal data across Member States and IT systems in Europe. The purposes of the Regulation are the following: i) incentivizing the free movement of non-personal data across the EU; ii) making data available for regulatory control; iii) facilitating the switch of cloud service providers for professional users; iv) being consistent with the Union’s cybersecurity package.

^[8] The CSA (Regulation 2019/881) grants a permanent mandate to ENISA, the agency tasked with helping the Commission and the Member States in meeting requirements of network and information security and gives it more resources and new powers. ENISA also assists Member States and coordinates EU response to large-scale cyberattacks.

^[9] Directive 2019/1024.

^[10] Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

^[11] ‘Towards A European Strategy on Business-To-Government Data Sharing for The Public Interest’, European Commission, available at https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/d96edc29-70fd-11eb-9ac9-01aa75ed71a1.

^[12] ETNO policy position on the European strategy for data (European Telecommunications Network Association 2020).

^[13] J. Debussche, J. Césae, ‘Data-related legal, ethical and social issues’, Two Birds, August 2019.

^[14] H. Richter, ‘The Law and Policy of Government Access to Private Sector Data (‘B2G Data Sharing’)’, Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition, 2020.

^[15] G. Ramazzoti, ‘Prospects of ‘Business to Government’ data sharing in Europe: Insights from Covid-19 and political philosophy’, International Development Research Network, 2020.

^[16] IDC, The Lisbon Council, The European Data Market Monitoring Tool: Key facts & figures, first policy conclusions, data landscape and quantified stories, 2016.

^[17] ibid.

^[18] M. Colas et al., ‘Cracking the Data Conundrum: How Successful Companies Make Big Data Operational’, Capgemini Consulting, 2014, available at https://www.capgemini.com/consulting/wp-content/uploads/sites/30/2017/07/big_data_pov_03-02-15.pdf.

^[19] UN Development Group, ‘Data privacy, ethics and protection. Guidance note on big data for achievement of the 2030 agenda’, available athttps://www.unglobalpulse.org/policy/privacy-and-data-protection-principles/#:~:text=The%20Guidance%20Note%20on%20Data,offerings%2C%20and%20shared%20with%20UNDG.

^[20] L. Romanoff, ‘Privacy and ethics in international public sector’, UN Global Pulse Workshop on Data Ethics, 2019.

^[21] T. Klein, S. Verhulst, ‘Access to New Data Sources for Statistics: Business Models and Incentives for the Corporate Sector’, PARIS21, Discussion Paper No. 10, March 2017, available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3141446.

^[22] W. B. Werther, D. Chandler, ‘Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Brand Insurance’, Business Horizons, 2005.

^[23] B. Tau, M. Hackman, ‘Federal Agencies Use Cell Phone Location Data for Immigration Enforcement’, Wall Street Journal, 2020, available at https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-agencies-use-cellphone-location-data-for-immigration-enforcement-11581078600.

^[24] Aljazeera ‘US Military Buys Location Data of Popular Muslim Apps: Report’, 2020, available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/11/17/report-us-military-buying-location-data-on-popular-muslim-apps.

^[25] European Commission, ‘Towards A European Strategy on Business-To-Government Data Sharing for The Public Interest’, 2020.

^[26] ibid.

^[27] ‘Investing in European Research - Tax Incentives for Research’, Ec.europa.eu, 2006, available at https://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/policy/tax_incentives_en.htm.

[28] ibid.

^[29] G. Cavalier, ‘For A European Approach To R&D Tax Incentive(S)’, European Law Institute, 2021, available at https://europeanlawinstitute.eu/projects-publications/completed-projects-old/tax-law/.

^[30] L. Kinnear, ‘Does Government Have a Role to Play in Corporate Social Responsibility?’, Giving Force, available at https://www.givingforce.com/does-government-have-a-role-to-play-in-corporate-social-responsibility/.

^[31] W. B. Werther, D. Chandler, ‘Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility as Global Brand Insurance’, Business Horizons, 2005.

^[32] Directive 2014/95/EC.

^[33] Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU, Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Regulation (EU) No. 537/2014, as regards corporate sustainability reporting, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0189.

^[34] European Innovation Council, ‘The European Capital of Innovation Awards’, , 2021, available at https://eic.ec.europa.eu/eic-funding-opportunities/eic-prizes/european-capital-innovation-awards_en.

^[35] European Business Awards, ‘Get the recognition your Business deserves’, 2021, available at https://www.businessawardseurope.com/about.

^[36] ‘EC D-G, Study on data sharing between companies in Europe’, Everis Benelux, 2018.

^[37] ibid.

^[38] Data Governance Act, COM/2020/767 final.

^[39] European Commission, ‘Data Act & amended rules on the legal protection of databases’, 2021, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13045-Data-Act-&-amended-rules-on-the-legal-protection-of-databases/public-consultation_en.

^[40] European Commission, ‘Directorate-General for competition, communication from the commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions. A competition policy fit for new challenges’, 2021, available at https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/documents-register/detail?ref=COM(2021)713&lang=en.

^[41] ibid.

^[42]Gaia-x, ‘What is Gaia-x’, 2021, available at https://www.data-infrastructure.eu/GAIAX/Navigation/EN/Home/home.html

^[43] TRUSTS, ‘Motivation & Objectives - TRUSTS'’, available at https://www.trusts-data.eu/motivation-objectives/.

^[44] H. Richter, P.R. Slowinski, ‘The Data Sharing Economy: On the Emergence of New Intermediaries’, International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law volume, 4–29, 2019, available at https://doi.org/10.1007/s40319-018-00777-7.

^[45] Report By the Committee of Experts on Non-Personal Data Governance Framework, 2020, available at https://ourgovdotin.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kris-gopalakrishnan-committee-report-on-non-personal-data-gover nance-framework.pdf.

^[46] ibid.

^[47] T.E. Hardwicke et al.., ‘Data Availability, Reusability, And Analytic Reproducibility: Evaluating the Impact of A Mandatory Open Data Policy at The Journal Cognition’, Royal Society Open Science, 2018.

^[48] L. Zoboli, ‘'Fueling the European Digital Economy: A Regulatory Assessment of B2B Data Sharing’,

European Business Law Review, 31, Issue 4, pp. 663-692, 2020, available at https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/European+Business+Law+Review/31.4/EULR2020026

^[49] N. Pahwa, ‘Nationalisation of Data Will Destroy Value for Businesses, Investors’, Times of India, 2020, available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/nationalisation-of-data-will-destroy-value-for-businesses-investors/.

^[50] The New York City Council ‘A Local Law to Amend the Administrative Code of The City Of New York, In Relation to Data on Orders Placed Through Third-Party Food Delivery Services’, 2021, available at https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=4951001&GUID=4CB11989-5925-418B-9627-B2AED230D67F.

^[51] ‘AB-2149. Food Delivery Platforms’, California Legislative Information, 2020, available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB2149

^[52] B. Cyphers, H. Tsukayama, «Why Data-Sharing Mandates Are the Wrong Way to Regulate Tech», Electronic Frontier Foundation, 2021, available at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/08/why-data-sharing-mandates-are-wrong-way-regulate-tech.

^[53] J. Prüfer, «Mandatory Data Sharing», Tilburg School of Economics and Management, available at https://prufer.net/2021/02/04/mandatory-data-sharing-development-of-a-test-governance-structure/.

^[54] Support Centre for Data Sharing, ‘Mandatory Data Sharing Vs. Data Sovereignty: How to Connect Global Data Dots?’, 2021, available at https://eudatasharing.eu/news/mandatory-data-sharing-vs-data-sovereignty-how-connect-global-data-dots.

^[55] ‘Assessment of the EU Member States’ Rules on Health Data in The Light Of GDPR’, Publications Office of the European Union, 2021.

^[56] Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

^[57] P. De Hert et al., ‘The right to data portability in the GDPR: Towards user-centric interoperability of digital services’, Computer Law & Security Review, 2018, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364917303333.

^[58] ‘Right to data portability’, Information Commissioner’s Office, 2021, available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-data-portability/.

^[59] L. Irwin, ‘The GDPR: Understanding the right to data portability’, IT Governance, 2020, available at https://www.itgovernance.eu/blog/en/the-gdpr-understanding-the-right-to-data-portability.

^[60] Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data.

^[61] P. De Hhert et al., ‘The right to data portability in the GDPR: Towards user-centric interoperability of digital services’, Computer Law & Security Review, 2018, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364917303333.

^[62] ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Guidelines on the right to data portability’, European Commission, WP 242 rev.01, supra p 4.

^[63] ‘Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation’, European Commission, Article 29 WP, WP 203, p. 46-47.

^[64] ‘European Commission Staff Working Document on the free flow of data and emerging issues of the European data economy accompanying the document communication building a European data economy’, European Commission, 9 final, 2017, p. 47.

^[65] EDPS recommendations on the EU’s options for data protection reform, (2015/C 301/01).

^[66] Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

^[67] ibid.

^[68] ibid.

^[69] Regulation (EU) 2016/679.

^[70] Annex 2 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions ‘Towards interoperability for European public services’, European Commission, COM/2010/0744 final, 2010.

^[71] Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Guidelines on the right to data portability’, European Commission, WP 242 rev.01.

^[72] ibid.

^[73] Amending Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public sector information.

^[74] Regulation (EU) n. 1025/2012.

^[75] ‘Machine-Readable’, Open Data Handbook, 2018, available at https://opendatahandbook.org/glossary/en/terms/machine-readable/.

^[76] The Re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations (2015), no. 1415.

^[77] ‘Right to Data Portability’, Information Commissioner’s Office, available at https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/right-to-data-portability/.

^[78] ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Guidelines on the right to data portability’, European Commission, WP 242 rev.01,

^[79] J. Wong, T. Henderson, ‘The right to data portability in practice: exploring the implications of the technologically neutral GDPR’, International Data Privacy Law, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2019.

^[80] B.A. Greenberg, ‘Rethinking Technology Neutrality’, Minnesot a Law Review , Vol. 100, p. 1495, 2016, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2748932

^[81] Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council ‘Data protection as a pillar of citizens’ empowerment and the EU’s approach to the digital transition - two years of application of the General Data Protection Regulation’, European Commission, COM (2020) 264 final, Brussels, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0264&rid=5

^[82] ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Guidelines on the right to data portability’, European Commission, WP 242 rev.01.

^[83] Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive).

^[84] Decision (EU) 2015/2240 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2015 establishing a programme on interoperability solutions and common frameworks for European public administrations, businesses and citizens (ISA2 programme) as a means for modernising the public sector, [2015] OJ L318/1, art 2.

^[85] ‘Data portability, interoperability and competition’, OECD, 2021, available at https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/data-portability-interoperability-and-competition.htm

^[86] ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Guidelines on the right to data portability’, European Commission, WP 242 rev.01.

^[87] ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Guidelines on the right to data portability’, European Commission, WP 242 rev.01

^[88] ibid.

^[89] ibid.

^[90] ‘Article 29 Data Protection Working Party: Guidelines on the right to data portability’, European Commission, WP 242 rev.01.

^[91] T. Morey et al., ‘Customer Data: Designing for Transparency and Trust’, Harvard Business Review, 2015, available at https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-data-designing-for-transparency-and-trust.

^[92] Regulation 2016/679, Article 20 (1).

^[93] S. Turner, J. Galindo Quintero, J. Lis, L.M. Tancczer, ‘The exercisability of the right to data portability in the emerging Internet of Things (IoT) environment’, New Media & Society, 23(10), 2021, pp. 2861-2881.

^[94] E. Sydmoudis, S. Mager, S. Kuebler-Wachendorff, P. Pizzinini, J. Grossklags, J. Kranz, ‘Data Portability between Online Services: An Empirical Analysis on the Effectiveness of GDPR Art. 20’, Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, 2021, pp. 351-372.

^[95] DLA Piper. GDPR fines and data breach survey: January 2021.

^[96] J. Krämer, P. Senellart, A. De Streel, ‘Economic implications and regulatory challenges’, Centre on regulation in Europe, June 2020.

^[97] Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act) Brussels, 23.2.2022 COM (2022) 68 final 2022/0047 (COD).

^[98] Proposal for a Regulation on European data governance (Data Governance Act) 25/11/2020 COM (2020) 767.

^[99] P. Haeck, «EU unveils industrial data rulebook», Politico, 2022.

^[100]«EU Data Policy Update. Dr2 consultants», CCIA, 10 March 2021, available at https://dr2consultants.eu/dr2-consultants-launches-new-eu-data-policy-services.

^[101] Schechner, Mackrael, «Tech Giants to Be Forced to Share More Data Under EU Proposal», 2022.

^[102] Fitouri, «Data Act: Right ambition to unlock data potential, but obligations would hold back Europe’s data-driven recovery», DigitalEurope, 2022.

“Bundesverfassungsgericht Zur Ezb”: Another Blow to the European Union Post-Brexit?

Articles — 2023-04-16T11:29:45+00:00

This paper examines the consequences and implications of the decision of the BVerfG of 5 May 2020 not only regarding EU law, but also regarding the sustainability of the Eurozone. It explores the implications of this decision at the time of the Covid-19 pandemic and how it might be an early-onset of the collapse of the Euro. Likewise, it examines the consequences that the collapse of the Euro would have for Germany. Finally, it discusses how what appears to be a bane may be a blessing in disguise and a historical tipping point that could allow for the much hoped-for and expected reform of the EU and its internal functioning.

1. Introduction

The Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG), the German Constitutional Court, made history on 5 May 2020. It declared partly unconstitutional the European Central Bank (ECB)’s quantitative easing policy.^[1] The policy consists in the ECB buying government bonds to inject money into the economy of the countries of the Euro-area and expand their economic activity, thus absorbing the debts of the worst-off EU member states. It participates of the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP). It was launched on 22 January 2015. It concerns the purchase of bonds issued by the governments and agencies of the Eurozone including bonds issued by the European institutions.^[2]

In this context, the ECB undertook to respect several requirements. One of these criteria was proportionality. Fiscally, it means, for instance, that if the ECB undertook to buy €2bn of German bonds with a 6% coupon, it would receive €120,000,000 interests annually from the Finanzagentur GmbH (FA) – the German Treasury – and would have to return this €120,000,000 annually to the Bundesbank (BB) – the German Central Bank – with the responsibility for it to remit it to the FA. The distribution of interest had to be pro rata with the national equity shares held at the ECB.^[3] This means that the ECB could not, logically, return more equity shares to a member state than it had received in the first place. Another requirement was not to purchase more than 33% of a particular issue of bonds of a central government of a member state of the Euro-area or more than 33% of its outstanding securities.^[4] Likewise, the ECB undertook not to favour any individual member state by becoming their majority creditor. This was later affirmed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).^[5]

However, Mario Draghi, former President of the ECB, announced in his introductory statement to the press conference held by the ECB on 10 March 2016 that the ECB had decided to increase the purchase rate from 33% to 50%.^[6] This decision followed from the European sovereign debt crisis. It purported to revitalise the most shaken EU economies and guarantee European financial stability, especially in the Eurozone. As a result, the ECB became the majority creditor of some member states. Simultaneously, it flouted the pro rata criterion. The ECB bond-buying programme led to a yearly transfer from the countries whose bonds were bought to the countries whose bond were not bought, thus leaving the most virtuous countries, especially Germany, bear the cost of the financial mismanagement of the least responsible. In so doing, the ECB engaged the national central banks of the Euro-area in loss sharing activities.^[7]

Accordingly, a group of German citizens raised a priority preliminary ruling before the BVerfG on the compatibility of the decision of the ECB with the German Constitution and the interests of the German people. They considered that their fundamental rights provided under the federal Grundgesetz had been violated by the Bundestag and the Bundesregierung for failure to take steps against the ECB’s unfair quantitative easing policy (PSPP) and for failure to bring the ECB before the European Court of Justice (ECJ) so that it could review the legality of this decision, determine the infringement of an essential procedural requirement, find an infringement of the Treaties, or identify a misuse of powers under Art. 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).^[8]

Thus, the decision of the BVerfG asserts and revives heated discussions about the supremacy of EU law over the domestic laws of its member states. Likewise, it menaces the stability and sustainability of the Eurozone as it gives carte blanche to the Bundesbank to withdraw from it or, rather, disapply the policies that are at odds with the interests of the German people and state. It is, however, doubtful that such circumstance would be beneficial to Germany.

Against the foregoing background, this paper examines the consequences and implications of the decision of the BVerfG not only regarding EU law, but also regarding the sustainability of the Eurozone. It explores the implications of this decision at the time of the Covid-19 outbreak and how it might be an early-onset of the collapse of the Euro. Likewise, it examines the consequences that the collapse of the Euro would have for Germany. Finally, it discusses how what appears to be a bane may be a blessing in disguise and a historical tipping point that could allow for the much hoped-for and expected reform of the EU and its internal functioning.

2. Primacy of German Law Over EU Law: Historical Overview of the German Democratic Model

Law is the cement of social life in Germany. It is “the rule on which the whole order, the beauty, and all the agreeableness of human life depends”, to misquote Pudendorf.^[9] This is true since time immemorial. Already in 1356, when what would be Germany was no more than a mosaic of states, the Germans developed laws to hold together all forms of social life across the entities that composed it. They construed law as a basic set of arrangements devised according to necessity, reason, or principle as opposed to whim or impulse. It allows people to live their daily lives without fearing that their rights would be infringed. So much is illustrated by the Bulla Aurea, a decree issued by the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire at Nuremberg and Metz to fix for ca. 400 years, important aspects of its constitutional structure.^[10] It is the seminal document in German constitutional history. It is to German constitutionalism what Magna Carta is to English and, by extension, British constitutionalism.^[11]Another seminal constitutional text was the Augsburg Settlement (1555), an official document that ended the religious strife between Protestants and Catholics. It ascertained the permanent schism of Christianity within the Holy Roman Empire. It permitted the cohabitation of Catholics and Protestants within the same Empire and allowed princes to elect either Lutheranism or Roman Catholicism as the official confession of their state according to the rule cuius regio, eius religio.^[12] Another major document was, of course, Frederick the Great’s Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (1794), the first greatest compilation of law in the modern period after Justinian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis. It was dedicated to the rationalisation of the exercise of power through administrative codification.^[13]

This long constitutional tradition took a whole new dimension with the advent and fall of Nazism. The latter was the decisive factor that precipitated the constitution of a definite body of fundamental principles and the establishment of precedents according to which Germany is acknowledged to be governed. It culminated in the adoption of the Grundgesetz, a basic norm, order, or rule that forms the underlying basis for German law and politics. Notably, it establishes German constitutional law above politics and other forms of governance that could pose a threat to the integrity and inviolability of Germany’s sovereignty and the rights of its people.^[14] Hence, the BVerfG has such a determining role in German social, legal, and political life nowadays. It is simultaneously the arbiter of political life, but also the mouthpiece of the democratic model that Germany endeavoured to achieve since the early-modern period.

Consequently, the BVerfG does not tolerate any contestation of its decisions, including from the EU although EU law takes, in theory, precedence over the domestic laws of the member states. It would be tantamount to contesting German law itself and, somehow, the raison d’être of the German state, something the BVerfG cannot allow. It has always been clear. It has always held that the participation of Germany to what became the European Union is contingent on the consistency of EU law with German law, especially German constitutional law. Indeed, already in 1974, the BVerfG ruled in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft that the primacy of EU law is subject to the existence of mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights in the order of the Union equivalent to those existing in the German constitutional order:^[15] “Solange der Integrationsprozeß der Gemeinschaft nicht so weit fortgeschritten ist, daß das Gemeinschaftsrecht auch einen von einem Parlament beschlossenen und in Geltung stehenden formulierten Katalog von Grundrechten enthält, der dem Grundrechtskatalog des Grundgesetzes adäquat ist, ist nach Einholung der in Art. 177 EWGV geforderten Entscheidung des Europäischen Gerichtshofes die Vorlage eines Gerichts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland an das Bundesverfassungsgericht im Normenkontrollverfahren zulässig und geboten, wenn das Gericht die für es entscheidungserhebliche Vorschrift des Gemeinschaftsrechts in der vom Europäischen Gerichtshof gegebenen Auslegung für unanwendbar hält, weil und soweit sie mit einem der Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes kollidier”.^[16]

Thus, it recognised the possibility for it to review the constitutionality of the acts of the Communities (now the EU) against the Grundgesetz. Likewise, it inferred that if there were no equivalent protection of fundamental rights within the order of the EU, it would overrule the alleged primacy of EU law and would substitute domestic law for it. It established, thereby, the first general and fundamental principle of EU law. It caused the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC now CJEU) to fill the gaps of the Treaty promptly. It formed the basis for the development of principles for the protection of fundamental rights in EU law. The CJEC drew inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the member states to identify the fundamental rights of EU law.^[17]Later, it recognised in Nold (1974) that such principles also had to be derived from the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948)^[18] and the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) in Rutili (1975).^[19] This led the BVerfG to adopt a second Solange decision in 1986 in which it acknowledged that the Communities provide sufficient protection to fundamental rights equivalent to that of the German constitution.^[20]It appeared more reticent in its decisions on Maastricht (1993)^[21]and Lisbon (2009)^[22]regarding the allocation of competences between the Union and the member states.

The decision of 5 May 2020 is the heir of this tradition. A far cry from the general assumption that it threatens the survival of the Eurozone,^[23] it merely determines that the ECB infringed the TFEU by expanding its quantitative easing policy in 2016, thus acting outside of its mandate and against the interests of the member states. The decision of the BVerfG is no more than a call to order or reminder that the Union and its institutions cannot overlook basic fundamental rights, infringe on the rights of its member states and their population, impose decisions undemocratically and, finally, decide on their own competence (see Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine).^[24]

Nonetheless, the judgement of 5 May 2020 is a declaration of war of the BVerfG on the CJEU. It contradicts the decision of the CJEU to the reference for a preliminary ruling that it had raised in which the later decided that the ECB’s policy did not infringe the Treaty and vindicated the action of the ECB.^[25] Thus, the decision of 5 May 2020 deems the CJEU equally uncaring with the German interests and regarded its judgment as a hinder to the cement of German social, political, and legal life: the Grundgesetz. Hence it opposed it with its constitutional censorship. This means that, to the BVerfG, as in 1974, EU law is only applicable to Germany if its slips past constitutional censorship.

However, the BVerfG did not contest the participation of Germany and the German Central Bank in the Eurozone in and of themselves. It only ruled that the ECB exceeded its mandate and violated the principle of democracy. It entails sovereignty and the right for each state to decide on its budgetary policy without it being imposed. It only acknowledged that if within three months from its judgment the Federal Diet and government did not obtain from the ECB that it drew new proportionality assessments of its quantitative easing policy protecting German interests, it would prohibit the German Central Bank from maintaining its participation to the PSPP scheme and prevent it from purchasing new bonds under the scheme. Likewise, it would require that they resold the securities already held and implement their own domestic policy consistently with the German constitution.^[26]The ruling of 5 May 2020 was, therefore, not a mandate to the German Government and Central Bank to leave the Eurozone completely should the ECB not produce any new assessments.

However, it remains no less that in adopting its ruling of 5 May 2020, the BVerfG acknowledged its supremacy over the CJEU in the construction of EU law. It cast aside the preliminary ruling it had sought in Case C‑493/17 which it deemed incomprehensible, arbitrary, and foul of the Grundgesetz.^[27] This is likely to affect the functioning of the Union. In fact, the ruling of the BVerfG has for its effect the subjugation of the ECB to German law. This is not only foul of the Treaty which explicitly provides that the latter is not subject to any national influence and is an independent body,^[28] but also it hampers the functioning of the ECB which may no longer be able to rely on its satellites, the national central banks, to fulfil its policies and support the many.

Likewise, this judicial great feat or coup d’éclat is likely to put Germany in an awkward position vis-à-vis its European partners. Its failure to follow its European obligations by way of its constitutional court might lead to it being sanctioned by the CJEU^[29]for failure to meet its treaty-obligations and may even lead to it leaving the Eurozone fair and square in the long-run. It would have much to lose than gain from this. Thus, the German government is in a dilemma. A double-edged sword of Damocles hangs over its head. The implications of the decision of 5 May 2020 on the ECB’s policy on the development of EU law must, therefore, be studied in more details.

3. Implications

3.1 Consequences in the Light of the Covid-19 Pandemic

The outbreak of the new coronavirus in January 2020,^[30]declared a pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020,^[31] compounded even more financial needs within the Union to prevent a severe economic decline and significant fall in the GDP of its member states already affected by bad public finance. Against the foregoing background, the ECB declared in April 2020 that it would pledge €750bn to fight the Covid-19 crash.^[32] At the same time, it announced that its bid would know no limitation and that it stood ready to commit even more money if required to fulfil its commitment to the Eurozone to counter the devastating effects of Covid-19 on the economy and the European single market.^[33]It acknowledged, thereby, that it would depart temporarily from the pro rata distribution key between each member state of the Euro-area.

The ECB named this new policy Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). It entails the purchase of commercial papers (i.e., unsecured promissory notes with a fixed maturity of about 6 months) issued by large corporations. This is because closure en masse in the past few weeks worried it.^[34] This new policy also entails the easing of the rules relating to the types of interests that the ECB usually accepts as security for the loan operations that it conducts so as to allow more business financing applications and foster European stability.^[35] Hence, Christine Lagarde argued in a tweet on 18 March 2020 that^[36][extraordinary] times require extraordinary action. There are no limits to our commitment to the euro. We are determined to use the full potential of our tools, within our mandate.

Her statement is reminiscent of the ECB’s ‘Whatever it takes’ policy during the sovereign debt crisis in 2016.^[37]Thus, the ECB gave itself another mandate to explore every alternative to maintain economic stability in the Union even if it means increasing its credit-buying operations and flouting some rules. It could, hypothetically, even decide to increase its purchase rate from 33% to 50% or more as in 2016 although its communiqué does not mention that explicitly.

Consequently, the ECB opted this time for targeted relief measures instead of general measures consisting, for instance, in lowering its base interest rate like its American^[38]and British counterparts.^[39]Its aim is truly to flood second-tier banks with liquidities they can loan to companies, corporations, and enterprises. Its policy comes at a time where securities exchange plummet,^[40]borrowing costs increase,^[41] and where the variances between the German public debt (one of the lowest) and that of other European countries keeps increasing especially in France, Spain, and Italy where it goes through the roof.^[42]

In this regard, the plaintiffs in the judgment of 5 May 2020 could rely on the ruling of the BVerfG to contest the participation of Germany to PEPP since it prompts Germany to contribute to the salvation of weaker economies while receiving very little in return. It follows from the decision of May 5, 2020, that this is contrary to the interest of the population that it serves whose welfare it must uphold under its Basic Law. Hence, the BVerfG could force Germany to opt out of the currency union unless one argues that the Union has mechanisms allowing it to compel its member states to adhere to all the rules attending to the European common monetary policy whatever happens, pace any domestic judicial ruling,^[43]especially since adhesion to the Euro was intended to be irreversible and irrevocable.^[44]

3.2 Significance for Germany and the European Union

The decision of the BVerfG brings back an old financial antagonism within the Union which dates back to Maastricht (1992). It concerns the active hostility and opposition between those northern European countries that were cautious of their public spend and were deemed stingy (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden) and those southern European countries less cautious of their public purse and frugal (e.g. France, Italy, Spain, Greece).^[45] Over the years, it has become the symbol of a dysfunctional Europe out of touch with the people. The eleven countries who ventured in creating an economic and monetary union did not elaborate enforcement mechanism for the convergence of their budgetary and economic policies. The participating states which were at distinct levels of development remained the master builders of their own budgetary policies. However, the latter was regulated by some rules. Once in the economic and monetary union, the member states pledged to maintain their annual general government deficit below or at no more than 3% of their gross domestic product (GDP) at market prices at the end of the preceding fiscal year.^[46]Likewise, they pledged that their nominal gross government debt relative to their GDP at market prices would not exceed 60% at the end of the preceding fiscal year.^[47]

However, the Treaty was breached even before the Euro was adopted. By 1999, only six member states met the convergence criteria including Netherlands, Austria, Germany and, surprisingly, Italy.^[48]Each state acting for itself, the Treaty provided for a no-bail out clause that ensured that each country is liable for the repayment of their own debt.^[49] It purported to prevent risk premia resulting from unwise fiscal policies from affecting partner countries. Thus, the clause fostered prudent and sagacious fiscal national fiscal policies. None of these safeguards have worked in practice. This is notably because in the early years of the Euro, the member states took on high debts in spite of the convergence criteria.^[50] This created a speculative bubble, especially in the field of finance and real estate in Spain, Netherlands, Greece, and Ireland.^[51]It caused economic and financial disequilibria amongst member states. It continued to increase for want of efficient sanction mechanisms and popped in 2008. Then, it exposed the lamentable financial disequilibrium that plagued the Union. This is not surprising given the Treaty had no social aspect and did not establish any system of redistribution allowing for the correction of the divergences between member states. Likewise, the Treaty did not provide for any crisis management mechanism, especially where a state faces bankruptcy. European leaders understood this all too late when Greece nearly became bankrupt in 2010 and at the time of the sovereign debt crisis in 2012.

These events lifted the curtain behind the economic and monetary union and revealed a fiasco. They exposed a lack of unity, the widening of the gaps between countries, the lack of solidarity between member states which is incompatible with a monetary union, and the lack of convergence whether fiscal, economic, or budgetary. Since, the member states have adopted a plethora of protocols to fill the gaps of Maastricht and strengthen economic stability; but these have only complexified European economic governance and have not helped obviate the economic divergences between member states.^[52]

While the European Commission plays a greater role in the control of the budget of the member states, it lacks any adequate criteria to identify disequilibria between states and sanction member states efficaciously even though the Maastricht criteria have been refined to account for economic change in the determination of the structural deficit of a state.^[53] Several suggestions have been made to improve European economic stability. They are summed up in three trains of thought. First, some Eurosceptics supported by the American economist Joseph Stiglitz suggest that the Treaty should be repealed and each state should recover their full monetary sovereignty.^[54]It does not take a genius to realise that this suggestion is silly and would not favour convergence but would only bring more disparities amongst states. Besides, this would not favour anyone, especially Germany who would return to the Deutsche Mark. It would not only be far higher than the Euro, but it also means that Germany could no longer be an export country par excellence because of its huge current account surplus.^[55] So, Germany has no interest in the enfeeblement and repeal of the Eurozone as its constitutional court invites it to.

By contrast, another trend supported by better rounded German economists suggests a return to Maastricht and the adoption of true enforcement mechanisms guaranteeing the efficacy of European integration.^[56]This echoes president Steinmeier hortatory call in which he stated: “30 Jahre nach der Deutschen Einheit, 75 Jahre nach dem Ende des Krieges sind wir Deutsche zur Solidarität in Europa nicht nur aufgerufen - wir sind dazu verpflichtet”.^[57]

Finally, a more federalist trend calls for the simplification of the whole of the European monetary policies and the introduction of solidarity mechanisms to ensure European integration for instance through the creation of an European fund to provide relief to the most worse off countries in times of crisis.^[58]Another suggestion is the institution of a common European minimal employment insurance to eliminate the existing gaps between member states.^[59]Others suggest even the mutualisation of the public debts and the establishment of a common Treasury to steer the European economic policy and suppress divergences between states.^[60] The latter two movements highlight the need for a renegotiation of the Treaties or the adoption of new mechanisms to break the stalemate that the BVerfG pinpointed in its judgment.

4. Call for Reform

Crises have always given the EU the chance to evolve. Crises have always forced the EU and its member states to stop gazing at their navels and edge forward slowly but steadily. The EU grows in strength and wisdom crisis after crisis, jolt after jolt, and chaos after chaos. It learns from its past and always endeavours to get back on its feet. Crises are its blood line. After all, the European project is born of sustained military conflicts between European nations since the first true world war between 1756 and 1763^[61]and a sustained call for peace and stability in Europe initiated by Charlemagne^[62]and George of Kunštát and Poděbrady in their times.^[63]These foreshadowed the European Union. They have made Europe develop gradually but surely as a continent, family, and union of nations. So much is illustrated in the current period by the European debt crisis, the migrant crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic. They have forced the EU member states not to self-indulge and contemplate excessively on their single issues at the expense of a wider view, but to stick together and find common solution beneficial to all.^[64]

Regarding the current crisis of the Euro, President Macron has continually called on Chancellor Merkel to further the European construction and produce innovative ideas and solutions since his election in 2017.^[65] His calls were ignored. However, it is safe bet that the decision of the BVerfG of 5 May 2020 will force Merkel and other heads of states and governments to be less ambiguous as to the necessity to mutualise the resources of the European budget to cope with exampled crises and come up to the mark. The ball is, thus, in Germany’s court. Either it refuses to cooperate and the inertial forces within the EU will rotate in all directions and make the EU implode to no one’s interest, or it pulls itself together and acknowledges that there is an urgent need to renegotiate the treaties and come up with bespoke solutions to cope with crises. Few controvert to this.^[66]Macron’s and Merkel’s recovery initiative and release of €500bn shows encouraging signs of the beginning of this process.^[67]

5. Conclusion

The decision of the BVerfG of 5 May 2020 is interesting in many respects. It reasserts the supremacy of German law over EU law in stark relief to the principle by which EU law takes precedence over domestic law. Similarly, it is a declaration of war to the authority of the CJEU whose jurisdiction it challenges. However, given that adhesion to the Eurozone is irreversible, there is little chance for it to cause the demise of the Eurozone. By contrast, it only calls for a much needed reform of the European monetary policy, more economic discipline, and the implementation of mechanisms to safeguard the fundamental rights of each people of the Union to ensure that none is left to bear the cost of the indiscipline of the others. It calls for a rethinking of the treaties and the development of a more virtuous Union concerned for economic stability and sound financial, fiscal, and economic management in times of prosperity as well as in times of crisis.

* Kane joined Edinburgh Law School in 2017 to read for an LL.M. in European Law. Before joining the University of Edinburgh, he read for an LL.B. (Hons) in English and French Law and German Language and an MA in Business and Financial Markets Law at Faculté Jean Monnet–Université Paris-Saclay. He was also awarded a Certificate in Common Law by the University of London Institute in Paris. Further to his academic activity, he has provided expertise on French and English law to junior counsels and UK and French claimants in France and England & Wales. Kane is currently pursuing a PhD in Law at the University of Edinburgh. His thesis focuses on the assessment of the development of a general principle of contract based on consensus in early modern legal thought and will challenge the accepted macro-narratives of European legal history. Kane's research interests are in the areas of EU competition law, commercial law, and legal history. He has a particular interest in contract law, especially regarding formation, interpretation and breach in a historical and comparative context. Kane can be contacted at k.abry@ed.ac.uk.

[1] BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15 - Rn. (1 - 237), Judgment of Second Senate of 5 May 2020.

[2] J. Bernard, ‘War of courts at the top of the European Union: The ruling of the German Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe’, para 1, Delcade avocats & solicitors, 12 May 2020, available at https://www.delcade.com/legal-news/competition-law/war-courts-top-european-union-ruling-german-federal-constitutional-court-karlsruhe/, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[3] European Central Bank, ‘Capital subscription’, 2012, updated 2020, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/orga/capital/html/index.en.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[4] European Central Bank, Decision of 4 March 2015 on a secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme, [n. 774/2015], ECB/2015/10.

[5] European Court of Justice (CG), Heinrich Weiss and Others [C-493/17]. See European Court of Justice (GC), Peter Gauweiler and Others v Deutscher Bundestag [C-62/14].

[6] M. Draghi, V. Constâncio, ‘Introductory statement to the press conference (with Q&A)’, Press Conference of meeting of the Governing Council, 10 March 2016, Frankfurt, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pressconf/2016/html/is160310.en.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[7] M. Draghi, V. Constâncio, op. cit.; European Central Bank, ‘Monetary policy decisions’ (2015), Press Release, 22 January 2015 available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2015/html/pr150122.en.html, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[8] BVerfG, op. cit., II.1, para 19.

[9] S. Von Pufendorf, De iure naturae et gentium (1672) 3.4.2.

[10] B. Schneidmüller, ‘Monarchische Ordnungen – Die Goldene Bulle von 1356 und die französischen Ordonnanzen von 1374’ in J. Fried, O. B. Rader, Die Welt des Mittelalters. Erinnerungsorte eines Jahrtausends, Beck C. H, 2011, pp. 324-335; M-L Heckman, ‘Der Deutsche Orden und die „Goldene Bulle“ Kaiser Karls IV. Mit einer Vorbemerkung zur Herkunft der Quaternionen (mit Edition ausgewählter Stücke)’ in K. Neitmann, W. Neugebauer, U. Schaper, Jahrbuch für die Geschichte Mittel- und Ostdeutschlands, De Gruyter, 2006, pp. 173-226; E. Ladewig Petersen, ‘Studien zur Goldenen Bulle von 1356’ (1966) Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters, Vol 22, pp 227-253; A Wolf, ‘Das „Kaiserliche Rechtbuch“ Karls IV. (sogenannte Goldene Bulle)’ in H. Coing, Jus Commune (1969) Vol 2, pp 1-32; K-F Johannes, ‘Die Goldene Bulle und die Praxis der Königswahl 1356-1410’ (2008) Archiv für mittelalterliche Philosophie und Kultur, Vol 14, pp 179-199.

[11] A. Lyon, Constitutional History of the UK, Routledge, London, 2003.

[12] H. Olrik, Salmonsens Konversationsleksikon, 1915, Vol 5, p. 339.

[13] Allgemeines Landrecht für die Preußischen Staaten (1794), available at https://opinioiuris.de/quelle/1621, accessed on 21 May 2020; W. W. Smithers, ‘The German Civil Code’ in, The American Law Registrar, University of Pennsylvania, 1902, p. 708, available at https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?art.=6365&context=penn_law_review, accessed on 21 May 2020, Sir A. W. Ward, ‘The Cambridge Modern History’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,1909, p. 728.

[14] Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1949), arts. 1, 2, 20-32 available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/gg/BJNR000010949.html, accessed on 21 May 2020.

[15] BVerfGE 37, 271 - Solange I (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel). Compare to R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport to contra Garland v British Rail Engineering [1982] 2 All ER 402, per Lord Diplock and Macarthys v Smith[1980] Case 129/79, per Lord Denning. Compare also to Constitutionnel, Décision n° 74-54 DC du 15 janvier 1975 Loi relative à l'interruption volontaire de la grossesse (IVG); Conseil d'Etat, Section, du 1 mars 1968, 62814 (Syndicat Général des Fabricants de Semoule de France); Conseil d’Etat, Assemblée, 20 October 1989 (Nicolo); Conseil d'Etat, 4 / 1 SSR, du 24 septembre 1990, 58657 (Boisdet); Conseil d'Etat, Assemblée, du 28 février 1992, 56776 56777 (Société Rothmans v Philip Morris France); Cour de Cassation, Chambre MIXTE, du 24 mai 1975, 73-13.556 (Cafés Jacques Vabre); Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 2004-505 DC du 19 novembre 2004 Traité établissant une Constitution pour l'Europe; Conseil Constitutionnel, Décision n° 2006-540 DC du 27 juillet 2006; Conseil d'État, Assemblée, 30 octobre 1998, Sarran et Levacher; Conseil d'Etat, 1 / 2 SSR, du 3 décembre 2001, 226514 (Syndicat National de l'Industrie Pharmaceutique (SNIP); Conseil d'État, 8 février 2007, Société Arcelor Atlantique et Lorraine et autres; Cour de Cassation, Assemblée plénière, du 2 juin 2000, 99-60.274 (Fraisse); French Constitution, Art.s 54 and 55; Case C-6064, Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.

[16] BVerfGE 37, 271, op. cit., [my own translation]: “As long as the [European] process of integration is not too excessive and Community law also acknowledges a catalogue of fundamental rights equivalent to that of the German Constitution (Basic Law), adopted by a Parliament, and adequate for Art. 177 EEC to operate. A court of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Federal Constitutional Court can control the legality of these norms and overrule them if it deems them to collide with one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law. In such case, the courts will be obliged to obey the domestic law over the European”.

[17] European Court of Justice, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, [Case11/1970], para 2.

[18] European Court of Justice, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities [Case 4-73].

[19] European Court of Justice, Roland Rutili v Ministre de l'intérieur [Case 36-75]. See also European Court of Justice, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, [Case C-185/95 P]; European Court of Justice (First Chamber), Omega Spielhallen- und Automatenaufstellungs-GmbH v Oberbürgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, [C 36/02]; European Court of Justice, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich, [C-112/00], 2003 I-05659 Case C-112/00, Judgment of the Court of 12 June 2003, Eugen Schmidberger, Internationale Transporte und Planzüge v Republik Österreich; European Court of Justice, Laval un Partneri Ltd v Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundets avdelning 1, Byggettan and Svenska Elektrikerförbundet, [C-341/05], 2007 I-11767; European Court of Justice (GC), International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union v Viking Line ABP and OÜ Viking Line Eesti, [C-438/05], 2007 I-10779.

[20] 2 Bundesverfassungsgericht, Solange II-decision, [n. 197/83], para 2.

[21] Bundesverfassungsgericht, Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court of October 12, 1993, 89, 155.

[22] Bundesverfassungsgericht, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. (1 – 421).

[23] A. Evans-Pritchard, ‘EU risks losing Germany if it picks a constitutional fight to the death, or the euro if it doesn't’, The telegraph, 17 May 2020, available at https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2020/05/17/eu-risks-losing-germany-picks-constitutional-fight-death-euro/, accessed on 22 May 2020; R. McCrea, ‘German Constitutional Court is a bigger threat to EU than Brexit or Covid-19’, The Irish Times, 16 May 2020, available at https://www.irishtimes.com/opinion/german-constitutional-court-is-a-bigger-threat-to-eu-than-brexit-or-covid-19-1.4254549, accessed on 22 May 2020; K. Pistor, ‘Germany’s Constitutional Court Goes Rogue’ Project Syndicate, 8 May 2020, available https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/german-constitutional-court-ecb-ruling-may-threaten-euro-by-katharina-pistor-2020-05?barrier=accesspaylog, accessed on 22 May 2020; M. Poiares Maduro, ‘The German Constitutional Court struck a blow to EU integration. This is how we can save it’, Euronews, 20 May 2020, available at https://www.euronews.com/2020/05/20/german-constitutional-court-struck-blow-to-eu-integration-this-is-how-we-can-save-it-view, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[24] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union (2007), art. 5, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M%2FTXT, accessed on 22 May 2020

[25]European Court of Justice, Reference for a preliminary ruling — Economic and monetary policy – Decision (EU) 2015/774 of the European Central Bank — Validity — Secondary markets public sector asset purchase programme — Art.s 119 and 127 TFEU — Powers of the ECB and the European System of Central Banks — Maintenance of price stability — Proportionality — Art. 123 TFEU — Prohibition of monetary financing of Member States in the euro area, [C‑493/17], available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=208741&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=491037, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[26] 2 BvR 859/15, op. cit., para 255.

[27] 2 BvR 859/15, op. cit., paras 81, 120, 183, 191, and 210.

[28] Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/browse/institutions/bank.html?locale=it, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[29] European Commission, ‘Statement by President VON DER LEYEN’, 10 May 2020, available at https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEMENT_20_846, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[30]‘Rolling updates on coronavirus disease (COVID-19)’, World Health Organisation, 2020, available https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/events-as-they-happen, accessed on 22 May 2020; ‘Statement on the second meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) Emergency Committee regarding the outbreak of novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV)’, World Health Organisation, 30 January 2020, available at https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/30-01-2020-statement-on-the-second-meeting-of-the-international-health-regulations-(2005)-emergency-committee-regarding-the-outbreak-of-novel-coronavirus-(2019-ncov), accessed on 22 May 2020.

[31], ‘WHO Director-General's opening remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 - 11 March 2020’, World Health Organisation, 11 March 2020, available at https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[32] European Central Bank, ‘ECB announces €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP)’ Press release of Governing Council, 18 March 2020, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[33] European Central Bank, op. cit., available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html: ‘To the extent that some self-imposed limits might hamper action that the ECB is required to take in order to fulfil its mandate, the Governing Council will consider revising them to the extent necessary to make its action proportionate to the risks that we face. The ECB will not tolerate any risks to the smooth transmission of its monetary policy in all jurisdictions of the euro area’.

[34] European Central Bank, op. cit., para 2, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[35] ‘Securities’ in European Central Bank, op. cit., available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.pr200318_1~3949d6f266.en.html, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[36] C. Lagarde on Twitter, 19 March 2020, available https://twitter.com/Lagarde/status/1240414918966480896, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[37] C. Alcaraz, S. Claessens, G. Cuadra, D. Marques-Ibanez, H. Sapriza, ‘Working Paper Series | Whatever it takes: what’s the impact of a major nonconventional monetary policy intervention?’, March 2019, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scpwps/ecb.wp2249~543dd2fbd3.en.pdf, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[38] J. H. Powell, Federal Reserve Board, ‘COVID-19 and the Economy (webcast)’ Webcast, 9 April 2020, p. 2, available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/files/powell20200409a.pdf, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[39] Bank of England, «Bank of England measures to respond to the economic shock from Covid-19», 11 March 2020, available at https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2020/march/boe-measures-to-respond-to-the-economic-shock-from-covid-19, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[40] R J Samuelson, ‘What Crash of 2020 Means’ (2020) The Washington Post, accessed on 22 May 2020, available here (EN); S. William, ‘Stock Market Crash 2020: Everything You Need to Know’, The Motley Fool, 10 March 2020, available at https://www.fool.com/investing/2020/03/10/stock-market-crash-2020-everything-you-need-to-kno.aspx, accessed on 22 May 2020; T Chenel, ‘La Bourse de Paris s'effondre à cause du coronavirus et de la chute des cours du pétrole’, Business Insider, 9 March 2020, available at https://www.businessinsider.fr/la-bourse-de-paris-seffondre-a-cause-du-coronavirus-et-de-la-chute-des-cours-du-petrole/ , accessed on 22 May 2020; Boursier.com, ‘Actualités du vendredi 22 mai 2020’ (2020) Boursier.com; BFM Bourse, ‘CAC 40 : Le CAC 40 s'effondre après les annonces de la BCE’, Boursier.com, 23 June 2020, available at https://www.boursier.com/actualites/news-du-jour, accessed on 22 May 2020.

[41] C. Emmerson, I. Stockton, ‘The economic response to coronavirus will substantially increase government borrowing’, Institute for Fisical Studies, 26 March 2020, Institute for Fiscal Studies, available at https://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/14771, accessed on 22 May 2020; Institute for National Statistics, ‘Public sector finances, UK: April 2020’, ons.gov.uk, 22 May 2020, available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicsectorfinance/bulletins/publicsectorfinances/april2020, accessed on 24 May 2020.

[42] S. Fleming, M. Arnold, ‘Eurozone faces economic strains as government debt piles up’, Financial Times, 16 April 2020, available at https://www.ft.com/content/a58cbfba-9f3e-4a91-85ca-e5090d2489bd, accessed on 220 May 2020.

[43] M. D. W. Stoffels, Can the European Union Force Its Member States to Introduce the Euro?, 1^st ed., Nomos Verlag, 2019.

[44] Lord Locke LLP, ‘The Eurozone crisis - the final stage?’, Lexology, 15 May 2012, , available at https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=a92664b9-d267-4347-a59a-6488ab3895fb, accessed on 23 May 2020; European Central Bank, ‘Withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and EMU. Some reflections’ (2009) Legal Working Paper, Series No 10, available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp10.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[45] Y. Bertoncini, ‘Question d'Europe n°555’ , Fondation Robert Schuman, 20 April 2020, available at https://www.robert-schuman.eu/fr/questions-d-europe/0555-la-solidarite-europeenne-en-temps-de-crise-un-heritage-a-approfondir-face-au-covid-19, accessed on 23 May 2020; M Lefebre, ‘ThucyBlog n° 33 – L’Europe survivra-t-elle à la crise du coronavirus ?’, Centre Thucydide, 4 May 2020 , available https://www.afri-ct.org/2020/thucyblog-n-33-leurope-survivra-t-elle-a-la-crise-du-coronavirus/, accessed on 23 May 2020; N Dubois, J Quatremer, Article published in Libération (2002) cited in В двух частях, Le français économique (2010), available at http://www.seun.ru/content/learning/4/science/1/doc/Ч2.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[46] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union - PROTOCOLS – Protocols (No 12 &13) on the excessive deficit procedure, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, pp 279–280.

[47] Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, op. cit.

[48] A. Forster, Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations, Palgrave Macmillan, 1999, p. 67; V Toadera, V Gîdiua, ‘Emerging Markets Queries in Finance and Business. The study of nominal convergence in European Union’ (2012) Procedia Economics and Finance, Issue 3, pp 872, accessed on 23 May 2020, available at https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212567112002432?ref=pdf_download&fr=RR-2&rr=7bb02c924a0cbac1.

[49] Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJC 326, 26.10.2012, pp. 47-390, Art. 125.

[50] J. Hopkin, ‘The troubled southern periphery: The Euro experience in Italy and Spain’ in M. Matthijs, M. Blyth, The future of the Euro, Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015, p. 166 ff.

[51] X. Chen, M. Funke, ‘Renewed Momentum in the German Housing Market: Boom or Bubble?’ (2013) EconStor, CESifo Working Paper, No. 4287, pp 8, 11, 14, , available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/77694/1/cesifo_wp4287.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020; N. Triantafy llopoulos, T. Kandyla, ‘Buyers’ behaviour and the housing bubble in Greece - European Real Estate Society Conference 2010 SDA Bocconi School of Management’, Milan, 23 – 26 June 2010, pp. 1-15, available at https://www.propertyfinance.it/sitoeres/contents/papers/id36.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[52] Stability and Growth Pact (‘Two-Packs’) (1998) available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/stability-and-growth-pact_en, accessed on 23 May 2020; Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 amending Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 12-24; Council Regulation (EU) No 1177/2011 of 8 November 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 33-40; Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 1-7; Council Directive 2011/85/EU of 8 November 2011 on requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 41-47; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 25–32; Regulation (EU) No 1174/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area, OJ L 306, 23.11.2011, pp. 8-11; The European Semester (2020), available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[53] For instance, the Stability and Growth Pact requires each country commits to implement yearly improvements for their structural deficit equal to minimum 0.5% of their GDP when their debt is below 60% of their GDP and 1% when it exceeds 60 %. See Stability and Growth Pact, op. cit., available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/eu-economic-governance-monitoring-prevention-correction/european-semester_en, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[54] C. Durand, S. Villemot, ‘Abandoning the Euro Could Help Save Europe’, Verso, 2 March 2017, , available at https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/3117-abandoning-the-euro-could-help-save-europe, accessed on 23 May 2020 ; G. Jones, M. Bendeich, ‘Italy's 5-Star hails Brexit as democracy, wants Italy vote on euro’ Reuters, 24 June 2016, available at https://www.reuters.com/art./us-britain-eu-italy-5star-idUSKCN0ZA1W7, accessed on 23 May 2020; P. S. Goodman, ‘How a currency intended to unite Europe wound up dividing it’, The New York Times, 27 July 2016, available at https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/business/international/how-a-currency-intended-to-unite-europe-wound-up-dividing-it.html accessed on 23 May 2020 contra M. S. Feldstein, ‘The Failure of the Euro’ The Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, available at https://www.nber.org/feldstein/fa121311.html, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[55] H. Kundnani, The Paradox of German Power, Oxford Univ Pr, 2015, p. 79.

[56] N. Winkeljohann, T. Straubhaar, M. Bräuninger, J. Hinze, H. Vöpel, ‘Der Euro in der Krise’ (2012) Studienreihe Politik und Wirtschaft pp 13ff, available at https://www.pwc.de/de/offentliche-unternehmen/assets/pwc_studie_eurokrise_april_2012.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020; H Reimers, ‘Targetsalden: Viel mehr als nur ein Haftungsrisiko’ (2014) Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol 94, Issue 2, p 139, available at https://core.ac.uk/reader/205245604, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[57] H Charisius, ‘Bundespräsident ruft zu Geduld und Solidarität auf’ (2020) Süddeutsche Zeitung, available at https://www.sueddeutsche.de/gesundheit/gesundheit-bundespraesident-ruft-zu-geduld-und-solidaritaet-auf-dpa.urn-newsml-dpa-com-20090101-200411-99-669851, accessed on 22 May 2020. [My own translation]: ‘30 years after the German unity, 75 years after the end of WWII, we, Germans, are not only invited to support solidarity in Europe, but are required to do so’.

[58] G. Dufrénot, F. Jawadi, W. Louhichi, Market microstructure and nonlinear dynamics: Keeping financial crisis in context, Springer Nature, 2014, pp. 239; European Commission, «COVID-19: Commission sets out European coordinated response to counter the economic impact of the Coronavirus» (2020) available https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_459, accessed on 23 May 2020; D. Boffey, ‘EU strikes €500bn relief deal for countries hit hardest by pandemic’, The Guardian, 9 April 2020, available at https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/apr/09/eu-risks-break-up-over-coronabonds-row-warns-italian-pm, accessed on 23 May 2020;, ‘Searching for meaning. The covid-19 pandemic puts pressure on the EU: An old question has resurfaced: what is the point of the bloc?’ The Economist, 14 May 2020, available https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/05/14/the-covid-19-pandemic-puts-pressure-on-the-eu, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[59] M. Beblavý, G. Marconi, l. Maselli, ‘A European unemployment benefit scheme: The rationale and the challenges ahead’, European Commission | Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, pp 1-32, January 2017, available at https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:BzrCkUxJiSkJ:https://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet%3FdocId%3D16884%26langId%3Den+&cd=1&hl=da&ct=clnk&gl=uk&client=safari, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[60] S. Tilford, ‘Why the Eurozone needs debt mutualisation’ Centre for European Reform, 28 July 2011, available https://www.cer.eu/insights/why-eurozone-needs-debt-mutualisation, accessed on 23 May 2020; A. Calvo, ‘Gurría calls for further European integration, debt mutualisation in eurozone’, Euractiv, available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/interview/gurria-calls-for-further-european-integration-debt-mutualisation-in-eurozone/, accessed on 23 May 2020; L. Molthof, ‘The EU’s southern member states have set the stage for European debt mutualisation’, The London School of Economics and Political Science, 21 May 2020, available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2020/05/21/the-eus-southern-member-states-have-set-the-stage-for-european-debt-mutualisation/, accessed on 20 May 2020.

[61] Seven Years’ War. See H. V. Bowen, War and British Society 1688–1815, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p 7. WWI and WWII supplied the cement for the construction of European unity as well. On the ideas of European unity and the impact of European and world wars on its construction. See M. Dedman, The origins and development of the European Union 1945-1995: A history of European integration, Routledge, 2009; C. E. De Vries, ‘Don't Mention the War! Second World War Remembrance and Support for European Cooperation (2019) Journal of Common Market Studies (2019) pp 21-40; D. Dinan, Europe recast: A history of European Union, 2^nd edition, Red Globe Press, 2004; P. Pasture, Imagining European unity since 1000 AD, Palgrave Macmillan, 2015; P. M. R. Stirk, European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period, 1^st edition, Pinter Pub Ltd, 1989; M. L. Smith, P. M. R. Stirk, Making the new Europe: European unity and the Second World War, 1^st edition, Pinter Pub Ltd, 1990.

[62] F. L. Ganshof, ‘Le programme de gouvernement impérial de Charlemagne’ in Ganshof et al., Renovatio imperii. Atti della giornata internazionale di studio per il Millenario, 1963, pp. 63-96.

[63] A. D. Smith, ‘National Identity and the Idea of European Unity’, 1992, International Affairs, Vol 68, Issue 1, pp 55-76.

[64] A. Glencross, ‘The EU response to the Eurozone crisis: Democratic contestation and the new fault lines in European integration’ Europa-Kolleg Hamburg | Institute for European Integration, Discussion Paper No 3/13, July 2013, available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/82634/1/766849171.pdf, accessed on 23 May 2020; European Council, Council of the European Union, ‘EU migration policy’ 2020, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/migratory-pressures/, accessed on 23 May 2020; European Council, Council of the European Union, ‘COVID-19 coronavirus outbreak and the EU's response’, 2020, available at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/coronavirus/, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[65] V. Hacot, P. Théveniaud, ‘«Nous avons des confrontations» : le drôle de cadeau de Merkel à Macron’ Le Parisien, 15 May 2019 (modified 16 May 2019) , , available at https://www.leparisien.fr/elections/europeennes/europeennes-le-drole-de-cadeau-de-merkel-a-macron-15-05-2019-8072877.php accessed on 23 May 2020 contra F. Collomp, ‘Comment Macron a rallié Merkel à l’idée d’une solidarité financière européenne’, Le Figaro, 19 May 2020, available at https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/comment-macron-a-rallie-merkel-a-l-idee-d-une-solidarite-financiere-europeenne-20200519, accessed on 23 May 2020.

[66] P. Kaczmarczyk, ‘To survive the COVID-19 crisis, the euro area can’t go back to business as usual’ LSE Business Review, 2020, available at https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/businessreview/2020/03/21/to-survive-the-covid-19-crisis-the-euro-area-cant-go-back-to-business-as-usual/, accessed on 23 May 2020; N. Raffin, ‘Renégociation des traités: Mélenchon peut-il convaincre l’Europe?’, 20 Minutes, 19 April 2017, available at https://www.20minutes.fr/elections/2052695-20170419-renegociation-traites-melenchon-peut-convaincre-europe, accessed on 23 May 2020; L. Albert, ‘Européennes : Manon Aubry veut renégocier des traités européens « problématiques »’, Les Echos, 28 April 2020, available at https://www.lesechos.fr/politique-societe/politique/le-grand-rendez-vous-europe-1-cnews-les-echos-manon-aubry-veut-renegocier-des-traites-europeens-problematiques-1014615, accessed on 23 May 2020

[67] C Goßner, S Lawton, ‘Merkel and Macron roll out €500 billion COVID-19 recovery initiative’ Euractiv, (2020), available at https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/merkel-and-macron-roll-out-e500-billion-covid-19-recovery-initiative/, accessed on 23 May 2020.

Giornata del Giurista 2023

Maria Cristina Trimboli — 2023-04-20T22:16:55+00:00

Nei momenti di tensione politica e sociale, come quello attuale, i contrasti tra il diritto positivo e il diritto “nobile” dei principi possono diventare particolarmente acuti. Gli ordinamenti costituzionali sviluppatisi nel secondo dopo guerra hanno quindi cercato di fornire risposte a questi dilemmi. A tal riguardo la Prof.ssa De Pretis ha ricordato che in Italia la Costituzione è rigida, ossia contiene principi inderogabili, non attaccabili dalla legge ordinaria. A presidio e tutela della Costituzione è stata creata la Corte costituzionale, cui spetta, inter alia, la giurisdizione sulle controversie relative alla legittimità costituzionale delle leggi e degli atti aventi forza di legge, dello Stato e delle Regioni.

Il contrasto tra la legge ordinaria e la Costituzione si risolve quindi sollevando la questione dinanzi alla Corte costituzionale. Quest’ultima ha il potere e il dovere di verificare la compatibilità tra la legge ordinaria e i principi costituzionali, con l'indipendenza e l'autorevolezza che la caratterizzano.

Il bilanciamento dei diritti costituzionali durante l’epidemia di Covid-19

In merito al delicato bilanciamento effettuato tra il diritto alla salute e gli altri diritti costituzionali durante la pandemia di Covid-19, la Vicepresidente De Pretis ha affermato che il bilanciamento degli interessi è un'operazione che spetta sempre al legislatore, il quale deve perseguire gli obiettivi della Costituzione e far convivere interessi spesso conflittuali. La scelta del legislatore può essere sottoposta al vaglio della Corte costituzionale che, nel rispetto delle scelte politiche di questo, applica il metodo della ragionevolezza e della proporzionalità. Le crisi come quella della pandemia rappresentano una sfida notevole in questo senso, poiché richiedono di conciliare la dimensione individuale della salute con quella collettiva.

La Vicepresidente De Pretis ha altresì evidenziato che lo stato di eccezione, inteso quale momento di sospensione delle regole ordinarie, è un'ipotesi non contemplata dalla Costituzione italiana. Tale stato di eccezione, infatti, si pone al di fuori dell'ordinamento costituzionale, rappresentando un elemento di rottura dello stesso. Durante la crisi sanitaria, l’ordinamento italiano ha reagito alla crisi sanitaria utilizzando strumenti già esistenti, i quali sono stati vagliati dalla Corte costituzionale e dichiarati compatibili con la Costituzione.

Nei casi afferenti all’emergenza pandemica sollevati dinnanzi alla Consulta, quest'ultima ha ritenuto quasi sempre che il legislatore non fosse fuoriuscito dai limiti di proporzionalità e ragionevolezza, poiché l'esigenza di rispondere ad un contagio diffuso e letale giustificava, ad esempio, anche misure limitative della libertà di circolazione. Tuttavia, quando il contagio si è gradualmente attenuato e le misure limitative delle libertà costituzionalmente garantite venivano prorogate, la Corte è intervenuta in modo deciso, ribadendo l'importanza di adeguare le misure alle esigenze del caso concreto e all’evoluzione del quadro pandemico, in modo da preservare l'equilibrio tra i diversi diritti costituzionali.

Le decisioni della Corte Costituzionale in situazioni di emergenza

La Vicepresidente ha enfatizzato l'importanza di applicare la Costituzione in ogni ambito del diritto, non solo nella sfere di competenza della Corte costituzionale. In tale prospettiva, soltanto ove il giudice ritenga che una norma non sia legittima anche dopo aver tentato di interpretarla in modo orientato alla Costituzione, si potrà rivolgere alla Corte per richiedere un giudizio di legittimità.

Un ulteriore spunto di riflessione emerso durante l’intervento è stato se le decisioni della Corte, in virtù delle complesse questioni di diritto sollevate e delle modalità indirette di accesso ad essa, avessero necessitato di tempistiche più rapide per gestire l’emergenza. A tal proposito, la Prof.ssa De Pretis ha fatto notare come la Corte abbia risposto prontamente alle questioni inerenti alla pandemia, con un tempo di circa nove mesi, considerato relativamente breve. In particolare, la Vicepresidente ha preso come esempio la sospensione da parte della Consulta dell'efficacia di una legge regionale della Valle d'Aosta sulla gestione della pandemia, la cui costituzionalità è stata successivamente confermata. L'utilizzo di strumenti di tutela provvisoria e cautelare ha quindi permesso alla Corte di rispondere alle esigenze urgenti della situazione.

Il dialogo tra la Corte costituzionale italiana e altre Corti nazionali e sovranazionali

Le questioni sollevate davanti alle Corti di diverse nazioni possono afferire a temi molto simili, come il fine vita e altre questioni di coscienza. Pertanto, il confronto tra le Corti costituzionali è sempre salutare, ancor più in quanto qualora i parlamenti dovessero riscontrare difficoltà nel pronunciarsi su temi dibattuti, sarebbero proprio le Corti a dover fornire risposte.

Esistono inoltre importanti canali di dialogo istituzionale con le Corti sovranazionali, con le quali la Corte costituzionale italiana è necessariamente in contatto. La necessità di questo dialogo deriva dalla presenza di altre Carte con contenuti di portata costituzionale, quali la Carta dei diritti fondamentali dell'Unione Europea e la Convenzione Europea dei Diritti dell'Uomo. Il dialogo con le Corti sovranazionali non è quindi solo “amichevole”, ma corrisponde a un disegno che mira a congiungere l’ordinamento nazionale e sovranazionale sulla base di previsioni che si trovano all'interno di ciascun ordinamento.

Le Corti sovranazionali hanno sviluppato una propria giurisprudenza su diritti che potrebbero sovrapporsi a quelli tutelati dalla Costituzione italiana. Pertanto, la Corte costituzionale, nel prendere le proprie decisioni, non può non tenere conto di quello che le Corti sovranazionali hanno deciso in casi analoghi di tutela dei medesimi diritti. Il rapporto con queste Corti può essere conflittuale o dialogico, come nel noto caso di Taricco, in cui la Corte costituzionale italiana si è trovata lacerata nell'applicare la Costituzione e rispettare il diritto europeo. In particolare, in relazione ad un reato tributario, i giudici costituzionali hanno riconosciuto la prescrizione come principio fondamentale dell’ordinamento italiano, non ammettendo la sua disapplicazione, e ricorrendo alla teoria dei controlimiti. Alla fine, proprio grazie al dialogo, la Corte di Giustizia si è dimostrata comprensiva e la questione è stata risolta.

Sistemi costituzionali differenti per disciplinare le emergenze

Si è dibattuto sull'efficacia dei sistemi costituzionali nel disciplinare le emergenze. In particolare, si è indagato sulla validità di clausole generali rispetto a sistemi razionalizzati^[1] che prevedono diversi modelli a seconda del tipo di emergenza.

A tal riguardo, la Vicepresidente De Pretis ha affermato che non vi sono ragioni specifiche per preferire un determinato modello di gestione dell'emergenza. Tuttavia, l’assenza nella Costituzione di una clausola che preveda lo stato di eccezione non deve essere valutata come una mancanza poiché è comunque garantita la tenuta del sistema istituzionale italiano anche in situazioni di emergenza. In effetti, non c’è emergenza alla quale non si possa far fronte rispettando le garanzie costituzionali: l’operazione del bilanciamento degli interessi è il cuore di ogni scelta politica ed è sufficiente per far fronte a qualsiasi situazione.

Mantenimento degli strumenti emergenziali dopo il superamento della crisi

Negli scambi conclusivi dell’incontro si è discusso sull'esistenza di strumenti emergenziali che non trovano più giustificazione, e se sia accettabile mantenere tali strumenti nel nostro ordinamento. La Vicepresidente De Pretis ha fatto notare che le crisi possono portare all'introduzione di nuovi strumenti che restano in vigore anche dopo la fine della crisi stessa, come ad esempio la disciplina del lavoro agile, introdotta durante la pandemia di Covid-19 e dimostratasi utile anche una volta cessata l’emergenza sanitaria.

In quest’ambito, la Corte costituzionale ha svolto un ruolo fondamentale nel valutare le proroghe di misure adottate durante il periodo di crisi. Talvolta, infatti, la Corte ha ritenuto che alcune di queste misure non fossero più adeguate in quanto la crisi si era attenuata, dimostrando così l'importanza di una costante revisione delle politiche adottate in situazioni di emergenza.

Foto di Massimiliano Stucchi, riproduzione riservata

[1] Presenti, ad esempio, in Spagna, Francia e Germania.

Il Mercato Italiano dei Capitali: Quale Futuro?

Marco Alibrando, Silvia Dalla Quercia, Giorgio Hassan, Lucrezia Villa — 2023-04-25T22:55:17+00:00

Nei saluti di apertura, il Rettore dell’Università Bocconi Francesco Billari ha esordito con una riflessione sul tema dell'educazione finanziaria, sottolineando l’importanza che tutti gli italiani diventino partecipi e abbiano una conoscenza minima sul tema, sotto il duplice profilo economico e giuridico. Successivamente, il Rettore ha invitato a riflettere sul fenomeno della fuga del “talento” dalle grandi aziende: con un’efficace comparazione, ha ritrovato una somiglianza tra il fenomeno della migrazione dalla borsa italiana e quello ormai noto della fuga dei cervelli. L’Italia, infatti, non ha solo un problema di democrazia finanziaria, ma anche di demografia finanziaria.

A seguire l’intervento del Prof. Cesare Cavallini, Direttore del Dipartimento di Studi Giuridici, il quale ha definito il tema dei mercati dei capitali in senso lato un tema “bocconiano”. Difatti, tutte le tematiche che hanno un aspetto scientifico primario e un impatto nella realtà esterna naturale e che sono legate al mondo del mercato e dell’impresa, qualificano l’Università ma anche l’essenza e la nascita del Dipartimento di Studi Giuridici Angelo Sraffa. Queste tematiche da un lato hanno consentito e consentono l’apertura internazionale degli Studi Giuridici e, dall’altro, incentivano una più recente interdisciplinarità con studiosi provenienti da altri settori.

Il crollo della capitalizzazione del mercato italiano

Ha preso in seguito la parola il Prof. Em. Piergaetano Marchetti per una riflessione introduttiva sul tema della giornata. Dopo aver ricordato che l’Università Bocconi è stato il primo centro in Italia a studiare a livello internazionale il mercato dei capitali, ha proposto di affrontare il vasto tema dei mercati dei capitali sia nella sua macro-dimensione (da intendersi come investimento nel mercato e nello sviluppo delle piccole medie aziende, mediante supporti finanziari e tributari), sia nella sua dimensione di dettaglio (a livello regolamentare e di vigilanza). Il tema necessita di una riflessione attenta in particolare circa la funzionalità e l’efficacia degli strumenti ad oggi presenti. In effetti, i dati degli ultimi anni relativi al mercato italiano dei capitali mostrano in chiara luce il fatto che il mercato abbia visto fortemente calare il numero delle società quotate; si può quindi parlare di un vero e proprio crollo di capitalizzazione del mercato, che pone l’Italia al di sotto delle medie dei Paesi UE.^[1] Escluso il periodo degli anni Novanta, durante gli anni che hanno preceduto la crisi dei mutui subprime e la crisi pandemica, il mercato italiano ha assisto all’uscita dal mercato dei capitali di molte società, la quale però non è stata compensata da nuove entrate. Questa realtà è stata accompagnata da due fenomeni che affliggono il mercato italiano, quello del delisting e del forum shopping. Nella pratica questi fenomeni si sono presentati in tre modalità:

(i) vi sono state società italiane che hanno trasferito la sede all’estero quotandosi anche nei rispettivi mercati, con l’effetto di non essere più assoggettate alla regolamentazione italiana;

(ii) alcune società italiane si sono quotate in altri mercati esteri continuando ad essere società italiane;

(iii) vi sono infine casi di società estere che si sono quotate nel mercato italiano, ma che non sono assoggettate alla disciplina italiana e al codice di Corporate Governance.

Il rapporto OCSE sullo stato delle società europee nel triennio 2018-2020 mostra un evidente declino della capitalizzazione nei mercati delle società, che da 248 alla fine del 2013 sono passate a 210 nel 2022; in tutti gli anni lo scarto è stato negativo, ad eccezione degli anni 2017 e 2018. Negli ultimi 10 anni la capitalizzazione delle società che hanno fatto il delisting vale circa 110 miliardi, mentre la capitalizzazione delle nuove società che si sono quotate vale 60 miliardi, con uno scarto di 50 miliardi. Il ruolo delle società italiane sugli indici internazionali è marginale, con un evidente effetto penalizzante sulle imprese italiane.

Conclusa la panoramica della situazione del mercato italiano dei capitali, il Prof. Marchetti ha posto la seguente questione: “è corretto riconoscere la sola primazia dei mercati regolamentati, presupponendo che gli altri, alternativi, siano davvero non regolamentati?”. In effetti, questa prospettiva distoglie l’attenzione da quei mercati che ad oggi, pur ottenendo il favore delle PMI, rimangono in secondo piano. Si tratta di un tema, quello dello “scalino dei mercati”, che necessita di maggior considerazione da parte del legislatore.

Una nuova figura di investitore

Un ulteriore problema che si pone con riferimento al panorama italiano è la presenza di imprese grandi e solide, leader mondali nella produzione di alcuni prodotti, che hanno scelto di non quotarsi, nonostante la competizione internazionale le avrebbe dovute spingere in tale direzione. Per converso, negli ultimi anni si è assistito all’aumento degli investitori italiani, che dall’8% sono passati al 10%. Si tratta di un dato interessante nel panorama degli investimenti, che però deve essere analizzato correttamente: questi investitori infatti, a differenza del passato, non hanno una propensione individuale a curare l’investimento. Si potrebbe valutare pertanto la possibilità di creare un nuovo tipo di investitore collettivo di matrice italiana. Questa figura dovrebbe, da un lato, aumentare la fiducia degli investitori con l’obbiettivo di farne confluire i capitali verso le PMI e, dall’altro, far percepire alle imprese di essere loro vicine, più di quanto lo sarebbe un investitore istituzionale, affinché queste poi si avvicinino al mercato dei capitali. Alla luce di queste considerazioni, appare quindi prioritario introdurre nel mercato italiano intermediari finanziari adeguati e specialmente una legislazione che non sia di over protection per permettere e favorire la crescita dell’equity.

Il Prof. Marchetti, da ultimo, ha ricordato che il fenomeno del delisting è diffuso e sta colpendo tutti i mercati, non solo quello italiano, ed è sorretto da ragioni macroeconomiche. In Italia, tuttavia, il fenomeno è sproporzionatamente accentuato, per cui devono adottarsi correttivi diversi, non trovandosi il nostro paese meramente “sull’onda generale”.

In conclusione, diventa necessario fare delle scelte. In particolare, è necessaria una regolamentazione che modifichi le norme sui mercati, sulla base di un intervento congiunto con l’Unione Europea. Bisogna, infatti, avere consapevolezza della situazione in cui il mercato italiano si trova e individuare la strada che consenta da una parte di armonizzare la disciplina interna con quella comunitaria (requisito essenziale al fine di costituire un mercato unico) e dall’altra di non mortificare la specificità dell’ordinamento italiano. Questi temi finiscono inevitabilmente per sollevare la questione della concorrenza regolamentare tra gli ordinamenti. Si tratta di un problema politico importante, rispetto al quale sorgono due alternative possibili: prevedere una gara regolamentare oppure porre un limite alla competizione laddove questa diventi lesiva. È necessario quindi che il regolatore/legislatore individui il giusto bilanciamento. L’Italia ha già dato prova di avere la volontà di riformarsi, ma la riforma deve partorire risultati concreti.

Facendo seguito agli interventi introduttivi, si è svolta la prima sessione vertente sullo sviluppo del mercato dei capitali e la crescita economica, con specifico riferimento al rapporto EC/OCSE 2020 e al Green Book 2022 presentato dal Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze (MEF). Relatori sono stati i Proff. Carmine di Noia (OCSE) e Cristina Finocchi Mahne (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore) assieme a Federico Freni (MEF) e Mario Nava (Commissione Europea).

Il Dott. Nava ha anzitutto enfatizzato la necessità di affrontare la problematica della fuga dal mercato dei capitali sotto una duplice prospettiva: di respiro “macroeconomico” da un lato; orientata a riequilibrare il rapporto tra regolamentazione, vigilanza e stakeholders istituzionali dall’altro. La ripresa economica europea all’indomani della pandemia, accompagnata dal meccanismo di finanziamento del “Next Generation EU” rappresentano alcuni dei presupposti da cui ripartire per un più efficiente rapporto tra finanziamenti pubblici e investimenti privati.

Il bisogno di una maggior armonizzazione regolamentare

Il Prof. Carmine Di Noia, riprendendo il rapporto OCSE sullo stato delle società europee nel triennio 2018-2020^[2], ha quindi evidenziato il trend positivo nel rapporto tra cd. “zombie firms” e società ad alto valore aggiunto nel nostro paese, specie in rapporto alle grandi nazioni europee. Avuto coscienza di tale miglioramento parrebbe quindi opportuno conformare i nuovi flussi di armonizzazione del diritto societario e dei sistemi finanziari integrati alle “Key Reccomendations” dell’OCSE. Tra l’altro, nel rapporto tra diritto interno e [armonizzazione del] diritto comunitario, il Prof. Di Noia ha rimarcato la “rigidità” che affligge, tra l’altro, la disciplina del Codice di Corporate Governance e l’obbligo di non concorrenza (cd. “cooling off”) posto in capo ai dirigenti delle grandi imprese. Tale rapporto di tensione deve essere proiettato, con sguardo “al di fuori” della stessa prospettiva europea, allo sviluppo di una disciplina legislativa e regolatoria più attrattiva e di respiro internazionale.

Il Dott. Freni ha sottolineato la difficoltà di armonizzare i mercati europei in ragione dello iato normativo che distanzia gli Stati Membri. Segue, in questa prospettiva, la necessità di guardare la sfida della regolamentazione “dall’interno”, in modo da rinvigorire il mercato nazionale dei capitali a partire dalla ridefinizione delle procedure e della disciplina interna nell’ottica del recepimento della disciplina comunitaria sugli strumenti finanziari.

A tal riguardo, diviene prioritario formare i professionisti e gli investitori nel mercato “di domani”, in linea con il corrente obiettivo del MEF, condiviso con il Ministero dell’Istruzione e del Merito, di inserire l’educazione finanziaria tra gli insegnamenti obbligatori già nella scuola dell’obbligo. Operatività, efficacia, efficienza, rapidità d’esecuzione: questi sono gli standard che devono orientare il legislatore nella regolamentazione della materia e che hanno caratterizzato la redazione del più recente disegno di legge in materia.

Possibili incentivi ad investire nel mercato italiano

La Prof.ssa Finocchi Mahne ha da parte sua ribadito la necessità di ridefinire i caratteri della regolamentazione [interna] senza incappare in fuorvianti prospettive di crescita economica deregolata, ma piuttosto avendo presente la sua funzionalità per uno sviluppo sostenibile e responsabile del mercato.

Su queste basi, la Prof.ssa Finocchi Mahne ha ripreso il confronto tra il fenomeno della cd. “great resignation” con il problema, così definito dal Rettore Billari, della “demografia finanziaria” che affligge il mercato finanziario interno. A suo avviso ciò è dovuto anche all’assenza di un purpose che spinga le aziende a fare ragionamenti non solo orientati al valore economico della capitalizzazione ma che richiami, in aggiunta, il “senso dell’appartenenza” al Paese d’origine e, quindi, al suo mercato. Un purpose che attualmente manca e che dovrebbe orientare in futuro la scelta del regolatore e la spinta verso il progresso, latamente inteso. Un primo auspicabile investimento per contrastare il diffusissimo ricorso al delisting dai mercati nazionali potrebbe essere un investimento nell’etica della sostenibilità e della trasparenza dei mercati, nell’implicito assunto che la fuga dalla capitalizzazione sia anche una fuga dagli obblighi regolatori e di trasparenza richiesti dal mercato.

Nel valutare gli esiti degli investimenti comunitari nei paesi europei in ambito finanziario, il Dott. Nava ha inoltre osservato che non solo la regolamentazione, ma anche altri fattori incidono sui ritorni di tali investimenti. Tra questi: il business environment del Paese membro; l’eccessivo ricorso alle sanzioni, determinato da una disciplina poco chiara ed eccessivamente repressiva (cd. “sanzionificio”); il mancato (rectius, auspicato) sviluppo di meccanismi di vigilanza assai più efficienti in un mercato sempre più integrato; l’orientamento alla responsabilità e alla sostenibilità.

Il Dott. Freni ha infine analizzato, con sguardo critico, la ripresa della domanda interna per l’acquisto di titoli di Stato, pur in un quadro di progressiva diminuzione degli investimenti in economia reale. Da una parte, il vigore della domanda interna per Btp non può supplire alla “copertura” della Banca Centrale Europea: il passaggio da una politica di “Quantitative Easing” a una di “Quantitative tightening” da parte della BCE desta quindi grande preoccupazione a prescindere dallo stato della domanda interna.^[3] D’altra parte, l’abbassamento del livello di investimenti in economia reale accentua la necessità di concepire “veicoli” e “propulsivi” statali per invertire il trend degli ultimi anni.

L’apertura al mercato è, specie in tempi di crisi, elemento cruciale: in questo senso, un eccesso regolatorio può precludere tale accesso. Con queste premesse, il Prof. Di Noia e il Dott. Nava hanno concluso il panel richiamando le più efficaci riforme in materia di mercati finanziari: lo strumento dei piani individuali di risparmio (PIR);^[4] la riforma della disciplina di Corporate Governance; infine, in prospettiva, le iniziative degli Stati per rispondere alla necessità di diversificare gli investimenti e di ricorso alla capitalizzazione.

La seconda sessione è stata dedicata al tema dell’efficacia della supervisione finanziaria e a un’analisi del 2022 come l’anno del grande re/delisting. Hanno preso parte alla tavola rotonda Paolo Savona (Consob), Adriana Pierelli (BNY Mellon), Fabrizio Testa (Borsa Italiana), Marcello Bianchi (Assonime) e il Prof. Marco Ventoruzzo (Università Bocconi).

Sul tema della minor attrattività della piazza italiana rispetto alle altre, è intervenuto Fabrizio Testa, amministratore delegato di Borsa Italiana. In particolare, il re/delisting può essere il risultato di una serie di fattori. Può conseguire infatti ad una scelta strategica, poiché la società a un certo punto della crescita non trova più stimoli per rimanere in borsa, oppure essere determinato dalla differenza dei costi di vigilanza rispetto ad altre giurisdizioni. A questi fattori si aggiunge il tema dell’orgoglio di appartenenza al paese. A tal riguardo, il Dott. Testa ha sostenuto che molti si quotino perché credono di contribuire alla crescita del paese, mentre altri imprenditori hanno una maggiore propensione verso l’estero. Nel complesso, parrebbero opportune quattro modifiche fiscali per incentivare le quotazioni in borsa:

i) deduzione fiscale per i costi della quotazione;

ii) agevolazioni fiscali per i manager che concludono la quotazione;

iii) introduzione del credito d’imposta per spese legate alla quotazione di piccole e medie imprese (PMI);

iv) proroga del credito d’imposta per i Piani Individuali di Risparmio (PIR) alternativi.

Il successo del mercato americano

La Dott.ssa Pierelli ha svolto in seguito una breve considerazione sui motivi che fondano l’attrattività del mercato americano sotto tre differenti punti di vista: quello di chi investe, di chi “guarda” gli investimenti altrui e di chi decide di fare una seconda quotazione nel mercato americano.Alcuni dei principali fattori di successo sono la liquidità, una più efficiente gestione del rischio – motivo principale alla base del trasferimento di numerose società tech – e la capacità di creare un ecosistema (essendoci più aziende dello stesso settore gli investitori possono confrontarle). Anche l’oversight della Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) è un elemento positivo, ma tuttavia non così rilevante come i tre precedenti.

La doppia quotazione – che rimane ancora una scelta importante e sensata, dato che non tutti gli investitori americani possono acquistare azioni estere direttamente in dollari – è molte volte giustificata dal fatto che le società hanno un cash flow in dollari, vendono i loro prodotti o servizi negli USA e vogliono quindi essere visibili in quel mercato perché le aiuta dal punto di vista delle vendite, oppure perché la quotazione è propedeutica a future acquisizioni negli USA.

Il sottosviluppo del mercato di capitali italiano

Il Dott. Bianchi ha analizzato i rischi di avere un mercato piccolo, come è quello italiano, con riferimento al fenomeno del re/delisting. Questo fenomeno non riguarda solo l’Italia, ma tutti i mercati sviluppati, a eccezione dell’Asia.

Essendo la crisi del delisting assai rilevante in questi mercati, vengono pertanto attuati dei meccanismi di aggiustamento. Se il mercato è sviluppato, allora il riequilibrio tra le sue componenti fa sì che si raggiunga un equilibrio complessivo, mentre se il mercato è sottosviluppato gli squilibri possono diventare sostanziali. Il problema del sottosviluppo del mercato di capitali italiano è centrale e ha delle radici molto profonde. Considerando il peso degli indici azionari, le società italiane pesano nell’indice europeo principale per il 3%, mentre l’economia italiana pesa nel PIL di quegli stessi paesi per il 10%, secondo un rapporto di 1 a 3. Diversamente, le imprese francesi pesano nell’indice il 17%, ma il peso dell’economia francese nel PIL complessivo è del 15%. In Italia quindi, quando gli investimenti seguono gli indici, il sottosviluppo tende ad amplificarsi. A ciò si cumula la poca capacità di supportare la crescita che in questo momento rischia di essere un fattore degenerativo. La competizione globale, sempre più feroce, unita all’incapacità di cogliere le opportunità di crescita, causa una marginalizzazione delle società italiane, che rischiano di chiudere o essere acquisite.

Le cause del sottosviluppo del mercato di capitali italiano sono quindi strutturali, dovute sia alla difficoltà di trasformare il risparmio individuale in risparmio istituzionale sia legate al sistema normativo. Il sottosviluppo, ovviamente, non può essere risolto con una riforma. Tuttavia, sarebbe opportuno allinearsi agli standard internazionali e quindi garantire maggiore flessibilità, prevedendo, per esempio, meno vincoli in relazione al voto plurimo, liberalizzando la nomina del board e ricalibrando i compiti degli organi di controllo.

Possibili soluzioni

Nelle osservazioni conclusive, il Prof. Ventoruzzo ha approfondito, sempre dal punto di vista della supervisione finanziaria, il tema dell’attrattività della piazza italiana (la quale dipende da variabili macroeconomiche difficilmente controllabili dal solo governo nazionale).

Una possibile soluzione, senza abbandonarsi ad esterofilie superficiali, sarebbe il recepimento di aspetti della cultura del rimedio ex post. Pertanto, anziché provare a disciplinare tutto ex ante con perizia di dettagli, causando - inevitabilmente - un costo per tutti, si dovrebbe incentivare una disciplina che si basi su principi chiari ma contenuti e che sia seguita da un’azione di enforcement intelligente, equilibrata e proporzionata. Occorrerebbe inoltre cambiare il sistema, che oggi si basa su comunicazioni informali che spesso generano delle ambiguità, con una nuova prassi di risposte fornite direttamente dagli uffici – come viene già fatto dalla SEC –le quali non vincolano la commissione ma aiutano l’operatore a tenere un punto di riferimento.

La terza – conclusiva – sessione ha visto l’intervento dei relatori Stefania Bariatti (Università degli studi di Milano), Laura Segni (Intesa San Paolo), Davide Serra (Algebris), Alessandro Varaldo (Banca Aletti), Andrea Vismara (Equita). La sessione si è incentrata sull’importanza degli stakeholders per il mercato italiano dei capitali, e sulle esternalità positive in termini di crescita dell’economia reale derivanti dalla eventuale valorizzazione dello stesso, che si sommano ai diretti benefici di un sistema di scambio di strumenti finanziari maggiormente vivace e frequentato.

Nei moderni mercati di capitali, uscenti da un forte periodo di globalizzazione, gli stakeholders non sono più una categoria limitata come un tempo, ma potenzialmente si identificano con tutti i consociati e le loro formazioni giuridiche. Questo comporta grandi opportunità ma anche nuove responsabilità: ci si aspetta dall’intermediario finanziario un grande sforzo di individuazione dei propri stakeholders e dei temi più di interesse per le diverse categorie di soggetti rappresentate in questo genus; in particolare, rileva l’importanza della transizione digitale, nonché il concetto di impresa sostenibile. Non si tratta quindi, naturalmente, solo di temi giuridici, bensì di un nuovo mondo, che pone l’accento su necessità sentite anche bottom-up e che conseguentemente richiede risposte concrete.

La problematica penuria di investitori nel mercato italiano

In un movimento di focalizzazione sul contesto italiano, un problema che si pone rispetto al mercato dei capitali è la penuria di investitori. Questa mancanza di investimenti in società italiane è dovuta a due principali ordini di fattori: la limitata conoscenza dello stesso panorama di possibilità e la mancanza di incentivi, anche di natura fiscale.

Gli investitori domestici, in effetti, tendono a non investire la propria ricchezza nelle imprese italiane, ma in conti correnti oppure fondi di investimento esteri, soprattutto statunitensi. Gli investitori stranieri invece sono poco attratti dall’Italia, dove la valorizzazione delle imprese risulta essere inferiore rispetto agli altri paesi europei. La credibilità e la reputazione del mercato nazionale sono, inoltre, minate dai diversi e spesso repentini cambi di regime e di visione strategica, i quali convogliano un’idea di instabilità.

Il già menzionato problema del numero esiguo di investitori domestici è cruciale. La situazione di un mercato dominato dagli investitori esteri è difficile, perché questi, interessandosi solo delle grandi aziende, mancano di investire nelle c.d. small cap. Per un paese come l’Italia, il cui il tessuto economico è fondato su famiglie e legal entities secolari, in cui le piccole-medie imprese costituiscono la grande rappresentanza in Borsa, la situazione di difficoltà è evidente. Quest’ultima è grandemente dovuta alla disattenzione che si è avuta a livello regolamentare-pubblico nei confronti dei mercati dei capitali.

La risposta che ci si attende, attraverso scelte che in parte può fare solo il legislatore, è anzitutto l’incentivazione dell’investimento di risparmio gestito nelle società italiane, fornendo agli imprenditori gli strumenti e le risorse di cui necessitano per competere con le controparti estere. Questo risultato è perseguibile attraverso incentivi fiscali a favore di tutti quegli operatori che ad oggi potrebbero investire ma non lo fanno, come i fondi pensione, le assicurazioni e le casse di previdenza: una iniziativa che si sta sviluppando a livello governativo. Un'altra necessità è quella di portare la valorizzazione delle società italiane al pari degli altri paesi, per neutralizzare l’incentivo per le grandi aziende di andare a quotarsi all’estero.

L’inefficiente applicazione del diritto italiano

Questi processi incontrano ad oggi delle difficoltà, date in particolare dalla complessità dell’ordinamento giuridico italiano, che notoriamente genera incertezza e causa la diminuzione dell’appetibilità degli investimenti. Tuttavia, l’esperienza comprova come l’adempimento degli obblighi richiesti da altre giurisdizioni non si dimostri affatto più semplice. Pertanto, non è tanto il diritto italiano nella sua sostanza a costituire la difficoltà, bensì le inefficienze nella sua applicazione.

Ampliando la prospettiva in senso comunitario, una risposta a livello dell’UE sicuramente starebbe nella spinta all’armonizzazione, mentre a livello domestico ci si dovrebbe focalizzare sull’evitare il fenomeno del c.d. gold-plating, ossia l’ulteriore appesantimento del piano regolatorio rispetto agli standard europei.

Data per acquisita la risistemazione delle norme (primo tassello di una politica che si volga ad agevolare il mercato dei capitali), il problema non può comunque essere lasciato alle sole regole giuridiche. Occorre in Italia un c.d. consiglio di esperti, non sottoposto e sottomesso al cambio dei governi, che sia in grado di raccogliere nel tempo l’eredità fino ad oggi non riassunta dal regolatore e che non può essere raccolta dagli istituti di vigilanza, che non possono legittimamente essere chiamati a promuovere quegli stessi mercati che devono poi vigilare.

Per le considerazioni di sintesi sui lavori della giornata è intervenuta poi l’Avv. Alessandra Perrazzelli (Banca d’Italia), con chiusura del Prof. Andrea Sironi (Università Bocconi). L’intervento si è incentrato sull’importanza della supervisione e della digitalizzazione per un mercato dei capitali integrato.

L’ecosistema nel quale oggi si sviluppa il mercato finanziario italiano è molto ampio ed è caratterizzato da un’interazione sempre più stretta tra mondo finanziario e gli operatori tecnologici innovativi. Questo processo è stato poi recentemente accelerato a causa della pandemia da Covid-19.

Gli intermediari stanno finalmente facendo molto, permettendo a realtà di eccellenza tecnologica di emergere. Gli operatori si trovano a svolgere un’operazione sistematica sui propri modelli di business per tenere il passo con l’evoluzione e l’affermarsi della tecnologia quale strumento per fornire prodotti e servizi nuovi, mutati dalla digitalizzazione. L’esigenza dell’autorità di vigilanza è quella di portare un’innovazione forte del quadro regolamentare e dell’approccio alla supervisione. Sono in corso di definizione delle norme anche a livello europeo, ma i tempi necessari per inserirle nei sistemi nazionali italiani sono tradizionalmente troppo lunghi. Tuttalpiù, la vigilanza prudenziale non può più considerarsi sufficiente, ma l’istituto di vigilanza deve poter promuovere in prima persona l’innovazione e l’asservimento al progresso.

A livello di investimento, invece, accanto al ruolo importante di Cassa Depositi e Prestiti come anchor investor in tutti quei settori tecnologici in fase di sviluppo, è importante aggregare gli operatori e fare in modo che la massa di investitori nel nostro paese diventi sempre più grande. L’Italia di oggi vede una grande spinta al cambiamento: anche negli operatori tradizionali, ma soprattutto nelle startup e nel settore dello sviluppo.

Il paese si sta muovendo e la speranza è quella che ciò possa richiamare attenzione degli investitori, anche oltre i confini nazionali.

[1] La media del rapporto tra capitalizzazione del mercato e PIL è 1:3 per l’Italia rispetto ai paesi del G7, 1:2 rispetto ai paesi dell’area europea e il numero di società quotate ogni milione di popolazione è in rapporto di 1:5 rispetto ai paesi del G7 e 1:3 rispetto ai paesi dell’Unione Europea.

[2] Invece, osserva il Dott. Di Nava, è la Svezia, nell’ultimo anno, al primo posto tra tutti i paesi europei in termini di quotazioni e capitalizzazione sul mercato regolamentato interno.

[3] Si fa riferimento alla preannunciata intenzione, da parte della BCE, di avviare una politica restrittiva e deflazionistica tramite la riduzione degli investimenti in titoli governativi dei Paesi membri.

[4] Si veda a riguardo il prospetto illustrativo della Banca d’Italia, disponibile su https://economiapertutti.bancaditalia.it/investire/pir/

The Complicated Life of a Constitution

Mariano Andrea Morabito — 2023-05-04T23:03:15+00:00

L’evento ha rappresentato il terzo incontro del ciclo spring 2023 di seminari organizzati dal Dipartimento di Studi Giuridici “Angelo Sraffa” ed era volto ad approfondire l'influenza sulla cultura giuridica europea dell’originalismo, dottrina centrale nel contesto statunitense, che tende a ricercare il significato originario della Costituzione guardando al contesto storico e politico in cui è stata creata. Alcuni aspetti di questa dottrina stanno prendendo piede in Europa, al punto che è possibile osservarne le tracce tanto nelle opere degli studiosi quando in ambito giurisprudenziale.

L’originalismo negli Stati Uniti

L’originalismo è la teoria maggiormente diffusa nel contesto giuridico statunitense^[1] e può essere interpretato sia come un metodo che giustifica una determinata interpretazione della Costituzione che come un’interpretazione ideologica che tende a perseguire una determinata agenda politica. Il successo della dottrina è dovuto alla sua coerenza con alcune caratteristiche fondamentali del common law, come la sensibilità per il passato e l’idea che la Costituzione sia una sintesi di interessi, funzionale a garantire l’unità politica e il costituzionalismo democratico durante i momenti di crisi.

Una delle tesi centrali dell’originalismo sostiene che le Costituzioni sono contingenti in senso sociologico in quanto rappresentano il prodotto di interazioni, avvenute in un determinato contesto storico, volte a introdurre valutazioni strategiche che trovano fondamento solo in quel quadro di riferimento. Ne consegue che le Costituzioni sono il risultato di fattori storicamente determinanti e non di una volontà politica ragionata che vuole pensare a valori universalizzanti e universalizzabili. Per questa ragione, il fondamento dei principi è inestricabilmente legato al contesto storico in cui si è proceduto alla loro adozione – avvenuta in un momento anteriore rispetto alla creazione del testo costituzionale.

Proseguendo su questa linea di pensiero, la Costituzione viene quindi intesa come un progetto esaurito nel momento in cui viene creato e funzionale a risolvere esclusivamente i problemi individuati dai costituenti. Da ciò deriva che il miglior modo per interpretarla è ricercarne il significato originale, salvaguardandone la portata normativa senza cercare uno sviluppo del testo attraverso significati ulteriori: solo in questo modo, secondo la tesi originalista, sarebbe possibile preservare la natura del costituzionalismo democratico. Ciò ha portato alcuni autori, tra cui Antonin Scalia, storico giudice della Corte Suprema Americana, a ritenere che la Costituzione è morta, in quanto frutto di una volontà politica contingente che si esaurisce al momento della creazione; ne consegue l’inidoneità a risolvere problemi attuali che non erano stati contemplati dai costituenti. In quest’ottica, i casi in cui la Costituzione non può fornire una risposta vanno risolti attraverso un processo politico e non con l’attivismo giudiziario con cui il giudice si sostituisce al legislatore.

L’originalismo nel contesto giuridico europeo

L’originalismo non ha trovato molto spazio nella cultura giuridica europea a seguito della seconda guerra mondiale: la pervasività della cultura pubblicistica ha infatti fatto propendere per letture sistematiche della Costituzione.^[2]Il diritto costituzionale in Europa si è quindi sviluppato a partire dall’idea che l’ordinamento incorpori dei principi morali: per questa ragione è possibile che, nonostante la lettura testuale conservi sempre la sua importanza, l’interpretazione sia in alcuni casi improntata più alla giustizia che alle fonti. Nondimeno, anche nel contesto europeo si sono affermate teorie secondo cui è necessaria una convergenza tra il modello di società che emerge dalla Costituzione e il risultato delle interpretazioni costituzionali. Ad esempio, la dottrina tedesca ha ritenuto necessaria un’estensività condivisa tra testo costituzionale e funzionamento della comunità politica; ciò ha giustificato la modifica della Costituzione a seguito di cambiamenti fattuali della società che necessitavano di una legittimazione costituzionale. Anche nell’Unione Europea ci sono state delle trasformazioni che hanno avuto manifestazione politica ma sono state rese plausibili dal contesto giuridico in cui sono emerse: ad esempio, nel caso della Brexit, il cambiamento politico è dipeso dalla capacità della cultura giuridica di concepirlo come possibile.^[3]

Ciò considerato, le tesi originaliste fondate sul concetto di contingenza hanno trovato maggiore affermazione sul continente ed è possibile osservarne le tracce anche in ambito giurisprudenziale. Ad esempio, nella causa Germania v. Italia del 2014,^[4]la Corte Costituzionale ha sancito, nonostante la soggezione del diritto interno al diritto comunitario, l’immodificabilità dell’articolo 24 della Costituzione avente ad oggetto il diritto di difesa. L’articolo in questione, secondo la Corte, esprime e sintetizza la storia di reazione italiana al regime autoritario ed è fortemente radicato nella cultura e nella storia del paese. Attraverso questo ragionamento la Corte ha dato rilievo alla contingenza, giustificando la centralità di un valore alla luce del momento storico a cui si riferisce.

In conclusione, il punto fondamentale di tensione nel dibattito costituzionale può essere individuato nella definizione stessa di Costituzione. Le tesi originaliste, di fatto, mettono in discussione una caratteristica fondamentale che ha caratterizzato lo sviluppo della cultura costituzionale in Europa, ossia l’idea che le Costituzioni rispondano ad una domanda di giustizia che viene dalla società. In quest’ottica, le Costituzioni si configurano come dei libri delle risposte, sempre aperti e pensati per essere tali.

^[1] La larga diffusione ha favorito la nascita, all’interno della dottrina stessa, di vari filoni molto differenti tra loro. Si consideri che, ad esempio, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, icona liberal statunitense, ha affermato di essere originalista, se con questo termine si intende la volontà di conservare lo spirito originale della Costituzione.

^[2] Inoltre, a differenza di quanto avvenuto negli Stati Uniti, i lavori preparatori alla base dell’adozione di numerosi testi costituzionali non furono oggetto di ampia diffusione. Pertanto, la loro generale indisponibilità ha indotto molti a sottovalutarne la rilevanza.

^[3] I giudici inglesi hanno sempre manifestato la loro difficoltà a comprendere alcuni aspetti del sistema giuridico dell’Unione Europea, come l’interpretazione teleologica o l’idea secondo cui la Costituzione sia un progetto portato avanti dai giudici.

^[4] Corte Cost., 29 ottobre 2014, n. 45, disponibile su: https://www.cortecostituzionale.it/actionSchedaPronuncia.do?anno=2014&numero=238

Assessing the Past, Envisioning The Future

Francesco De Rosa, Elisa Piccini — 2023-06-11T23:12:52+00:00

The opening roundtable was chaired by Chiara Giorgetti and Michele Potestà (Lévy Kaufmann-Kohler), with the participation of Lise Bosman (Permanent Court of Arbitration), Mohamed Abdel-Wahab (Zulficar & Partners; University of Cairo), Jaroslav Kudrna (The Czech Republic), Ferdinando Emanuele (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton) and Francesca Salerno (ENEL).

Investment arbitration was born after the Second World War, when cross-border investment became vital, and the World Bank was created. Given that part of its mission is to encourage reconstruction and development and promote investment, the World Bank recognized the importance of having an institution to resolved disputes between private investors and States. Thus, it established the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), now counting 158 member States.

The early days of ICSID were quiet but, as the number of investment treaties between states proliferated and investment increased, attention towards ICSID grew. The system started to be criticized for lack of lacking transparency, diversity, and impartiality, and some even advocated for a complete change. As a matter of fact, ICSID proved to be to be capable of evolving, and it was progressively improved through various reforms. These addressed issues such as the time and costs of proceedings, the importance of expanding the ways to solve disputes through mediation and conciliation, the diversity of arbitrators, and the degree of procedural transparency and consistency.

Still, new challenges remain for the future, and a proactive approach is needed. For this reason, it is paramount to analyze past reforms and new proposals from the point of view of different stakeholders, namely States, private companies, counsels, arbitrators and institutions. In this regard, one critical issue it to consider is the importance of taking into account the consequences that investment treaties can have on the climate. Both States and investors agree that treaties should only protect investments that are sustainable and compliant with climate change rules.

Another particularly interesting debate concerns the possibility of introducing obligations for investors in investment treaties. Historically, only States’ obligations were included. States are convinced that this relationship must be rebalanced, so the reform process should also look at introducing duties for the investors. On the opposite side, investors argue that only States should be asked to comply with regulations, because it is usually their responsibility when disputes arise.

Finally, many stakeholders are advocating for the creation of a permanent court to decide investor-State claims, instead of having arbitrators appointed by the parties. This proposal allegedly has the advantage of enhancing coherence and consistency in the decisions, by providing a more structured and transparent framework for the resolution of investment disputes. However, many have expressed concerns on this proposal’s feasibility. First of all, different states have different ideas on the features that this court should have. Moreover, there is no guarantee that a permanent body would be more independent and transparent than arbitrators appointed by the parties.

In conclusion, the evolution of investment arbitration through ICSID reforms has addressed many of the concerns about the transparency, diversity, and impartiality of the system. However, new challenges continue to arise, and a proactive approach is required to address them effectively. Moving forward, it is crucial to carefully analyze past reforms and new proposals from the perspectives of different stakeholders to ensure a fair and effective system.

The role of States in arbitration

Another session focused on the different roles that states can play in arbitration as respondents, claimants, counterclaimants, regulators, treaty parties and reformers. To address this topic, Dyalá Jiménez Figures (Costa Rica Ministry of Foreign Trade), Prof. Makane Moïse Mbengue (University of Geneva), Prof. Attila Tanzi (Bologna University) and Jadranka Osrečak (State Attorney Office of the Republic of Croatia) were invited.

Dyalá Jiménez Figures firstly discussed about the role of states as policy makers, underlying the importance of long-term policies. Usually these imply governments’ stability, which is obviously difficult to reach yet fundamental, and so it is of primary importance for representatives of the people to try to achieve this goal, which also consists of providing aftercare for the investors and early dispute resolution mechanisms. In fact, there is a study that shows that about 25% of investors allocate their savings in a specific country only if its stability is ensured. This phenomenon happens mostly in developing countries and it is very important for the growth of their economies.

One important example is the case of Costa Rica which undertook multiple innovative initiatives later turning out to be successful. Firstly, they chose not to exploit their natural resources and to protect the environment which was a very controversial position back in the 1950s since it was believed that it was not feasible for a country to increase its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) without exploiting nature. Moreover, they also decided to open their waters to trade, which was also very unusual since this policy decision was submitted to a referendum. On the other hand, one of Cost Rica’s weaknesses is that the country has never been clear on whether it supports private-public partnerships to build better infrastructures.

Finally, Costa Rica established a government body made of three institutions: the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the Investor Protection Agency, and the Promotion Agency. These three agencies are very important because they can make long term decisions without political pressure, in this way they can be independent from the government’s influence. This governance has been stable (obviously changing according to international standards) and so it ensured predictability, one of the key elements contributing to Costa Rica’s success.

Another aspect to consider with respect to Costa Rica’s policy making is its compliance with the values of the current international arbitration system. In fact, Costa Rica not only firmly believes in such system, but also participates actively in promoting and proposing reforms. In order to start this type of procedure, there is a specific governance which follows up disputes and makes sure that the state is defending its cases properly. In particular Costa Rica has had to deal with 14 International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) cases, in which they were pretty successful as they were ordered to repay damages only in two of them. Other four cases were decided in Costa Rica’s favour and in the other cases Costa Rica was found to have breached international obligations - the state, however, did not have to pay for any damage.

One last aspect to take into consideration concerns the role of the states as negotiators of agreements which contain dispute settlement clauses. In this regard, Costa Rica, despite its small size, occupies a central position given that it has 14 free trades agreements and 16 bilateral investment treaties with countries all over the world. This was also possible because the country and its representatives continuously learn from their own cases.

The investment challenges faced by African states

Prof. Makane Moïse Mbengue focused on the main challenges that African states have to face in the investment field by illustrating the so called three “C” theory.

The first one stands for continuity. This is a massive problem for Africa because of the constant change not only of governments, but also of investments’ negotiators. The natural consequence is that for states it is very difficult to act as good reformers since they don’t have continuity. For example, on one side we can consider Morocco and Nigeria, which have had the same team of negotiators for the last fifteen years and so they were able to successfully enact reforms, unlike Zambia which does not have this kind of stability.

The second “C” refers to lack of coordination: in many African countries those who enact investments laws do not communicate with those who negotiate free trade agreements, who, in turn, do not talk with those who negotiate continental investments instruments. This is what is commonly called fragmentation of the reformers, which means that states engage in multiple reforms all at once. The coordination problem also exists in terms of timing, resulting in lack of synchronicity. In fact, in Africa reforms are much faster at the continental level than at the bilateral investment treaty level.

The last “C” stands for competition, which is particularly high among states in Africa. In fact, most African countries seek Long Term Investments to achieve development, so there is a strong competition when it comes to attract these investments. For instance, right now there are many states which are suspicious towards Kenya because there is a fear that this state could deviate from the consensus that has been reached at the continental level regarding the African continent free trade area.

The increasing importance of counterclaims

Prof. Attila Tanzi talked about the current legal framework, also underlining that counterclaims remain relatively rare because many tribunals are suspicious of them. Nonetheless, there are unquestionable pros in allowing counterclaims which represent a fundamental element of the respondent state's right to present its case on an equal footing with the investor, thus guaranteeing a better administration of justice. That’s why counterclaims can provide the best instrument to guarantee balance and can be treated as a general principle of law that rests on reasons of fairness.

Finally, Jadranka Osrečak spoke about the Raiffeisen bank case, which arose from an arbitration issue and ended up addressing a wider number of policies issues. The proceeding was initiated in February 2021 by the Republic of Croatia against the Austrian bank Raiffeisen Bank and its Croatian subsidiary. The German Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt accepted Croatia’s claim and ruled that the arbitration proceedings commenced by these two banks against Croatia under the Austria-Croatia BIT were inadmissible. This decision was ground-breaking, since for the first time a court in the European Union concluded that the principles of EU law enunciated by the CJEU in the Slovak Republic v Achmea case^[1] were to be applied beyond the scope of that specific case. In fact, the ECJ, considering investment tribunals as possible rivals and threats to the Union’s judicial system, established the possibility for national courts to declare arbitration proceedings inadmissible. Moreover, the Court ordered the banks to reimburse Croatia for the costs of the proceedings.

^[1] European Court of Justice, Slovak Republic v Achmea BV [C‑284/16].

The Europeanization of Italian Civil Procedure Law: The Italian Supreme Court and The Jurisdiction to Give Preliminary Rulings

Camilla D'Abbraccio — 2023-07-02T17:49:13+00:00

The 2022 reform of the Italian civil proceeding, aimed at ensuring efficiency and a reasonable duration of proceedings, has assigned an increasingly important role to judges.

While on one hand the pursuit of this goal has characterized many reforms of civil procedural law in the last years, on the other hand, these periodic changes have also produced many interpretative and applicative problems, which have resulted in interpretative divergences between courts, hence rendering decisions in similar cases unpredictable.

Therefore, the 2022 reform, in addition to aiming for efficiency and reasonable timing, sought to overcome the difficulties coming from decades of legislative innovations. The most relevant novelty of this reform lies in the recognition of an increasingly important role to judges, as the new rules give more importance to the role of the precedent, which is arguably the most important outcome of judicial activity.

Is the expansion of judges’ powers in civil proceedings a good choice? Does it represent an effective option with respect to the goal of ensuring a reasonable duration of the judicial decision-making process? The answer is not that simple, as there are many elements involved which include, inter alia, the appointment of new judges and the modernization of civil proceedings. What is certain is that the strengthening of the role of the judges can obtain the reduction of conflict between judicial decisions, increasing the degree of predictability.

On the other hand, many scholars acknowledge that this novelty can actually cause uncertainty of the law. They also argue that the existence of interpretative conflict is not a bad thing, because interpretative conflicts show that the law is evolving, and this means that improvement and refinement of the law is assured. However, while it is true that the law evolves through interpretation, the existence of interpretative conflicts rarely causes the law to evolve: indeed, for the law to evolve, conflicts must be first resolved.

The new rule

Hence, the 2022 reform set out in art. 363 bis a new tool for preventing and resolving interpretative conflicts, which provides that any Italian court can ask the Supreme Court (Corte di Cassazione) to give a preliminary ruling on a pending legal issue when the question:

Is necessary to resolve the case
Involves difficulties concerning interpretation
Is likely to arise in many cases

Moreover, any decision on the merit by the lower court which submitted the question is suspended until the opinion is delivered or three months go by.

This mechanism surely resembles the preliminary reference system before the European Court of Justice, and also a mechanism already existing in France. In particular, according to the French Civil Code, lower courts, before ruling on an issue raising a new question of law that presents serious problems of interpretation, may seek the opinion of the Cour de Cassation. As in the new Italian provision, any decision on the merit by the lower court which submitted the question is suspended until the opinion is delivered.

An important difference between the French rule and the Italian one is that while the Italian Supreme Court’s decision is binding for the court which submitted the question, the decision of the French court is merely persuasive, and lower courts are free to not comply with it and thus to disregard the precedent. However, it should also be noted that usually lower French courts tend to conform to the Supreme Court’s decisions, as they are persuasive and effective and possess great authoritative force.

Another main difference between the French and the Italian provision is that the Italian Supreme Court’s order manifests itself in the so-called “principio di diritto”, which identifies the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law, while this concept has no space in the French provision. Indeed, unlike the French rule, the Italian rule expressly provides that the Supreme Court’s order is binding.

The model of the European Court of Justice

Therefore, the Italian rule is much more similar to the preliminary rulings of the European Court of Justice. The references for preliminary rulings serve to assure nondivergent interpretations of EU law. The European Court of Justice’s decision, like the Italian rule, is not just an opinion but takes the form of a judgment. The lower court which submitted the question is bound by the interpretation given as well as other national courts before which the same problem arises. Indeed, throughout the history of the European Union, several important principles of EU law have been laid down through preliminary rulings.

The 2022 Italian reform provides for something very similar in order to ensure the effective and uniform application of Italian law and to prevent divergent interpretations. Lower courts can now refer to the Supreme Court and ask to solve an issue concerning the interpretation of Italian law, and the precedent of the Supreme Court is much more important than in the past.

This exchange of procedural tools clearly shows that legal systems develop and evolve, distance themselves and then get close. Indeed, nowadays, even talking about a rigid distinction between the civil law and the common law legal systems is a simplification, and this is demonstrated by the fact that the Italian legal system is pursuing the common law model of the binding precedent.The new Italian rule is a clear example of this fading separation as it shows that the Italian legal system is consistently moving towards the precedent based system traditionally associated with common law jurisdictions.

The role of the "Sezioni Unite"

The increasing importance of the Italian Supreme Court’s precedent can be captured also in another rule, which prevents the Supreme Court from disregarding its own precedents pronounced by its most important section, namely the “Sezioni Unite”.

The “Sezioni Unite” are the Supreme Court of Cassation’s most authoritative section; they come into play when it is necessary to settle contrasts that have arisen between the decisions of the individual sections or when the proposed issues are of special importance (e.g., because it is an issue arising for the first time).

If one of the sections of the Supreme Court intends to overrule a precedent established by the Sezioni Unite, it is obliged to refer the question of law to the mentioned section. Therefore, it cannot freely disregard it, even if it can avoid following it. Hence, this legal pattern shows that the Italian legal system is progressively being directed toward a transformation of precedents in binding decisions. However, while for the Supreme Court its own precedents can be considered binding, for the lower courts they possess merely persuasive force, as there are no rules that make them binding.

Viewing things from a broader perspective, it can be concluded that the real force of a precedent should be found in its argumentative force. Indeed, when the precedent’s reasonableness fails and the precedent no longer exhibits persuasive force, it is progressively disregarded and can therefore be modified or overcome. As a matter of fact, common law systems have never explicitly written the principle of stare decisis but have instead always assumed it.

Looking at the aforementioned reform, the interpretation given by the Corte di Cassazione after the preliminary reference will only bind the lower court which made the referral and not all lower courts. Therefore, this new reform can be seen as a confirmation of the conclusion that the real reason for considering a judicial precedent binding lies in its persuasiveness and reasonableness.

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Frank Ramsey’s Contributions to Probability (and Legal) Theory

Articles — 2023-09-05T11:32:38+00:00

Introduction

Frank Ramsey was one of the first theorists, along with Bruno de Finetti,[1] to formalize the notion of subjective probability, but how did Ramsey discover this revolutionary insight in the first place – the idea that probability can consist of a subjective value or purely personal estimate? Cheryl Misak’s beautiful 2020 biography of Frank Ramsey, which is subtitled A Sheer Excess of Powers, explores this terrain as well as Ramsey’s many other scholarly contributions.[2] Misak’s book is divided into three broad temporal sections: i) “Boyhood”, which consists of three chapters devoted to the years 1903 to 1920, i.e. from the year of Ramsey’s birth up to his arrival at Cambridge University; ii) “The Cambridge Man”, which contains seven chapters that describe Ramsey’s undergraduate years at Trinity College as well as his six-month sojourn in Vienna in 1924; and, lastly, iii) “An Astonishing Half Decade”, which contains nine chapters and covers the last five years of Ramsey’s short but productive life. Likewise, I will structure my review of Misak’s work into three parts, with each part corresponding to one of the three main sections of Misak’s book. Part I of my review revisits Ramsay’s boyhood; Part II, his years at Cambridge University; and Part III, his final years. Part IV then concludes by showing how Ramsey’s work and ideas can help shed new light on the law. [3]

I. Ramsey’s Boyhood

Although there is no evidence that the young Ramsey was exposed to the rigors of probability theory by his parents Arthur and Agnes Ramsey or during his formal education at Winchester College (a demanding English boarding school for boys), two details from Ramsey’s boyhood, as recounted in Part I of Misak’s book, stood out for me the most. One was the young Ramsey’s principled opposition to the brutal system of bullying and hazing at his boarding school. Misak summarizes this savage system in the second chapter of her book. Here is just one chilling excerpt:

Each junior was the personal servant of an older student and had to “fag” or “sweat” for him. That meant cleaning the buttons and boots of his Officers’ Training Corps uniforms as well as his muddy cricket boots so they gleaned white again, as well as countless other tasks. The juniors [also] had to make the prefects’ tea, or afternoon meal, and wash up after …[4]

Ramsey, however, detested these regular hazing rituals, and towards the end of his tenure at boarding school, he wrote in his diary that he had “[d]ecided to give up sweating juniors”.[5] Furthermore, according to Misak, Ramsey even made a bargain with the younger boy assigned to him that he would not be required to do any chores at all for him; in return, the boy was to pay it forward to his assigned junior when the time came.[6] In other words, this early episode shows how Ramsey, even at a young age, was a man of principle.

The other aspect of Ramsey’s boyhood that caught my attention was his voracious reading habits.[7] Even at such an early age, Ramsey was a boy who loved the world of ideas, for in addition to his regular coursework at his boarding school, Ramsey devoured dozens of advanced works from a wide variety of fields. Among the many extracurricular books the young Ramsey is reported to have read are David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature, Bertrand Russell’s Problems of Philosophy, and G.E. Moore’s Ethics. If one were to create a syllabus with the goal of imparting a well-rounded liberal arts education, one would be hard-pressed to assemble a better collection of classic works.

II. Cambridge University

Part II of Cheryl Misak’s intellectual biography of Frank Ramsey is devoted to Ramsey’s undergraduate years at Cambridge University, where the young scholar would, among other things, translate Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and study John Maynard Keynes’s Treatise on Probability. If there is a common or overarching theme during these formative years in Ramsey’s intellectual life (1920-24), it is his willingness to challenge the most powerful and sacrosanct ideas of such great and legendary scholars and philosophers as G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Here, I will limit myself to just one such momentous undergraduate episode: Ramsey’s early critique of Keynes’s theory of probability.

To appreciate the young Frank Ramsey’s first foray into probability theory, I must first provide some relevant background. The great John Maynard Keynes had published his Treatise on Probability in 1921,[8] and in a review of Keynes’s work, none other than Bertrand Russell had called Keynes’s Treatise “the most important work on probability that has appeared for a very long time”,[9] adding that the “book as a whole is one which it is impossible to praise too highly”.[10] Why was Keynes’s work so highly praised at the time? Because Keynes had developed a new way of looking at the concept of probability. For Keynes, probability consisted of an objective or logical relation between evidence and hypothesis, or in the words of Misak, a relation “between any set of premises and a conclusion in virtue of which, if we know the first, we will be warranted in accepting the second with some particular degree of belief”.[11]

Ramsey, however, immediately identified two big blind spots in Keynes’s conception of probability.[12] One was Keynes’s admission that not all probabilities are numerical or measurable, especially when the truth values of our underlying premises are in dispute. In that case, when we have no idea whether our premises are true or not, Keynes’s approach does not allow us to measure the probabilities of our conclusions. For Ramsey, by contrast, all probabilities should be measurable. The other problem with Keynes’s theory – a deeper problem to boot – was the objective nature of his view of probability: the idea that all statements or propositions stand in logical relation to each other. Ramsey, by contrast, denied the existence of these logical relations altogether. For Ramsey, probability was based on experience, not logic. That is, far from being an objective relation, the strength or weakness of the relationship between two propositions also depended on psychological factors: on one’s personal experiences and subjective beliefs.[13]

Yet, as the saying goes, “it takes a theory to beat a theory”,[14] and at this stage of his promising career the young Ramsey had yet to develop his own full-fledged theory of probability. Ramsey would finally get around to doing so in the last half decade of his short life, but before proceeding, I will take a short detour to recount two important personal episodes that occurred during this middle stage of Ramsey’s short life: his six-month sojourn in Vienna,[15] and his secret love affair with Lettice Baker,[16] who deserves a biography of her own.

In brief, upon the completion of his undergraduate studies, Ramsey had decided to spend an extended period of time in Vienna to undergo psychoanalysis.[17] At that time, according to Misak, “taking the cure in Vienna” was a common pastime for many young Cambridge academics.[18] Furthermore, Frank Ramsey took full advantage of all that the former imperial capital had to offer: deep discussions with members of the legendary Vienna Circle of anti-metaphysical philosophers, cultured nights at the world-famous Opera, and even some sordid sexual escapades with a Viennese prostitute.

Moreover, within a month of his return to England, in the fall of 1924, Ramsey met Lettice Baker at a Moral Sciences Club meeting at Trinity College.[19] Shortly thereafter, Ramsey asked her out to tea, and they quickly fell in love. For my part, what struck me the most about the Ramsey-Baker love affair was how they had to keep their amorous relationship a secret until they were legally wed in September of 1925, but more importantly for the world of ideas, Ramsey’s greatest scholarly contributions, including his theory of subjective probability (a theory that is especially relevant to law, as I shall show below), were right around the corner.

III. Ramsey’s Swan Song

The third and last part of Cheryl Misak’s beautiful biography of Frank Ramsey (“An Astonishing Half Decade”) covers the last five years of Ramsey’s fleeting life. During the last half decade of his short but productive life, Ramsey made major contributions to a wide variety of fields, including economics, mathematics, and philosophy, but I shall focus here on his contributions to probability theory, for it was during this time that Ramsey developed his own full-fledged theory of subjective or psychological probability.

Ramsey developed his new approach to chance in a paper titled Truth and Probability, which he presented for the first time at a meeting of the Moral Sciences Club in November of 1926.[20] In this remarkable paper, which was eventually published posthumously in 1931,[21] Ramsey sketched out an entirely new and revolutionary way of looking at probability. We can summarize Ramsey’s picture of probability in ten words: “probabilities are beliefs and beliefs, in turn, are metaphorical bets”,[22] or to quote Ramsey’s himself, “Whenever we go to the station we are betting that a train will really run, and if we had not a sufficient degree of belief in this [outcome] we should decline this bet and stay at home”.[23] On this subjective view of probability, one can measure the strength of a person’s beliefs in betting terms, or again in Ramsey’s own words: a “probability of 1/3 is clearly related to the kind of belief [that] would lead to a bet of 2 to 1”.[24] Most importantly, Ramsey also showed how one’s bets – i.e., one’s subjective or personal probabilities – should obey the formal axioms of probability theory.[25]

It is hard to overstate the importance of Ramsey’s subjective betting paradigm.[26] First and foremost, Ramsey’s subjective approach fills a huge gap left open by standard probability theory based on frequencies, for as Misak herself correctly notes, frequentist methods can neither “provide an account of partial belief, nor an account of how an individual should make one-off decisions”.[27] This blind spot is so enormous and so well-known by now that I won’t belabor it here; it suffices to say that Ramsey’s subjective picture of probability delivers a serious blow to standard or frequentist models.

Secondly, Ramsey’s betting paradigm fills another huge blind spot in probability theory. Before Ramsey, the conventional wisdom, so to speak, was that some probabilities (especially personal probabilities) were not measurable in any rigorous way. After Ramsey, by contrast, we are fully able to express any person’s partial beliefs, even his subjective ones, using numerical values. How? By converting one’s beliefs into betting odds. (As an added bonus, Ramsey’s intellectual framework even enables us to determine whether our subjective beliefs are rational or not via now-standard Dutch book arguments).[28] In addition, Ramsey’s betting paradigm also provides the intellectual foundations for modern prediction markets,[29] one of the most promising and exciting market innovations of our time.[30] Perhaps we should rename prediction markets “Ramsey markets” in honor of Frank Ramsey.

But what do Ramsey’s ideas have to offer lawyers, judges, and legal theorists?

IV. A “Ramsey Model” of Judicial Voting

As it happens, Frank Ramsey’s subjective picture of probability has both normative and descriptive implications for law. To recap, according to Ramsey’s subjective picture of probability, probabilities are not an external or objective property of the real world. Instead, probabilities are internal entities – the subjective expression of one’s personal view of the world. Moreover, one’s subjective belief about the probability of a proposition’s truth can be expressed in numerical terms: one’s “degree of belief”.[31]

In other words, the probability of a particular proposition being true is just one’s degree of belief or level of confidence in the truth of that proposition. On this subjective view of probability, even if two people’s judgments about the probability of a proposition are vastly different at time t₁, after evidence for (or against) the statement/hypothesis contained in the proposition is introduced at time t₂, rational individuals should then revise their initial degrees of beliefs, and moreover, their degrees of belief will tend to converge as more and more new evidence becomes available. Isn’t this subjective convergence toward truth a good description of how common law judges and juries decide cases?

In addition to its descriptive power, Ramsey’s approach to probability may also have some normative implications for law. Consider judicial voting on multi-member panels, such as the Supreme Court of the United States. An appellate judge’s vote contains information (independent of whatever reasons the judge may give to justify his vote), so a Rasmisan judge should update his priors before casting a final and decisive vote, especially in close cases.[32] But is there any way of operationalizing these Bayesian insights? There is: “Ramsey voting”, “Ramsian voting”, or what I have also called “Bayesian verdicts”[33] or “Bayesian voting”.[34] In plain English, what if an appellate judge, when deciding a case, were required to not only state the reasons for his vote but were also required to express his degree of belief in the soundness or correctness of his decision?

To the point, a Ramsian system of judicial voting would look much different from the existing system of binary judicial voting in appellate cases. In place of emitting a simple binary vote either affirming or reversing a lower court’s decision, a Ramsian judge would rate or score the strength of the legal arguments of the parties. With Ramsian voting, a judge would have to assign a numerical score reflecting his relative degree of belief or credence in what the proper outcome of an issue or case should be, depending on whether the judge is engaged in outcome-voting or issue-voting.[35]

To understand how Ramsian voting could work in practice, recall that one’s degree of belief can be expressed in numerical terms anywhere in the range from 0 to 1:

In summary, the higher the score, the greater the judge’s credence or degree of belief. A score below 0.5, for example, would mean that the party with the burden of persuasion is not expected to prevail. A score above 0.5, by contrast, indicates that the party is expected to prevail, while a score of 0.5 means the judge is undecided about which party should prevail. Bayesian or Ramsian voting thus recognizes the subjective as well as the interdependent nature of law and legal interpretation.

This alternative method of voting goes by various names, including range voting,[36] utilitarian voting,[37] score voting,[38] point voting,[39] and cardinal voting,[40] just to name a few variants. For my part, I have used the term “Bayesian voting” not only because judicial decision-making in close cases is ultimately a subjective exercise in legal reasoning, but also to emphasize the close connection between this proposed method of judicial voting and the theory of subjective probability developed by such giants as Frank P. Ramsey and Bruno de Finetti.[41] To sum up, the subjective approach to probability can be used to improve collective decision making, including legal adjudication. Perhaps we should rename these alternative methods of voting “Ramsey voting” or “Ramsian voting” in honor of Frank Ramsey’s contributions to probability theory.

Conclusion

I will conclude my review of Misak with a confession and a conjecture. My confession is that I am befuddled by two aspects of Ramsey’s personal biography, of Ramsey the man: his decision to squander no less than six months of his fleeting life to undergo psychoanalysis in Vienna and the open nature of Ramsey’s marriage to Lettice Baker, for I agree with Sir Karl Popper that psychoanalysis is unfalsifiable pseudoscience,[42] and for me, love is not a matter of degree; true love requires one to give up one’s outside options – what game theorists refer to as credible commitment.[43]

Now that I have made my confession, I will proceed to my conjecture. What if romantic love were a matter of degree, like truth, instead of an all-or-nothing proposition?[44] Also, what if it was Ramsey’s extended exposure to psychoanalysis during his six-month sojourn in Vienna that somehow inspired him to develop his subjective approach to probability? After all, beliefs and desires – the raw materials, so to speak, of psychoanalysis – also play a critical role in Ramsey’s subjective theory of probability. If so, his sojourn in Vienna was not a waste of time after all; it was a necessary precondition of his contributions to the world of probability theory.

Thank you, Cheryl Misak, for sharing your Frank Ramsey with us.

* * *

Appendix: A “Ramsey Model” of Litigation

To further illustrate the relevance of the ideas of Frank Ramsey to law, this Appendix presents a simple analytical of litigation contests and applies the model to both criminal and civil cases.[45] In both types of cases, litigation is a game with two possible outcomes: positive (+) and negative (–).[46] Seen from the moving party’s perspective, for example, a positive outcome occurs when the moving party successfully imposes civil or criminal liability on the defendant; a negative outcome, when the defendant is able to avoid the imposition of liability.[47]

Before proceeding, notice that the relevant rules of procedure (i.e., the rules of the litigation process) – as well as the scope and legal meaning of wrongful acts and the types of legal liability imposed on wrongful actors – are not relevant to my simplified model.[48] In place of traditional legal analysis, this Ramsey-inspired model abstracts from the morass of legal materials and takes these features of the legal landscape as a given. Stated formally, these details are exogenous or external to the model. Having stated these simplifying assumptions, I now proceed to apply Bayes’ theorem to the litigation process as follows:

Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+)

In plain English, we want to find the posterior probability, Pr(guilty|+), that a defendant will be found liable at trial, given that he has really committed a wrongful act.[49]

My Ramsian approach to litigation contests thus takes into account both the possibility of a false positive (i.e., the imposition of liability when the defendant has not committed any wrongful act); as well as the possibility of a false negative (no liability even though the defendant has, in fact, committed a wrongful act).[50] The purpose of this stylized Ramsian model, however, is not to explore the many systemic imperfections (procedural or practical or otherwise) in the existing legal system, imperfections and asymmetries contributing to the problem of false positives and negatives.[51] Instead, the goal of the model is to solve for Pr(guilty|+) and answer the following key question: how reliable is the legal system? That is, how likely is it that a defendant who is found liable is, in fact, actually guilty of committing a wrongful act?

The remainder of this appendix will consider four possible scenarios or types of litigation games: i) non-random adjudication with risk-averse or virtuous moving parties; ii) non-random adjudication with risk-loving or less-than-virtuous moving parties; iii) random adjudication with risk-averse moving parties; and iv) random adjudication with risk-loving moving parties. This schema may thus be depicted in tabular form as follows:

Type of litigation game	Type of moving party
non-random adjudication	risk-averse
non-random adjudication	risk-loving
random adjudication	risk-averse
random adjudication	risk-loving

In summary, the adjudication variable in our model refers to the reliability or screening effectiveness of the process of adjudication. Non-random adjudication refers to litigation games that are 90% sensitive and 90% specific,[52] an assumption based on the classic and oft-repeated legal maxim “it is better that ten guilty men escape than that one innocent suffer”.[53] Random adjudication, by contrast, occurs when litigation games are only 50% sensitive and 50% specific and thus no more reliable than the toss of a coin.[54]

In addition, the terms risk-averse and virtuous, as applied to moving parties, refers to plaintiffs and prosecutors who play the litigation game only when they are at least 90% certain that the named defendant has committed an unlawful wrongful act, while risk-loving or less-than-virtuous moving parties refers to plaintiffs and prosecutors who are willing to play the litigation game even when they are only 60% certain that the named defendant has committed a wrongful act. Stated colloquially, virtuous plaintiffs are civil plaintiffs who rarely file frivolous claims and criminal prosecutors who rarely abuse their discretion; by contrast, less-than-virtuous moving parties are more willing to gamble on litigation outcomes than their more virtuous colleagues.

Non-random Adjudication with Risk-averse Moving Parties

Suppose the litigation game is 90% sensitive and 90% specific, that is, suppose the process of litigation is able to determine correctly, at least 90% of the time, when a defendant has committed a wrongful act, and suppose that the process will also determine correctly, again at least 90% of the time, when a defendant has not, in fact, committed a wrongful act.[55] But even with a 90% accuracy rate, this model of non-random adjudication still suffers from a 10% error rate. Given this error rate, we must turn to Bayes’ rule to determine the posterior probability that liability will nevertheless be incorrectly imposed on an innocent defendant (i.e., the probability that a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act will be incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant). To apply Bayes’ theorem, we must find the prior probability that any given defendant, selected at random, has in fact committed a wrongful act. What is this prior probability?

First, let the term “guilt” stand for a guilty defendant, let “innocent” represent an innocent defendant, and let the + symbol indicate the event of a positive litigation outcome for the plaintiff or prosecutor, as the case may be. That is, from the plaintiff or prosecutor’s perspective, a positive outcome, or +, occurs when liability is eventually imposed on the defendant. We now proceed to find the values for Pr(+|guilty), Pr(+|innocent), Pr(guilty), Pr(innocent), and Pr(+). To begin with, Pr(+|guilty) is the probability that a guilty defendant will be found guilty at the end of a litigation contest. Since we have assumed that the litigation process is 90% sensitive, the value for Pr(+|guilty) is equal to 0.9. By the same token, Pr(+|innocent), the probability that a particular litigation contest will produce a false positive (i.e., the probability that liability will be imposed on an innocent defendant) is equal to 0.1. This value is 0.1 since, given these initial assumptions, the litigation game produces false positives only 10% of the time.

Now suppose that plaintiffs and prosecutors are risk-averse or virtuous parties, that is, assume that plaintiffs and prosecutors alike are willing to play the litigation game only when they are at least 90% certain that the named defendant has, in fact, committed an unlawful wrongful act. (This risk-averse conduct is considered virtuous in my model since such moving parties are less willing than their risk-loving colleagues to gamble on the outcome of litigation, or expressed in legal language, virtuous civil plaintiffs rarely file frivolous claims and virtuous criminal prosecutors rarely abuse their discretion).[56]

Accordingly, given these stringent assumptions (i.e., risk-averse moving parties and non-random adjudication), the prior probability that a given defendant is guilty is 90%, or stated formally, letting A stand for the prior probability of being guilty, then Pr(A) = Pr(guilty) = 0.9. Summing up, Pr(A) or Pr(guilty) is the prior probability, in the absence of any additional information, that a particular defendant has committed a wrongful act. As stated above, this term is equal to 0.9 since we have assumed that 90% of all named defendants are guilty. Likewise, we determine Pr(B) or Pr(innocent), the prior probability that a particular defendant has not committed any wrongful act. This is simply 1 – Pr(guilty) or 0.1, since 1 – 0.9 = 0.1.

Lastly, Pr(+) refers to the prior probability of a positive litigation outcome (again, positive from the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s perspective), in the absence of any information about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. This value is found by adding the probability that a true positive result will occur (0.9 × 0.9 = 0.81), plus the probability that a false positive will happen (0.1 × 0.1 = 0.01) and is thus equal to 0.81 plus 0.01 = 0.82. Stated formally, Pr(+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] plus [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr(innocent)]. That is, the prior probability of a positive litigation outcome, Pr(+), is the sum of true positives and false positives and, given our assumptions above, is equal to 0.82 or 82%.

Having translated all the relevant terms of Bayes’ theorem, we may now restate our Bayesian model of litigation contests and find the posterior probability, Pr(guilty|+), that civil or criminal liability will be incorrectly imposed on a guilty defendant (i.e., the probability that a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act will nevertheless be incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant):

Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+) = {see below}

= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] +

[Pr(+|innocent) × Pr(innocent)])

= (0.9 × 0.9) ÷ [(0.9)(0.9) + (0.1)(0.1)]

= 0.81 ÷ 0.82 = 0.988

In other words, given our rosy assumptions above, the outcome of any particular litigation game will be highly accurate. Specifically, the probability that a defendant who is found liable for a wrongful act is actually guilty of committing such wrongful act is close to 99%, though there is still a 1% probability that an innocent defendant will nonetheless be found liable. But what happens when the litigation game is played by strategic plaintiffs or zealous prosecutors? That is, what happens when plaintiffs file a greater proportion of frivolous claims (relative to the optimal level of frivolous claims) or when prosecutors routinely ‘overcharge’ criminal defendants with extraneous or vague offenses (e.g., conspiracy)? I turn to this possibility below.

Non-random Adjudication with Risk-loving Moving Parties

Suppose the litigation game is still highly sensitive and specific as before (i.e., 90% sensitive and 90% specific), but that plaintiffs and prosecutors are risk-loving or less-than-virtuous actors. Specifically, assume that the moving parties are willing to play the litigation game even when they are only 60% certain (instead of 90% certain, as I assumed earlier) that the named defendant has committed a wrongful act. (Such behavior is less-than-virtuous in our model because the moving party is less concerned with the defendant’s actual guilt than a risk-averse or virtuous moving party). The intuition behind this revised assumption is that, in reality, the litigation game might be played by litigants (as well as judges) who are engaged in rent-seeking and self-serving behavior.[57] Thus, with risk-loving moving parties, the prior probability, Pr(guilty), that a given defendant is guilty is now only 60%, while the prior probability, Pr(innocent), that a particular defendant has not committed a wrongful act is 1 – Pr(guilty), or 1 – 0.6 = 0.4. Stated formally: Pr(guilty) = 0.6, and Pr(innocent) = 0.4.

Next, what is the probability that a guilty defendant will be found guilty, or Pr(+|guilty)? In this variation of the model, the value for Pr(+|guilty) is equal to 0.90 since we continue to assume the litigation game is 90% sensitive. Pr(+|innocent), the probability that a particular litigation game will produce a false positive (i.e., the probability that liability will be imposed on an innocent defendant), remains 0.1. Lastly, recall that Pr(+) is the probability that a true positive result will occur (in this case, 0.9 × 0.6 = 0.54), plus the probability that a false positive will happen (0.1 × 0.4 = 0.04), and is thus equal to 0.54 plus 0.04 = 0.58. Stated formally, Pr(+) =[Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] plus [Pr(+|innocent) × Pr(innocent)] = 0.54 plus 0.4 = 0.58.

Given these revised assumptions – non-random adjudication and less-than-virtuous plaintiffs – we now find the posterior probability that liability will be correctly imposed on a guilty or wrongful defendant as follows:

Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+) = {see below}

= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] +

[Pr(+|innocent) × Pr(innocent)])

= (0.9 × 0.6) ÷ [(0.9)(0.6) + (0.1)(0.4)]

= 0.54 ÷ 0.58 = 0.931

In this case, despite the presence of risk-loving moving parties, the outcome of any particular litigation game will still be highly reliable. Specifically, although there is a 7% chance that an innocent defendant will be found liable, the posterior probability that a defendant who is found liable for a wrongful act is actually guilty is still 93%. But now, consider what happens when litigation is a crapshoot, that is, stated formally, what happens when the litigation game is only 50% sensitive and 50% specific?

Random Adjudication with Risk-averse Moving Parties

Suppose now that litigation outcomes area only 50% sensitive and 50% specific; that is, courts are only able to decide cases correctly no more than half of the time when a defendant has committed a wrongful act; the process of litigation is random, no better than a coin toss, since courts will correctly determine with one-half probability, or p = 0.5, whether a defendant has committed a wrongful act.

Given this inherent randomness along with the presence of virtuous plaintiffs, we now turn to Bayes’ rule to determine the posterior probability that liability will be incorrectly imposed on an innocent defendant (i.e., the probability that a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act will be incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant). Again, let “guilt” stand for a guilty defendant, “innocent” an innocent defendant, and the symbol + the event of a positive litigation outcome for the moving party (plaintiff or prosecutor). Next, we find the values for Pr(guilt), Pr(innocent), Pr(+|guilt), Pr(+|innocent), and Pr(+).

First, assuming that plaintiffs and prosecutors are virtuous or risk-averse actors and thus are willing to play the litigation game only when they are at least 90% certain that the named defendant is guilty, then Pr(guilty), the prior probability in the absence of other information that a particular defendant has committed a wrongful act, will be equal to 0.9, or stated formally, Pr(guilty) = 0.9. Likewise, Pr(innocent), the prior probability in the absence of other information that a particular defendant has not committed a wrongful act, is simply 1 – Pr(guilty) or 0.1, since 1 – 0.9 = 0.1

Next, Pr(+|guilty), the probability that liability will be imposed on a defendant who is actually guilty, is 0.5 since the litigation game in this variation of the model purely random (i.e., 50% sensitive). Similarly, Pr(+|innocent), the probability that liability will be imposed on an innocent defendant, is also 0.5 since, given these revised assumptions, the litigation game will produce a false positive half of the time the game is played.

Lastly, recall that Pr(+) is the sum of true positives and false positives, that is, the prior probability of a positive litigation outcome, positive from the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s perspective, in the absence of any information about the defendant’s guilt or innocence. Specifically, given our assumptions above, this value is equal to 0.5, that is, 0.5 × 0.9 = 0.45 (true positives) plus 0.5 × 0.1 = 0.05 (false positives). Thus, the prior probability of a positive litigation outcome, Pr(+), absent any information about the defendant’s guilt or innocence, is equal to 50%.

With these assumptions (random adjudication and virtuous or risk-averse plaintiffs), we apply Bayes’ theorem as follows:

Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+) = {see below}

= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] +

[Pr(+|innocent) × Pr(innocent)])

= (0.5 × 0.9) ÷ [(0.5)(0.9) + (0.5)(0.1)]

= 0.45 ÷ 0.50 = 0.9

This result is perhaps the most surprising one thus far. Even when the litigation game is a purely random process, no better than a coin toss, the outcome of any individual litigation game will still be highly reliable, given the presence of virtuous moving parties. Specifically, under this scenario there is a 90% probability that a defendant who is found liable for a wrongful act is, in fact, actually guilty. (In other words, even when litigation is random, there is only a 10% chance that an innocent defendant will be found guilty or civilly or criminally liable). Although this value is less than the corresponding values for Pr(guilty|+) in the previous two permutations of the model (subsections ii and iii above), this difference is marginal at best, considering the enormous qualitative differences between non-random adjudication and a purely random legal system. The present permutation of the model, however, assumes the presence of virtuous plaintiffs and prosecutors. What happens when the litigation game is purely random and the moving parties are less-than-virtuous? We explore this intriguing possibility in subsection iv below.

Random Adjudication with Risk-loving Moving Parties

Now suppose the litigation game is still a crapshoot but that plaintiffs and prosecutors are risk-loving or ‘less-than-virtuous’; that is, assume that the moving parties are more willing to gamble than their virtuous colleagues. Specifically, we will assume that the litigation game is 50% sensitive and 50% specific, and that plaintiffs and prosecutors are willing to play the litigation game even when they are only 60% certain that the named defendant has committed a wrongful act. Although these assumptions do not appear to be plausible (unless we assume the presence of risk-loving actors and picture litigants as pure gamblers), this permutation of the model, however implausible, may nevertheless provide an instructive counter-factual or hypothetical illustration of the Bayesian approach to litigation.

Given these revised assumptions (i.e., random results and risk-loving or less than virtuous actors), we can once again turn to Bayes’ theorem to determine the posterior probability that liability will be incorrectly imposed on an innocent defendant (i.e., the probability that a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act will be incorrectly classified as a wrongful or guilty defendant), and once again, “guilt” stands for a guilty defendant, “innocent” indicates an innocent defendant, and the symbol + represents the event of a positive litigation outcome for the plaintiff or prosecutor.

As such, Pr(guilty), the prior probability (in the absence of any additional information) that a particular defendant has committed a wrongful act, is equal to 0.6, while Pr(innocent), the prior probability that a particular defendant has not committed a wrongful act, is 0.4 (i.e., 1 – Pr(guilty), or 1 – 0.6). Next, Pr(+|guilty), the probability that liability will be imposed on a defendant who is actually guilty, and Pr(+|innocent), the probability that liability will be imposed on an innocent defendant, are both equal to 0.5 since, given our assumptions, this version of the litigation game is purely random. Lastly, Pr(+), the sum of true positives and false positives, is also 0.5 since, given our assumptions above, 0.5 × 0.6 = 0.3 (true positives) and 0.5 × 0.4 = 0.2 (false positives), or put another way, the prior probability of a positive litigation outcome (again, from the plaintiff’s or prosecutor’s perspective), absent any information about the defendant’s guilt or innocence, is equal to 50%.

Therefore, given random adjudication and risk-loving plaintiffs, we now apply Bayes’ theorem as follows:

Pr(guilty|+) = [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ Pr(+) = {see below}

= [Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] ÷ ([Pr(+|guilty) × Pr(guilty)] +

[Pr(+|innocent) × Pr(innocent)])

= (0.5 × 0.6) ÷ [(0.5)(0.6) + (0.5)(0.4)]

= 0.3 ÷ by 0.5 = 0.6

What is most surprising about this result is the ability of the litigation process to produce reliable results more than half the time, even when the underlying litigation game itself is purely random and even when the actors are less than virtuous. Specifically, the probability that the outcome of any individual litigation game will be accurate is 60%, even though the underlying litigation game is purely random, no more reliable than a coin toss. One way of explaining this potential paradox is to take another look at the Pr(guilty) term: the prior probability in the absence of additional information that a defendant selected at random is guilty (i.e., the prior probability that a particular defendant has committed a wrongful act). This prior probability term exerts a decisive influence in the fourth permutation of our model precisely because the outcome of litigation is purely random. That is, when litigation is a crapshoot, or to be more precise, when litigation is a coin toss, both the prior and posterior probabilities of the defendant’s guilt are the same. Here, since Pr(guilt) = 0.6, then Pr(+|guilty) = 0.6.

* J.D., Yale Law School. B.A., University of California at Santa Barbara. Associate Professor, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Puerto Rico (PUCPR). Associate Instructor of Law, University of Central Florida (UCF).

** O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law, Dover, New York, 1991 [1881], p. 1.

[1] For Bruno de Finetti’s landmark contributions to our understanding of probability, see B. de Finetti, Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment, Wiley, New Jersey, 1974.

[2] C. Misak, Frank Ramsey: A Sheer Excess of Powers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2020.

[3] In addition, to further demonstrate the relevance of Frank Ramsey to law and legal theory, this review includes a technical appendix that presents a probabilistic model of litigation inspired by Ramsey’s probabilistic ideas.

[4] See C. Misak, op. cit., p. 30.

[5] Id., p. 49.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Id., pp. 48-49.

[8] J.M. Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, Dover, New York, 2004 [1921].

[9] See B. Russell, ‘Review: A Treatise on Probability by John Maynard Keynes’, in The Mathematical Gazette, n. 32, 1948, p. 152.

[10] Ibid.

[11] See C. Misak, op. cit., p. 113 (emphasis added).

[12] Id., pp. 114-115. For the record, Ramsey published his review of Keynes’s Treatise on Probability in the January 1922 issue of Cambridge Magazine, i.e. while he was still an undergraduate!

[13] For students of the common law (myself included), Ramsey’s approach to probability may sound familiar. See, e.g., O.W. Holmes, op. cit., p. 1 (“The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience”).

[14] See, e.g., L. Solum, ‘Legal Theory Lexicon: It Takes a Theory to Beat a Theory’, Legal Theory Blog, 21 October 2012, available at https://perma.cc/82QH-8A4B.

[15] See C. Misak, op. cit., ch. 7.

[16] See id., pp. 205-208.

[17] It was during this time that Ramsey received the news of his appointment to a lectureship at King’s College. See C. Misak, op. cit., pp. 178-181.

[18] Id., p. 161.

[19] According to Misak, it was at this meeting that G.E. Moore read his now famous paper ‘A defence of common sense’. See C. Misak, op. cit., p. 205. Moore’s paper is reprinted in G.E. Moore, Philosophical Papers, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 1959.

[20] See C. Misak, op. cit., p. 263.

[21] See F. Ramsey, ‘Truth and Probability’, in R.B. Braithwaite (edited by), The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays, Routledge & Paul, London, 1931.

[22] See, e.g., R.T. Cox, ‘Probability, Frequency, and Reasonable Expectation’, in American Journal of Physics, n. 14, 1946, p. 1.

[23] See C. Misak, op. cit., p. 268.

[24] Id., p. 271.

[25] See generally F. Ramsey, ‘Truth and Probability’, op cit. See also F. MacBride, et al., ‘Frank Ramsey’, in E.N. Zalta & U. Nodelman (edited by), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 14 August 2019, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ramsey/. Misak’s biography itself also includes a separate summary by Nils-Eric Sahlin of the technical details of Ramsey’s subjective or betting approach to probability. See C. Misak, op. cit., pp. 272-273.

[26] See generally A. Hájek, ‘Interpretations of Probability’, in E.N. Zalta (edited by), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 28 August 2019, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/probability-interpret/.

[27] See C. Misak, op. cit., p. 266.

[28] In brief, the term “Dutch book” originates from the worlds of gambling and bookmaking. In the context of probability theory, a Dutch book refers to a series of bets that are structured in such a way that a bettor is guaranteed to either win or lose regardless of the outcome of an event. See generally Susan Vineberg, ‘Dutch Book Arguments’, in E.N. Zalta, U. Nodelman (edited by), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 14 May 2022, available at https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/dutch-book/.

[29] In summary, a prediction market is a type of financial market that allows individuals to trade contracts that are based on the outcome of future events. These events can range from political elections and sports results to economic indicators and even natural phenomena. See, e.g., J. Wolfers, E. Zitzewitz, ‘Prediction Markets’, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, n. 18, 2004, p. 107. For an extension of the prediction market model to the retrodiction of past events, see F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘Truth Markets’, Social Science Research Network, 24 January 2023, available at https://perma.cc/255J-6PVK.

[30] Among other things, prediction markets are designed to aggregate and utilize the collective wisdom and information of participants in order to generate more accurate predictions about the likelihood of various outcomes than other methods like polling or experts can. See, e.g., K.J. Arrow et al., ‘The Promise of Prediction Markets’, in Science, n. 320, 2008, p. 877.

[31] See generally S.G. Vick, Degrees of Belief, ASCE Press, Reston, 2002, ch. 2.

[32] Broadly speaking, a law case or legal issue is described as a ‘close case’ when its outcome is contested, leading to a split decision among the judges who are deciding the case or issue, with some favoring one outcome and others favoring a different outcome. For some examples of close cases, see E.A. Posner, A. Vermeule, ‘The Votes of Other Judges’, in Georgetown Law Journal, 2016, pp. 178-179.

[33] See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘Why Don’t Juries Try Range Voting’, in Criminal Law Bulletin, n. 51, 2015, p. 680.

[34] See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘The Case for Bayesian Judges’, in Journal of Legal Metrics, n. 6, 2019, p. 13.

[35] For an extended discussion of issue-voting versus outcome-voting by courts, see D. Post, S.C. Salop, ‘Rowing against the Tidewater: A Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels’, in Georgetown Law Journal, n. 80, 1992, p. 743.

[36] See W.D. Smith, ‘Range Voting’, unpublished manuscript, 28 November 2000, available at https://www.rangevoting.org/WarrenSmithPages/homepage/rangevote.pdf.

[37] See C. Hillinger, ‘The Case for Utilitarian Voting’, Munich Discussion Paper 2005-11, May 2005, available at https://perma.cc/657U-VNMD.

[38] See, e.g., Wikipedia, ‘Score Voting’, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, 20 July 2023, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Score_voting.

[39] See A. Hylland, R. Zeckhauser, ‘A Mechanism for Selecting Public Goods when Preferences Must Be Elicited’, Kennedy School of Government Discussion Paper 70D, December 1980, available at https://rangevoting.org/HylZeck1980.pdf.

[40] See K.J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values, 2 ed., Yale University Press, New Haven, 1970.

[41] See, e.g., M.C. Galavotti, ‘The Notion of Subjective Probability in the Work of Ramsey and de Finetti’, in Theoria, n. 57, 1991, p. 239.

[42] See generally K. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 2 ed., Routledge, London, 2002.

[43] See generally T. Schelling, The Strategy of the Conflict, 2 ed., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980.

[44] An economist might ask: “What is the ‘optimal’ level of love?”.

[45] This Appendix is based on my previous work. See F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game’, in European Journal of Legal Studies, n. 4, 2011, p. 220.

[46] Put another way, litigation (whether civil or criminal) is a contest in which the moving party, the plaintiff or prosecutor, attempts to impose civil or criminal liability on the defendant for the commission of a wrongful act, and like the term litigation, I define wrongful act broadly to include both civil wrongs, such as torts and breaches of contract, as well as criminal behavior.

[47] Seen from the defendant’s perspective, litigation is a contest in which the defendant attempts to avoid the imposition of liability or minimize his liability.

[48] My model also ignores the temporal dimension of adjudication; instead, I assume for simplicity that litigation is an instantaneous event, like a coin toss or the roll of a die.

[49] Ideally, of course, liability should be imposed only when a defendant has actually committed a wrongful act, and conversely, no liability should be imposed on innocent defendants (stated formally, in an ideal or perfect legal system the value for Pr(guilty|+) should be equal to or close to one: Pr(A|B) ≈ 1), but in reality false negatives and false positives will occur for a wide variety of reasons, such as heightened pleading standards and abuse of discovery in civil actions and prosecutorial discretion and prosecutorial misconduct in criminal cases.

[50] In the context of litigation, a false positive or Type I error occurs when a defendant who has not committed a wrongful act is nevertheless found liable for the commission of such act. By contrast, a false negative or Type II error occurs when a tortious or guilty defendant is able to avoid the imposition of liability. Stated colloquially, some guilty defendants will be able to avoid the imposition of liability, while some innocent ones will be punished.

[51] See, e.g., M. Galanter, ‘Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change’, in Law & Society Review, n. 9, 1974, p. 95.

[52] The adjudication variable can never be 100% sensitive nor 100% specific since errors are inevitable in any process of adjudication, regardless of the litigation procedures that are in place.

[53] See W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 2007 [1769], Vol. 4, p. 358, quoted in A. Volokh, ‘N Guilty Men’, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, n. 146, 1997, p. 173.

[54] See, e.g., F.E. Guerra-Pujol, ‘Chance and Litigation’, in Boston University Public Interest Law Journal, n. 21, 2011, p. 45.

[55] The intuition behind this assumption (non-random adjudication) is that reliable legal procedures will tend to produce just and fair results (Hart & Sacks 1994). The existence of reliable adjudication procedures in which liability is imposed only on guilty defendants is not a sufficient condition for justice. When a defendant has broken an unjust or unfair law (licensure requirements and racial segregation laws quickly come to mind), for example, justice would be better served by an unreliable adjudication procedure (i.e., by not enforcing the unjust or unfair law in the first place). But putting aside the underlying meaning of justice, such a litigation game appears to be a highly accurate one, since it will correctly determine with 90% probability, or nine times out of 10, whether the defendant has or has not committed a wrongful act, an essential precondition before liability may justly be imposed.

[56] I will relax these assumptions later.

[57] For further exploration of the problem of rent-seeking in law, see G. Tullock, The Logic of Law, Basic Books, New York, 1971. In principle, a more hard-core risk-loving moving party might be willing to gamble on the litigation game even when he or she is only 50% certain of the outcome. Nevertheless, I assume that a risk-loving moving party requires a 60% probability of a positive litigation outcome simply because he or she must expend resources to play the litigation game. Put another way, since litigation is not costless, the higher the cost of playing the litigation game, the more risk-averse an otherwise risk-loving moving party will be.

How does libertarian punishment theory deal with the doctrine of unjust enrichment?

Articles — 2023-10-24T22:13:12+00:00

I. Introduction

Libertarian punishment theory[1] emphasizes restitution. While it is usually impossible to make the victim “whole” again, after his ill-treatment, that is the direction in which notions of justice indicate we should tread.

But we are not now addressing these issues in general. Rather, the present essay is dedicated to analyzing several specific issues. In section II we look at ancillary criminal benefits and in section III internal criminal benefits. The burden of section IV is to discuss unjust enrichment. We conclude in section V.

II. Ancillary criminal benefits

Question 1: Suppose A steals a typewriter from B. Then clearly part of the proper restitution is to take the typewriter from A and give it back to B. But what if A has typed a manuscript using that stolen typewriter (and on paper that belongs to A) -- does A have a legitimate property title, also, to the manuscript? If not, what should be done with the manuscript?

In the view of Rothbard[2]: “It should be evident that our theory of proportional punishment—that people may be punished by losing their rights to the extent that they have invaded the rights of others—is frankly a retributive theory of punishment, a ‘tooth (or two teeth) for a tooth’ theory. Retribution is in bad repute among philosophers, who generally dismiss the concept quickly as ‘primitive’ or ‘barbaric’ and then race on to a discussion of the two other major theories of punishment: deterrence and rehabilitation. But simply to dismiss a concept as ‘barbaric’ can hardly suffice; after all, it is possible that in this case, the ‘barbarians’ hit on a concept that was superior to the more modern creeds.”

There are three possible answers to this typewriter query, and I will respond in increasing order of Draconianism.

The first is the least punitive to the criminal. Here, we consider two scenarios. The first is that the criminal merely plays with the keys of the typewriter, with no paper involved. We posit that the harm to the typewriter in terms of wear and tear is the same whether or not there is any actual writing going on. Then, apart from any other aspects of the retribution against A the criminal, the same response is visited upon him whether he types a manuscript, or, presses the keys to the same extent without writing anything. Here, the focus is entirely on what damage, if any, A did to B’s typewriter, during the time it was in his possession. Since it is the same by stipulation, the penalty would be the same in either case. The bottom line is that the criminal may keep his manuscript.

The second scenario is that A’s typing without paper does more (or less) damage to the writing machine than the alternative. If so, A must pay B more (or less) than before, because his damage to B’s property is of greater (or lesser) extent. In both these scenarios, A keeps the manuscript he wrote on the stolen typewriter.

Of course, it is only the tip of the iceberg that A be forced to return the item he took from B. If this were all there were, on utilitarian grounds, crime would “pay” from the limited economic perspective. For, if the criminal is caught, he suffers no more than the loss of time and the possible danger to which he was exposed when he perpetrated his evil deed. That would be but the first “tooth” to which Rothbard refers. The second would be the requirement that A be “served” in the manner he applied to B. Since A absconded with a typewriter of B’s, A must be compelled to give B an implement of the same kind; that is, A owes B his own typewriter.

Third, at least in the libertarian society, if A immediately after his robbery approached the (private) police, confessed, and returned to them his ill-gotten gain, then there would be no additional punishment for him. But if he compounded his theft by hiding from the forces of law and order then the costs of search and capture would be added to his bill. But there is one more penalty yet in store for A, a far more controversial one. When he committed his dastardly deed, he scared B. B’s sense of security was lessened. A proportional punishment would have to also take that into account. How so? By standing behind A and yelling “Boo?” Not a bit of it. Rather, A would be forced to play Russian Roulette, with the number of bullets and chambers, and importance of the criminal’s body part the gun must be aimed at, proportional to just how badly he frightened B. This, then, is the second most Draconian scenario. It is a four part penalty, consisting of two “teeth,” costs of capture, and the imposition of terrifying the criminal. But that is it! There is no more. Any other penalty would be adventitious, arbitrary, capricious, over and above the call of justice.

However, suppose that this manuscript typed up by A is worth one billion dollars. Or, more realistically, suppose A stole $5 from B and with those funds purchased a winning lottery ticket with a prize of a billion dollars. Would A have to pay B one dime of that amount of money? No, because, by stipulation, he has already fully paid the four elements of his punishment. Then, he may keep his (very valuable) manuscript, and/or the gigantic lottery prize he won with B’s money.

Let us now consider the most severe punishment of them all: it includes the previous level of severity, but with one more side condition: the criminal cannot be allowed to benefit from his crime, in any manner, shape or form. This is sometimes called the “Son of Sam” law, named after David Berkowitz, a notorious murderer who was offered great riches to publish his story. A similar issue arose with regard to David Chapman, the murderer of Beatles musician John Lennon. Under this rubric, A, who stole B’s typewriter and wrote a best-selling novel worth millions, and the person who stole $5 and purchased the winning lottery ticket, would have to give this ill-gotten wealth to their respective victims. And this, in addition to the four-part punishment series mentioned above as the second stage of Draconianism.

So, which of these three models fits in best with libertarianism? I argue for the second. Son of Sam rules are incompatible with the freedom philosophy. Why? This is due to an extrapolation of Rothbard’s insight about proportionality. He focused on vertical equity. Crimes of different severity should be treated proportionately. If a crime is twice as severe as another, it should be punished doubly.

But libertarian law, I contend, requires both horizontal and vertical equity. Let us now consider the latter. Two people, A and A’, steal a typewriter from B and B’. Or, two criminals steal $5 and buy a lottery ticket, call them C and C’. All four, A and A’ and C and C’ pay their full penalties, discussed under the second type of Draconianism. However, A and C are lucky. The manuscript typed by A sells for a million dollars, the one by A’ is worthless. C wins zillions in the lottery, the ticket purchased by C’ is worthless. Horizontal equity requires that A and A’, C and C’, be treated exactly equally. After all, they committed precisely the same crime. To deal with them differently, for something that occurs after the crime, would be unjust. It would be to treat equals unequally. It is unlibertarian. It violates horizontal equity.

But is it not positively galling that A and C benefit spectacularly (albeit indirectly) from their horrid crimes? We can just hear them each cackling to themselves and their friends that yes, crime does pay, as they roll in their money bins like Scrooge McDuck. Yes, of course, this objection is a powerful one. This seems entirely unjust. However, we can achieve solace from our appreciation of the Russian Roulette proviso. These newly wealthy criminals still have to face this hurdle. Now that they have this vast wealth at their disposal, the price they will likely pay to escape from this their just dessert, will presumably skyrocket. There will not be all that much money for them to roll around in after they finish paying for the privilege of not having to play this deadly game. Thus, from a theoretical position, we can have our cake and eat it to: stick to principle, and obviate the perceived unfairness of a criminal benefitting from his crime.

III. Internal criminal benefits

Question 2: In other cases, the use of stolen property may not be as tangible. For example, suppose A stole an electronic massage chair from B and has used it to massage himself several times. Does the proper course of restitution and punishment in this case depend on the extent to which A has used the massage chair (apart from compensation for the wear and tear resulting from A's use of the chair)? In fact, A's illegitimate use of the massage chair may have comforted and reinvigorated him and thus enabled him to generate more income from other (legitimate) activities. How should issues like this be handled?

Here we have a somewhat different challenge. In the previous section, the benefit to the criminal was tangible, physical. Here, it is internal. It is entirely possible to seize the typewriter from the criminal A who stole it, and return it to its rightful owner. But how can one alienate from the thief the comfort he derived from use of the massage chair? It is not possible.

The closest analogy we have to this scenario is the crime of rape. It is impossible in a similar way to “take” the rape from the rapist and return it to his victim. What, then, are the appropriate penalties for this shameful crime? The “two teeth” will obviously not apply to this case; this leaves only the third and fourth element of libertarian punishment theory. Is there anything that can take the place of the “two teeth?” Yes. What was done to the victim will now have to be done to the rapist, only twice over. In addition, there is "lucrum cessans" (profits lost), compensation at fair market value for the time lost by the victim of this invasive crime.

With this help due to extrapolating from the crime of rape we return to the question posed. How to deal with the criminal who benefits from the enjoyment of the massage chair? Our response, then, must be that there is no real difference in terms of punishment between stealing a television and acquiring a massage chair through theft and incorporating its benefits into, so to speak, oneself. The rapist, presumably, also derives internal psychic income from his foul deed which cannot be taken away from him either. Both malefactors must pay the penalty for their uncivilized behavior, despite the fact that they have each internalized the benefits of their rights violation, and there is thus nothing physical to return to the victim. However, if the massage chair robber writes better and more valuable material as a result of the relaxation his ill-gotten gain accords him, he need pay no greater penalty than a criminal who steals and uses a massage chair, feels equally better, but either writes nothing or derives no additional financial benefits from what he does write. Horizontal equity, not only vertical equity, is a touchstone of libertarianism.

IV. Unjust enrichment

Let us now consider the doctrine of "unjust enrichment" which is a general area of law, of which the two questions posed above are but examples.[3]

Here are some cases: Suppose A hires B to paint his house. B shows up but accidentally paints C's house (A's neighbor), instead. Under at least some interpretations of the law prohibiting unjust enrichment, B may sue C and make the latter pay for the paint job--maybe not the full price A had agreed upon, but some lesser amount, if the paint job actually increased the value of C's house (and if B made the error in good faith).

This conclusion is incompatible with libertarianism. C is an entirely innocent person. He did not authorize any painting of his house. The fact that B’s paint job in some objective manner increased the value of his home is entirely beside the point. To force him to pay B would involve positive obligations, anathema to the freedom philosophy. In that view, people’s only obligation is to keep their contracts and refrain from uninvited border crossings onto the persons or property of others.

Although “unjust enrichment” is a legal term, it also falls under the rubric of economics with the heading of external economies, or positive externalities. Here, one person, call him X, engages in an act that benefits Y, but X may not charge Y for improving his life in this way. For example, education: I go to school, I become, presumably, a better voter, a more informed citizen, a more supportive neighbor, etc. But, I may not bill you for these benefits that supposedly spill over on to you. Another example is compulsory union dues. The allegation here is that labor organizations benefit all workers in the firm, even though they are not members. Therefore, they must be forced to pay dues to the union.

Rothbard’s reductio absurdum of this argument is as follows: “A and B often benefit, it is held, if they can force C into doing something. . . . [A]ny argument proclaiming the right and goodness of, say, three neighbors, who yearn to form a string quartet, forcing a fourth neighbor at bayonet point to learn and play the viola, is hardly deserving of sober comment.”[4]

The problem is, there is no way that it can be demonstrated without any doubt that these people, the person whose house was mistakenly painted, the non-union employee, the general citizen, was indeed benefitted from these actions supposedly made in their behalf. It implies no logical contradiction to suppose either that they were indifferent to these “benefits,” or were actually harmed by them. The only way we can deduce benefits for sure is from voluntary interaction. When someone purchases a typewriter for $100, there can be no doubt that at the moment of purchase, he valued that item to a greater degree than its cost to him. If not, why, ever, would he have bought it? We are also entitled to infer that the criminal, too, prefers a world where he is in possession of the stolen good, rather than its rightful owner. But these are human actions[5]; the presumed beneficiary of “unjust enrichment” engages in no action. He is passive in this regard.

Suppose, arguendo, that C does indeed benefit from the mistaken house painting. It still does not follow that he must pay for it. I now smile at you, gentle reader. Stipulate that you do gain from this gift of mine to you. Should you be legally obligated to pay me for this benefit I just bestowed upon you? Hardly.

Another example. Suppose A steals a hunk of granite from B's quarry. Whereupon A carves a magnificent statue with that stolen material. The implication of “unjust enrichment” is that B may not have that particular piece of granite back from A because he, B, would be unjustly enriched. The value of the carved granite is so much greater than the raw granite of which B was robbed. Instead, A would only have to repay B for the value of the raw granite, plus the other libertarian aspects of punishment. This is clearly unjust, based on the libertarian philosophy. That particular rock belongs to B, and what A did to “improve” it is of no nevermind. But, suppose that A may indeed keep this carved rock in his possession, and only needs to forfeit an equally valued non-carved piece of granite. One way to handle such patent injustice is that when A is forced to undergo the Russian roulette part of his punishment, he will now be able to pay much more to B than otherwise would have been the case; so A’s increased wealth will tend to revert back to B in any case, even if the law does not require him to return the specific rock he stole. But, we can go further than that, and reject the entire doctrine of “unjust enrichment” as incompatible with libertarianism. Then, A must be compelled to return that specific carved rock. Maybe that will teach him not to be a crook.

There is something of an anomaly in the present analysis. We have insisted upon horizontal equity in terms of the positives: all criminals who commit the identical crime pay the exact same penalty. They both steal $5 and purchase a lottery ticket. One wins big, the other obtains nothing. The lucky one need not pay any more than the unlucky one . But, matters are quite different on the negative side.

A pushes B, a young, strong, man, who shrugs it off. A’ pushes B’ with identical force, but the latter is a young looking, strong-looking but actually weak man, who falls, hits his head on the pavement, and dies. Did A and A’ really commit the same crime? I argue that the two criminals really committed a different kind of crime; the former is guilty, merely, of assault and battery, the latter of outright murder. The aphorism that applies best in these types of cases is “the criminal takes his victim as he finds him.” The As of the world are responsible not only for what they do (they both pushed with the same force, a person, B, who looked the same), but also for the results of their actions. In the case of A, it was only a slight discomfort on the part of his victim. For A’, it was much worse.

Winning the lottery gives A great confidence. As a result, for the rest of his life, A earns an extra $1million per year. He has to give all of this to B, because he stole that $5? That would be the implication of the view I argue against. This punishment outrages our sense of justice. Does a penalty for a crime never end, merely because the reverberations benefit the perpetrator? I answer in the negative. Penalties do come to a conclusion, at least eventually; even Draconian ones, such as offered by the libertarian philosophy.

V. Conclusion

It is time to conclude this paper. To summarize, we have attempted to apply libertarian punishment theory to criminal behavior, asking whether, and if so, to what extent, offenders may properly benefit from their ill-gotten gains. Contrary to the Draconianism to which libertarianism is sometimes conflated, we arrive at a moderate position. The malefactor may indeed, sometimes, with restrictions, benefit from his crime, since all just punishments must eventually come to an end. We have also rejected the unjust enrichment doctrine, according to which the (supposed) beneficiary owes a debt to this (supposed benefactor).

* Harold E. Wirth Eminent Scholar Endowed Chair and Professor of Economics, Loyola University New Orleans

[1] W. Block, Toward a Libertarian Theory of Guilt and Punishment for the Crime of Statism in Hulsmann, Jorg Guido and Stephan Kinsella, eds., Property, Freedom and Society: Essays in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Auburn, AL: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2009, pp. 137-148; http://mises.org/books/hulsmann-kinsella_property-freedom-society-2009.pdf; http://mises.org/books/property_freedom_society_kinsella.pdf; festschrift; W. Block Libertarian punishment theory: working for, and donating to, the state Libertarian Papers, Vol. 1, 2009; http://libertarianpapers.org/2009/17-libertarian-punishment-theory-working-for-and-donating-to-the-state/; Dalrymple, Theodore. 2020. “Justice Means Punishment.” June 15; https://lawliberty.org/justice-means-punishment/?utm_source=LAL+Updates&utm_campaign=c722cb4c42-LAL_Daily_Updates&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_53ee3e1605-c722cb4c42-72552505; S.Kinsella, "Punishment and Proportionality: the Estoppel Approach," The Journal of Libertarian Studies, Vol. 12, No. 1, Spring, 1996, , pp. 51-74; http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/12_1/12_1_3.pdf; S. Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Punishment and Rights,” 30 Loy. L.A. L. Rev., 1997, pp. 607-45; C. Olson “Law in Anarchy.” Libertarian Forum Vol. XII, No. 6, November-December, 1979, p. 4; http://64.233.167.104/u/Mises?q=cache:gFT18_ZusWoJ:www.mises.org/journals/lf/1979/1979_11-12.pdf+two+teeth+for+a+tooth&hl=en&ie=UTF-8; R. Whitehead, W. Block “Taking the assets of the criminal to compensate victims of violence: a legal and philosophical approach,” Wayne State University Law School Journal of Law in Society Vol. 5, No. 1, Fall, 2003, pp.229-254

[2] M. Rothbard, “The Ethics of Liberty, New York University Press, New York, 1982, p. 88, fn. 6; https://cdn.mises.org/The%20Ethics%20of%20Liberty%2020191108.pdf;

[3] For background on this legal issue, see K. Barker , “Unjust Enrichment: Containing the Beast.” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Autumn), 1995, pp. 457-475; P. Birks, “Unjust Enrichment and Wrongful Enrichment.” 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1767, 2000-2001; W. Block, “Rejoinder to Dominiak on Unjust Enrichment and Libertarianism.” Polish Political Science Review, Volume 11, Issue 1, 2023, pp. 132 – 143; https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ppsr-2023-0009; DOI: https://doi.org/10.2478/ppsr-2023-0009; https://sciendo.com/issue/PPSR/11/1; politicalreview@uwr.edu.pl; W. Block, “Libertarian punishment theory and unjust enrichment.” Journal of Business Ethics, n. 154, 2017, pp. 103–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-017-3469-7; R. Callman, “He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition.” Harvard Law Review. Vol. 55, No. 4 (February), 1942, pp. 595-614; H. Dagan, “Unjust enrichment”, Cambridge University Press, 1997; Ł. Dominiak, “Unjust Enrichment and Libertarianism,” Polish Political Science Review, 10(2) 2022, pp.1-13; https://doi.org/10.2478/ppsr-2022-0009; https://sciendo.com/article/10.2478/ppsr-2022-0009; J. Gordley, “Foundations of private law, property, tort, contract, unjust enrichment”, Oxford University Press, 2006; S. Henderson, “Promises Grounded in the Past: The Idea of Unjust Enrichment and the Law of Contracts.” Virginia Law Review , Vol. 57, No. 7 (October), 1971, pp. 1115-1184; E. Sherwin “Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment.” 79 Tex. L. Rev. 2083, 2000-2001; C. Wonnell, “Replacing the Unitary Principle of Unjust Enrichment.” 45 Emory L. J. 153, 1996.

[4] M. Rothbard, Punishment and Proportionality, New York Univeristy Press, 2015; R.Barnett and J. Hagel, Assessing the Criminal: Restitution, Retribution, and the Legal Process, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977, p. 178.

[5] L. Mises , Human Action, Scholars ed. Auburn, AL.: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1998 [1949].

Il ruolo dell'African Development Bank per lo sviluppo dell'economia africana - Intervista a Domenico Fanizza

Cosmina Dumitrescu — 2025-02-25T19:10:21+00:00

L’intervista al Dott. Domenico Fanizza, Executive Director presso l’African Development Bank e già Executive Director per l’Italia presso il Fondo Monetario Internazionale, dà avvio a un progetto recentemente inaugurato da Bocconi Legal Papers di concerto con il Dott. Roberto Isibor, docente di Business and Investment Law of African Countries presso l’Università Bocconi.

Il progetto BLP for Africa si propone di avvicinare l’attività autorale ed editoriale di Bocconi Legal Papers ai recenti sviluppi legali ed economici del continente africano, tramite una prima sezione di interviste, coordinate dal Dott. Isibor, in cui i membri della redazione si confrontano con gli esponenti più illustri di istituzioni domestiche, europee e internazionali che collaborano con il continente africano.

Negli ultimi anni, il continente africano ha acquisito un ruolo sempre più centrale nelle strategie geopolitiche e nei flussi di investimento globali. In questo contesto, il Piano Mattei si propone come nuovo paradigma di cooperazione e sviluppo.

Come valuta questa strategia e quali potenzialità intravede per l’Africa nel bilanciare gli interessi degli investitori esteri, da un lato, con le priorità dello sviluppo locale, dall’altro?

Gli sviluppi geopolitici recenti hanno evidenziato come, per l’Europa e, forse, a maggior ragione per l’Italia, non vi sia una prospettiva di stabilità economica e crescita sostenuta, senza una relazione forte, dal punto di vista sia economico sia sociale, con il continente africano. La guerra in Ucraina ha messo in chiaro che il modello di crescita europeo, nonché italiano, degli ultimi 30 anni, basato su esportazioni rivolte principalmente all’est europeo, in una prima fase, e successivamente in Cina, non può essere mantenuto. Lo stesso vale per l’approvvigionamento energetico, che dipendeva principalmente dalla Russia. Due anni fa questo modello è crollato con la guerra in Ucraina. Questo ha spinto i Paesi europei a diversificare le fonti di approvvigionamento energetico e a individuare nuovi mercati di sbocco. Tuttavia, già da tempo era evidente che l’Italia non potesse continuare a crescere basandosi esclusivamente sulle esportazioni verso la Germania, vista la crescita anemica di quel paese. L’Africa rappresenta un mercato in forte espansione: è come se l’Italia avesse di fronte a sé la Cina. La sua popolazione è destinata a raggiungere quella cinese nei prossimi decenni, e la sua vicinanza geografica costituisce un vantaggio strategico per l’Europa. Il rallentamento della Cina rende ancora più evidente questa opportunità. Credo che questo sia il motivo principale dell’interesse accresciuto verso il continente, da un lato. Dall’altro lato, vi è anche la consapevolezza che paesi come il nostro stanno attraversando una glaciazione demografica, e non possono di fatto crescere se non utilizzano al meglio la forza lavoro che viene dal continente. Vi è inoltre una consapevolezza crescente riguardo alla necessità di integrare la forza lavoro africana nei sistemi produttivi europei, dato il declino demografico di paesi come l’Italia. La crescita della popolazione africana non è una minaccia, ma una risorsa: la storia dimostra che le teorie malthusiane, secondo cui la crescita demografica rappresenta un fattore critico per lo sviluppo, si sono rivelate errate. La sfida consiste nel creare condizioni per una integrazione sostenibile e vantaggiosa per entrambe le parti. In sintesi, è ormai chiaro che i destini economici e sociali dell’Europa e dell’Africa sono strettamente interconnessi. La trasformazione dell’economia e della società africana rappresenta un’opportunità straordinaria per l’Europa, che deve essere alimentata e gestita con lungimiranza. Naturalmente, permangono sfide e criticità che richiedono un approccio pragmatico e strategico.

Negli ultimi anni, il continente africano ha attirato un rinnovato interesse da parte degli investitori internazionali. In questo contesto, quale ruolo svolgono le istituzioni, in particolare l’African Development Bank (AfDB), nella promozione dello sviluppo economico e nella riduzione della povertà? Inoltre, quali sono gli strumenti operativi dell’AfDB e come essa gestisce le relazioni istituzionali con i paesi interessati a investire nel continente?

L’African Development Bank è un’istituzione unica nel panorama delle banche multilaterali di sviluppo. Conta 54 paesi membri africani e 24 paesi non africani, tra cui l’Italia e grandi economie come la Cina. È l’unica istituzione plurilaterale in cui le popolazioni africane sono rappresentate in maniera essenziale, dove non si possono prendere decisioni che non siano approvate anche dai leader africani. Ciò non succede in altre istituzioni comparabili; per esempio, la Banca Mondiale e l’International Monetary Fund (IMF) hanno una presenza africana trascurabile. Per di più, gli Stati Uniti e i G7 hanno un potere di veto per cui, se prendono una posizione radicale, tendono ad influenzare sempre le decisioni finali del gruppo internazionale, riducendo, possibilmente, gli interessi dei paesi in via di sviluppo. Prima di ricoprire la mia attuale posizione lavorativa presso l’African Union Bank, rappresentavo l’Italia al Consiglio di Amministrazione del Fondo Monetario Internazionale, dove spesso ci si asteneva perché non valeva la pena opporsi a certe decisioni economiche o politiche volute dai paesi più influenti. All’AfDB non è così: gli interessi del continente rimangono prioritari e nessun paese, per quanto influente, può esercitare un potere di veto sulle decisioni strategiche, come invece accade in altre organizzazioni multilaterali regionali, come l’Interamerican Development Bank. L’azionista di maggior peso della Banca africana è la Nigeria, alla quale, tuttavia, non è stato assegnato potere di veto alcuno. Tutto ciò crea una dinamica molto interessante.

Per quanto riguarda i suoi rapporti con i paesi, mandato principale dell’AfDB non è semplicemente la riduzione della povertà – che è solo un by product, un effetto secondario – ma la trasformazione economica del continente utilizzando risorse che sono estremamente limitate (tra 10 e 12 miliardi di dollari). La Banca adopera varie strategie per raggiungere il suo scopo, tra cui l’utilizzo calcolato della sua elevata quotazione di credito (AAA) sul mercato dei capitali per mobilitare fondi nei mercati finanziari e reinvestirli a condizioni vantaggiose nei programmi di sviluppo africani. I principali strumenti operativi dell’AfDB sono due: i finanziamenti a tassi di mercato – la banca concede prestiti agli Stati e alle imprese africane con condizioni competitive, sfruttando la sua solida posizione sui mercati internazionali – e l’African Development Fund (ADF), un’istituzione fondata sul modello dell’International Development Agency (IDA) della Banca Mondiale, con l’obiettivo di fornire finanziamenti agevolati ai paesi a basso reddito. Queste risorse sono generalmente contributi volontari da paesi partecipanti come l’Italia e il Regno Unito. Sono principalmente i paesi industriali, ma non solo. Queste risorse sono rivolte solo ai governi, a scopo di sovereign lending (prestiti che sono dati ai governi per investimento).

Le risorse non concessionali dell’AfDB sono rivolte sia ai governi che al settore privato, che è essenziale per la crescita economica sostenibile. Sebbene oggi solo il 20% dei prestiti della AfDB sia destinato alle imprese, l’obiettivo è aumentare questa quota. L’esperienza degli ultimi settanta anni di aiuti allo sviluppo non hanno creato una crescita duratura, pur avendo contribuito a soddisfare bisogni immediati. Perciò, ci tengo a sottolineare l’importanza del settore privato. I prestiti al settore privato dell’AfDB possono essere fatti sia verso i paesi a relativamente alto livello di reddito che verso i paesi a basso livello di reddito (quelli coperti dall’ADF). I problemi di governance sono, però, molto seri e sfortunatamente non ci si può sempre fidare dei governi, ragion per cui è meglio lavorare con il settore privato.

Nel contesto della cooperazione tra settore pubblico e privato, quale ruolo gioca l’African Development Bank nell’utilizzo dei partenariati pubblico-privati (PPP) come strumento di sviluppo e meccanismo di mitigazione del rischio? Considerando che istituzioni come la Banca Mondiale stanno incentivando sempre di più questa sinergia per affrontare sfide globali, come il cambiamento climatico, in che modo l’AfDB favorisce concretamente la collaborazione tra questi due mondi?

Diversamente dalla Banca Mondiale, che ha un ramo interamente dedicato al settore privato (International Financial Corporation), nella AfDB non c’è differenza istituzionale tra i due settori. Questo presenta sia vantaggi che svantaggi.

La Banca può finanziare un progetto privato fino a un massimo del 30% delle risorse necessarie. Interviene nei progetti privati dove è presente anche un partenariato con altri investitori interessati al finanziamento di piccole-medie imprese. Parlo di piccole e medie imprese, perché è questo il tipo di investimento che ha un impatto trasformativo evidente. In Africa ci sono grosse compagnie che hanno una buona capacità di ripagamento. Ma queste compagnie spesso non hanno bisogno di risorse finanziarie o, se ne hanno, l’investimento non ha un impatto trasformativo molto importante. Vogliamo andare nella direzione di finanziare piccole-medie imprese che possano crescere e marcare positivamente il panorama economico. Grandi aziende già consolidate hanno meno necessità di supporto finanziario e, spesso, i loro investimenti non portano a un cambiamento strutturale del tessuto economico locale.

Come opera la Banca per favorire il settore privato? La Banca utilizza due strategie principali: 1) individua e investe direttamente in progetti con un alto valore strategico, ma ciò è complesso a causa degli elevati livelli di rischio; 2) investe risorse nei vari fondi dedicati nel continente, gestiti da investitori che creano con la loro conoscenza dell’attività del continente dei veicoli di investimenti in cui la Banca può partecipare, aiutando a mobilizzare risorse addizionali.

Attualmente, la Banca sta rivolgendo la sua attenzione alla sua posizione di garante negli investimenti privati, dedicando la sua attività alla riduzione del rischio sostenuto dagli investitori. Ci sono diversi prodotti che la banca offre come posizione di garanzia. Un esempio è la guarantee on credit risk. Un altro esempio è la promozione delle strategiche public-private partnerships. Anche l’Italia è coinvolta nell’imponente progetto del Lobito Corridor (il Corridoio di Lobito), che collega le zone minerarie di Zambia, Repubblica Democratica del Congo e Angola con il porto di Lobito sulla costa atlantica. Questo è un grossissimo progetto lungo circa 500 km, che va oltre la costruzione di una ferrovia: l’idea è usare la public-private partnership per le parti di investimento infrastrutturale, ma anche fare investimenti complementari in agricoltura ed energia lungo questo tracciato. Il progetto coinvolge attori pubblici e privati, con il sostegno degli Stati Uniti e dell’Italia, che hanno sottoscritto un memorandum of understanding per questo progetto, insieme alla Banca dell’Unione Europea e ai paesi locali (Zambia, Angola, DRC). La Banca sta lavorando su 11 corridoi di questo tipo per cui una quantità di investimenti proveniente dall’esterno è più che necessaria. È evidente la nuova tendenza all’inclusione del territorio africano nei piani di investimento italiani mirati al rafforzamento e al rinnovo dei legami con il continente, con conseguenze benefiche per entrambi i lati. Molto recentemente è stato annunciato che l’Angola è diventato uno dei paesi pilota del Piano Mattei. Penso che questa sia davvero una cosa su cui bisogna lavorare; va nella direzione fondamentale di un mercato integrato per il continente, la cui assenza penso sia l’ostacolo principale all’investimento privato.

La Banca stima che il bisogno di investimenti addizionali annuali nel continente sono 490 miliardi di dollari fino al 2035. I governi africani, da soli, non hanno la capacità di colmare questa lacuna, e difficilmente i paesi industrializzati potranno farsi interamente carico di tali risorse. Di conseguenza, il coinvolgimento del settore privato è essenziale per sostenere lo sviluppo economico e costruire un mercato africano più integrato, superando una delle principali barriere agli investimenti.

Il contesto africano è particolarmente sensibile alle questioni ambientali e sta applicando politiche sempre più rigorose in materia di sostenibilità. Tuttavia, mentre in passato molti paesi si sono industrializzati senza restrizioni ambientali, oggi ai paesi africani viene richiesto di rispettare standard più stringenti fin dal loro sviluppo. Come si concilia questa esigenza con la necessità di crescita economica e quali strategie sono adottate per integrare la sostenibilità nei progetti finanziati, considerando l’urgenza del cambiamento climatico?

Le opinioni e l’approccio stanno rapidamente evolvendo e cambiando, sia per ragioni politiche che per le dinamiche globali in cambiamento. Ho l’impressione che si stia passando da una visione ideologica a una più pragmatica. Non c’è dubbio che la Banca stessa sia estremamente committed, impegnata nella lotta contro il cambiamento climatico, ma lo fa con un approccio realistico e orientato ai bisogni del continente. L’aspetto cruciale è che l’Africa stessa genera pochissime emissioni del CO₂, senz’altro meno del 5% mondiale, e sono concentrate in un paio di paesi (e.g. Sud Africa). Pertanto, il problema principale per il continente non è tanto la mitigazione delle emissioni, quanto piuttosto l’adattamento agli effetti del cambiamento climatico. L’aumento della frequenza e dell’intensità degli shock climatici sta avendo un impatto devastante sull’Africa, generando costi enormi per le economie locali e per le comunità più vulnerabili. Se vogliamo trasformare il continente, dobbiamo cercare di evitare gli errori commessi dai paesi industrializzati. L’accesso all’energia è una delle sfide più urgenti: milioni di persone in Africa non hanno elettricità e fanno affidamento su fonti altamente inquinanti, come la legna e il kerosene, per cucinare e riscaldarsi. Paradossalmente, è proprio questo utilizzo di combustibili tradizionali a contribuire alle emissioni di CO₂. Per affrontare il problema in modo sostenibile, è necessario trovare un equilibrio tra sviluppo e transizione energetica. Per molto tempo, i paesi industrializzati hanno promosso un approccio che escludeva completamente l’uso degli idrocarburi in Africa. Il gas naturale può rappresentare una fonte di transizione verso un mix energetico più sostenibile. Non si tratta di renderlo l’unica soluzione, ma di considerarlo un’opzione strategica per garantire un’energia più pulita rispetto a carbone e biomasse, mentre si sviluppano ulteriormente le rinnovabili. Questa prospettiva più pragmatica sta guadagnando consenso anche tra paesi come Italia, Regno Unito, Olanda che in passato avevano posizioni più rigide. La lotta al cambiamento climatico in Africa deve essere focalizzata sull’adaptation, ma senza sacrificare lo sviluppo. Perché una vera trasformazione economica non può avvenire senza garantire l’accesso all’energia per tutti.

Venticinque Anni di Partenariato tra Africa e Unione Europea - Intervista a Domenico Rosa

Carlo Mattia Granata — 2025-03-18T18:22:39+00:00

Il progetto BLP for Africa prosegue con l’intervista al Dott. Domenico Rosa, Head of Division presso la Commissione Europea per le Strategic Partnerships with Africa and with the ACP, che offre un'attenta panoramica delle recenti iniziative istituzionali a livello domestico ed europeo per lo sviluppo dell'economia del continente africano.

Quali sono state le principali sfide e i principali successi del partenariato tra Africa e Unione Europea in questi venticinque anni?

Dal Duemila a oggi sono trascorsi venticinque anni, quindi si potrebbe parlare di “nozze d’argento” tra Africa e Unione Europea. D’altra parte, è evidente che, in questo arco temporale, il contesto sia cambiato radicalmente. Venticinque anni fa si guardava all’Africa – e soprattutto alla creazione dell’Unione Africana – con molte aspettative: c’era la speranza di riprodurre il progetto dell’Unione Europea e giungere verso qualcosa di più omogeneo e coeso. Agli inizi, l’Africa era completamente diversa dall’Europa, date le numerose dinamiche regionali e nazionali. Inoltre, l’Unione Africana partiva da una base essenzialmente intergovernativa, non c’era l’idea di delegare talune funzioni e prerogative. Il principale successo del partenariato tra Africa e Unione Europea è stato individuare soluzioni “africane” per i problemi “africani”, principalmente nel settore della pace e della sicurezza. Un esempio è la creazione, da parte dell’Unione Europea, dell’ “African Peace Facility”, che ha permesso di finanziare missioni di peace keeping in Africa condotte da Paesi africani. Un altro settore in cui si sono registrati alcuni progressi è quello dell’integrazione economica, e non solo perché l’Unione Africana è riuscita a sottoscrivere l’“African Continental Free Trade Agreement”, ma anche perché si è dato avvio a una serie di processi di integrazione delle comunità economiche regionali. Inoltre, ci sono stati una serie di tentativi di replicare progetti di successo al livello europeo in Africa, come per esempio l’“Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme”, che è un copy-paste di “Erasmus Plus”.L’approccio dell’Unione Europea è comunque sempre stato multidisciplinare, al fine di dare all’Africa una certa autonomia in più settori.

Quali sono le nuove aree di cooperazione che l’Unione Europea prevede per il partenariato tra Africa e Unione Europea?

Le nuove aree di cooperazione tra Africa e Unione Europea possono essere individuate nei settori definiti come prioritari dall’“EU-Africa: Global Gateway Investment Package”, approvato al summit congiunto di febbraio 2022. Si comprendono la sostenibilità energetica, i sistemi agroindustriali, l’ambiente e la biodiversità, ma anche la scienza, la tecnologia e l’innovazione. Inoltre, si sostengono la connettività digitale e la connettività fisica, che, ancora oggi, rappresentano un ostacolo per l’integrazione economica dell’Africa. L’idea è quella di intervenire in modo tale da avere un impatto significativo, raccogliendo i principali attori del cambiamento, istituzioni e privati, intorno alle c.d. “Team Europe Initiatives”.

Qual è la visione dell’Unione Europea sul Global Gateway e quale ruolo gioca questa iniziativa nello sviluppo globale?

Il Global Gateway è un’iniziativa di respiro globale, che ha una specifica declinazione per l’Africa. Per comprendere la visione dell’Unione Europea occorre individuare il periodo storico nel quale questa iniziativa è nata. Dopo la pandemia da Covid-19 e durante il conflitto russo-ucraino, l’Unione Europea si è resa conto di non avere alcuna autonomia strategica in diversi settori (si pensi alla difficoltà di trovare mascherine all’inizio della pandemia o alla questione dell’approvvigionamento energetico durante il conflitto). In particolare, molti Paesi in via di sviluppo, tra cui l’Africa, hanno sofferto la mancanza di cereali, data dall’interruzione del corridoio di trasporto che parte dall’Ucraina. Il Global Gateway nasce proprio in questo contesto, con l’obiettivo di assicurare all’Unione Europea una certa autonomia strategica nel caso di crisi globali future. In primo luogo, l’Unione Europea può essere strategicamente autonoma nella misura in cui i suoi principali partner sono strategicamente autonomi. Per esempio, se l’Africa venisse colpita da una grave crisi genererebbe ingenti flussi migratori, che metterebbero in pericolo le frontiere dei Paesi europei. I settori in cui la dimensione esterna è più influente sono molteplici. Un esempio è quello del “Green Deal”. L’Unione Europea non ha possibilità di perseguire gli obiettivi stabiliti dall’accordo di Parigi se gli altri Paesi non fanno lo stesso. Tuttavia, si ravvisa una convergenza di interessi con l’Africa, in quanto, da un lato, i Paesi africani hanno un importante deficit energetico ma, dall’altro, sono tra quelli più ricchi di energie rinnovabili. Un ulteriore esempio è quello del digital, in cui è evidente l’influenza cinese di Huawei. Ciononostante, è un’esigenza comune quella di creare una società digitale non manipolata e affidabile. I vaccini sono stati oggetto di controversia tra Africa e Unione Europea. In un primo momento, non erano disponibili. Successivamente, l’Africa aveva accusato l’Unione Europea di non volerli condividere. In realtà, i vaccini erano disponibili, ma i Paesi africani non erano muniti di infrastrutture in grado di dare avvio a una vera e propria campagna vaccinale. A questo proposito, si noti la “Team Europe Initiative on Manufacturing and access to vaccine”, che, in tempi record, ha contribuito alla produzione di vaccini in Ruanda, Sud Africa, Ghana e Senegal. L’idea è ancora una volta quella di rendere l’Africa più indipendente.

Quali sono le principali differenze tra il Global Gateway e altre iniziative, come la Belt and Road Initiative cinese?

Riguardo alla Belt and Road Initiative, è evidente che si tratti di un’iniziativa che mira ad assicurare alla Cina l’accesso a una serie di risorse di cui l’Africa è ricca. Di fatto, si concede il primato alla sostenibilità del sistema economico cinese. Spesso, i media definiscono il Global Gateway come la risposta dell’Unione Europea alla Belt and Road Initiative. Tuttavia, è preferibile essere più cauti, in quanto nel Global Gateway si ravvisa una convergenza di interessi: da un lato, vi è la sostenibilità del sistema economico europeo e, dall’altro, vi è lo sviluppo delle comunità africane. L’istituzione di campagne vaccinali e la creazione di catene di valore al livello locale ne sono degli esempi. Ciononostante, non si può dire che l’Africa non eserciti una forte attrattiva sull’Unione Europea, date le sue numerose risorse, il problema demografico e soprattutto la prospettiva futura che diventi uno dei continenti con la classe media più grande al mondo. Infatti, la classe media è quella che consuma maggiormente e attrae più investimenti. La principale differenza tra la Belt and Road Initiative e il Global Gateway risiede dunque negli scopi perseguiti: la Cina ha un progetto più “imperialista”, mentre nell’Unione Europea vi è una maggiore concordanza con gli interessi dell’Africa.

La Belt and Road Initiative cinese è stata spesso criticata per il rischio di debt-trap democracy, ovvero la concessione a Paesi in via di sviluppo di ingenti somme di denaro a titolo di prestito, che faticano a restituire e dunque sono costretti a cedere infrastrutture strategiche. Si pensi alla questione del porto di Hambantota in Sri Lanka.

Come l’Unione Europea offre alternative finanziarie più sostenibili attraverso il Global Gateway?

Inoltre, quali strumenti vengono utilizzati per evitare che i Paesi africani si indebitino eccessivamente?

È evidente che, per molto tempo, la Cina sia stata il principale lender a livello mondiale. Sono noti i casi di Zambia ed Etiopia, Paesi che sono andati in default perché non sono stati in grado di ripagare il debito contratto con la Cina. In questo momento, si può dire che il Club di Parigi non possa promuovere alcuna iniziativa senza far sedere al tavolo la Cina. Tuttavia, la Cina ha un funzionamento interno molto diverso dall’Unione Europea: vi è una catena di comando ben definita e un sistema economico fortemente influenzato dal potere politico. Il Global Gateway offre un’alternativa finanziaria più sostenibile; l’obiettivo è quello di evitare crisi del debito a lungo termine. A tal proposito, l’Unione Europea propone hard instruments aventi soltanto una parte sottoposta a condizione. Per esempio, il c.d. “blending”mette insieme prestiti e doni. Al fine di ridurre i costi specifici degli investimenti, i doni riguardano per lo più gli studi di fattibilità e le misure complementari, garantendo così l’avvio dei progetti. Inoltre, in alcuni Paesi più fragili ed esposti a crisi future si effettuano investimenti soltanto a mezzo di doni.Un altro aspetto significativo consiste nella riduzione del costo del credito: l’Unione Europea, attraverso lo “European Fund for Sustainable Development Plus”, tenta di ridurre il rischio su determinati investimenti fornendo un apposito sistema di garanzie. Da un lato, si favoriscono gli investimenti in aree che il mercato non vede di buon occhio, in quanto ritenute molto rischiose, e, dall’altro, si riducono i costi degli investimenti, data l’assunzione di una parte dei rischi in capo all’Unione Europea. L’Unione Europea, a differenza della Cina, fa anche uso di soft instruments, volti principalmente a dare un supporto in termini di governance. Si va dagli investimenti nel settore dell’energia e dei trasporti alla manutenzione delle strade e degli impianti di produzione elettrica.

Il Piano Mattei è stato spesso presentato come un ponte tra Europa e Africa. Quali sono le principali sinergie tra il Piano Mattei e le iniziative della Commissione Europea?

Il Piano Mattei è stato lanciato nel 2023. Il 28 marzo, l’Italia ha in programma un summit con i Paesi indicati nel Piano Mattei. Il rapporto che intercorre tra il Piano Mattei e il Global Gateway è caratterizzato da numerose analogie, e per certi versi il Piano Mattei si sovrappone al Global Gateway. Tuttavia, il Global Gateway si differenzia dal Piano Mattei per il fatto di avere una dimensione più ampia, visto che l’obiettivo è quello di inquadrare in un unico progetto i singoli Stati Membri. In questa direzione prendono piede le “Team European Initiatives” e i “Global Gateway Flagship Projects”. Vi è una vera e propria convergenza di interessi. Tra il Piano Mattei e il Global Gateway si ravvisano notevoli sinergie: l’Italia, partecipando a “Team European Initiatives”, prende parte in modo coerente e adeguato al progetto europeo. Tuttavia, resta ferma la possibilità di lavorare parallelamente per perseguire gli obietti prefissati.

Qual è la visione dell’Unione Europea sul ruolo dell’Italia nell’ambito del partenariato tra Africa e Unione Europea?

L’opinione dell’Unione Europea sul Piano Mattei è molto positiva, anzi l’ideale sarebbe che ogni Stato Membro avesse un proprio Piano Mattei. Tuttavia, è evidente che il Piano Mattei si riferisca anche a questioni che interessano specificamente l’Italia, come per esempio i flussi migratori. Di recente, è stata effettuata un’analisi comparata del Piano Mattei e del Global Gateway, che ha dato prova di numerose somiglianze e convergenze. Tornando al partenariato tra Africa e Unione Europea, si evidenzia che uno degli errori più significativi che è stato commesso è quello di caricare l’Unione Africana di una serie di responsabilità per le quali non è effettivamente preparata. Risulta più efficiente promuovere strategie d’insieme declinate a livello dei singoli Paesi. Il Piano Mattei, identificando una serie di Paesi prioritari di intervento, va certamente in questa direzione.

In molti Paesi africani, la mancanza di una chiara regolamentazione sulla proprietà terriera e la coesistenza di norme di legge e consuetudini facilitano l’acquisizione di terreni da parte di attori privati, spesso a discapito delle comunità locali.

L’Unione Europea può prevenire il Land Grabbing da parte delle multinazionali europee? Se sì, quali meccanismi di controllo vengono applicati?

In tema di Land Grabbing, l’Unione Europea non prevede alcuna regolamentazione specifica. Tuttavia, le misure adottate a livello interno possono limitare le attività delle imprese di origine europea nel contesto africano. Si tratta di soft powersche influenzano anche le imprese americane e cinesi che interagiscono con l’Unione Europea. In generale, la regolamentazione è caratterizzata da una contraddizione intrinseca che vede, da un lato, l’esigenza di permettere all’economia europea di essere competitiva rispetto alle altre economie e, dall’altro, l’obiettivo di armonizzare le politiche dei singoli Stati membri con quella europea. A dimostrazione dell’influenza della regolamentazione europea si può riportare l’esempio dei “Critical materials”. È infatti previsto l’obbligo di dare alle comunità locali il 20% del valore delle risorse sottratte. Si noti che questa pratica non è contemplata da Cina, America, Canada e Australia. Inoltre, è stata introdotta un’apposita regolamentazione sulla “Deforestation”, la quale è stata posticipata di anno dietro domanda di alcuni Paesi in via di sviluppo, che non erano ancora pronti a darvi attuazione. Ulteriori iniziative sono quella del cacao sostenibile, che favorisce i piccoli produttori che osservano la regolamentazione europea, e quella del “Carbon Market Mechanism”, che mira a evitare il dumping sull’emissione di carbonio circa i prodotti venduti nel mercato europeo. In definitiva, l’unico modo che l’Unione Europea ha per evitare pratiche scorrette nei confronti dei Paesi in via di sviluppo, compresa l’Africa, è introdurre vincoli al mercato interno che si riflettano sul mercato esterno, con la cautela di rispettare le regole imposte dal WTO e non pregiudicare la competitività delle imprese, che, come risulta dal Report Draghi, stanno attraversando un momento di difficoltà.

Riforme e Sostenibilità degli Investimenti in Egitto: Intervista a Ziad Bahaa-Eldin

Cosmina Dumitrescu, Susanna Bozzi, Martina Laface, Ilaria De Francesco — 2025-04-02T11:35:14+00:00

Ziad Bahaa-Eldin is the managing partner at the Bonelli Erede office in Cairo, Egypt. Prior to being managing partner at the Italian law firm’s Egyptian office, he served in both government positions and in the private sector. Some of his most notable achievements were marked by his activity as a member of government, as Chairman of the Investment Authority, and during his time as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of International Cooperation. Although his undergraduate education in Cairo revolved around banking and finance, he later specialized in law at top ranking institutions such as King’s College London and LSE.

He is joined in this interview by Rana El Kahwagy, associate at Bonelli Erede Cairo.

Eldin:

Egypt is one of the few countries that, over the past century, has adopted the continental European civil law system. It is often said that Egypt’s choice was inspired by the French legal system, but that is not entirely accurate. While many of our legislative decisions were indeed influenced by the French system, the historical foundation of this choice lies in the adoption of the legal system enforced by the Ottoman Empire, under whose rule Egypt remained until the early 19th century. Around 1820, Egypt became somewhat independent from the Empire and, from that point onward, began sending numerous envoys abroad to study law, particularly in France. As a result, the French system was later adopted. Egypt is not the only Arab country to have embraced the continental civil law system, but it was the first. In fact, the Egyptian legal system was a trailblazer, shaping the legal frameworks adopted by the rest of the Arab world.

The corporate law system in Egypt dates back to 1981 and consists of a very comprehensive collection of “company law” legislation. The earliest examples of company law, as we know it today, date back to 1954. Before the predecessor of the current system, the drafts of the oldest Egyptian company law can be dated back to 1882. Therefore, corporate law in Egypt has deep historical roots and is quite an old phenomenon. It follows the typical structure of continental European legal systems, with one notable distinction: the body of corporate law is considered somewhat incomplete and must always be read in conjunction with a secondary collection of laws, namely the capital markets law. This body of law primarily focuses on shares, bonds, securities, and, of course, the listing of companies on the stock market. Furthermore, an up-to-date understanding of bankruptcy law is also essential, as it must be applied in conjunction with company law.

Egypt has introduced several reforms to attract foreign investment, yet many international companies still report bureaucratic hurdles and regulatory uncertainty. In your opinion, what are the key areas where Egypt’s regulatory framework could be improved to foster a more business-friendly environment, particularly for international investors? Furthermore, which sectors are usually more appealing to foreign investors?

Eldin:

Aside from corporate law in the traditional sense, since 1971, Egypt has always had an investment law. This is not unique to Egypt. Indeed, many countries in the 1960s and 1970s, particularly those transitioning to an open-market economy, started issuing special legislation which provides incentives, guarantees, and tax breaks to attract foreign investment. The first Egyptian law of this kind was issued in 1971, followed by successive legislation in 1974, 1978, and 1981, all aimed at providing benefits and privileges to certain sectors. For a while - roughly 20 to 30 years - this worked well. However, over the past 10 to 15 years, Egypt has struggled to attract foreign investment. The reason is not just bureaucracy; rather, in my view, the very approach to investment law is no longer effective. The logic behind investment law has traditionally been to grant investors specific benefits, tax incentives, protections. Today, however, investors are less interested in isolated privileges and more focused on the overall business environment. They prioritize economic stability, inflation rates, employment conditions, security, and political stability. Therefore, it is crucial for a country like Egypt to adopt new legislative and regulatory frameworks and move away from the traditional concept of investment law. Political stability, economic stability, and monetary policies are now considered much more important than the law itself. As for investment sectors, Egypt has a key advantage over some of its wealthier regional counterparts: it is not dependent on a single industry (not completely dependent on oil/gas or minerals). No single sector takes up more than 15% of the country’s GDP, making Egypt’s economy highly diversified and open for investment to be made into a plethora of different sectors. Over the next two years, I believe the focus should be on services, particularly tourism, tech services, and back-office operations, as these are going to be the fastest-growing sectors.

Starting from June 1, 2024, the Egyptian Competition Authority (ECA) has implemented a new merger control regime. This aims to ensure fair competition and prevent monopolistic practices in the Egyptian market. In your opinion, how effective will the ECA be in monitoring and enforcing the new merger control guidelines? How will the recent reform affect the operations of local companies and foreign investors in Egypt?

Eldin:

This is a very relevant question. Egypt has had competition law for about 20 years, and it has been effective in addressing major monopolistic tendencies, leading to successful prosecutions. The recent amendments to competition law have introduced some novelties. While in the past, there was no obligation to report or seek approval before completing a merger, the current system imposes a legal duty to apply for authorization when two entities merge, under certain conditions. Additionally, the new set of laws closed a legislative gap in the area of international mergers: any international merger must now be reported in Egypt to obtain approval from the national competition authority.

El Kahwagy:

I would add that, according to the new competition rules, the threshold is very low if compared to what other competition authorities are requiring. Moreover, the focus is now solely on the target company, rather than on all the parties involved in the transaction.

Eldin:

Since this is an interview and not a formal legal opinion, I can speak a bit more freely. I believe that the whole world is heading toward a reassessment of competition restrictions. Mario Draghi recently wrote an important report for the European Commission in which he highlighted what a lot of people have been complaining about: competition rules can sometimes get out of hand, to the point of harming the growth of local companies. Mr. Draghi said that, in Europe, competition regulations have become so strict that European companies struggle to compete with their Chinese or American counterparts. And if that is true for Europe, imagine what it means for a country like Egypt which is much smaller. Therefore, I believe that excessive competition rules should be scaled back slightly to allow local companies to grow. This reflects the ongoing tension between maintaining a regulated competitive environment at the national level and ensuring that domestic businesses have the ability to grow and compete internationally. I think that Mario Draghi’s report is indicative of all the imminent changes in global competition law.

The introduction of the tax dispute resolution law is seen as a step forward for better management of tax disputes. Do you believe this reform will reduce uncertainty for foreign investors? Additionally, what measures would further enhance the predictability and stability of Egypt’s tax system to make it more attractive to international companies?

Eldin:

The new tax changes are very important. The newly appointed finance Minister has been in office for just five to six months, and he has promised many tax reforms - this is one of them. The main emphasis of the new changes is more so on small enterprises. The problem in Egypt is that many small enterprises are informal. They are not “official.” Some people call them “black” or “gray” markets, but I think “informal” is the best term for them. These companies exist, the people are in business, but they do not report anything on their activity. There are no papers, no tax cards, there is nothing at all. Therefore, the main reason for the introduction of these changes is to encourage their formalization. In other words, to get the small enterprises to not be afraid of the tax authority and declare their business through the appropriate legal channels.

There is a large economic argument behind the formalization because it benefits the economy to have these companies grow legally rather than remain small illegally. I don't believe that this will be enough. I think this change is a suitable first step, but taxation is not about rules. It’s about trust. Law is one way to build trust, but a great responsibility also falls on the tax authority itself and its behaviour towards these enterprises. The law can be changed in one day, but it takes years to change the attitudes of both the business community and the tax authorities. In 2005 we had the biggest tax reform in Egypt which gradually generated a lot of trust, but it did so slowly. After the collapse of the regimes and changes of government, that trust was unfortunately completely lost. Now, I look at the new laws and the reforms not just as legal change, but, more importantly, as steps to rebuild that trust.

What is the key advantage of working for an Italian international law firm overseas? How does it differ from a traditional Egyptian commercial law firm? Does it mainly handle transactions for Italian clients in Egypt, or does the Bonelli Erede brand also appeal to local clients?

Eldin:

There are two types of local representation of a foreign law office. Sometimes a law firm will go to other countries in order to serve its own companies and existing clients. The other type, which we have adopted, is to not only serve the standing list of clients, but to serve both international companies and local ones. In this case, the Bonelli Erede Cairo is an Egyptian law office that is part of the Bonelli Erede network and not just a simple branch or extension of the Italian office. Each model has an advantage, but because Egypt is a big country with a sizable population, a lot of business and many qualified lawyers, the choice to make the office a full fledged Egyptian law firm was the most appropriate. There are also a number of advantages we get for being part of Bonelli Erede. The key in one is that Bonelli Erede is a huge law firm (over 700 lawyers and 120 partners). As such, the Egyptian firm does not need to be very large as we can always use the resources provided by Bonelli Erede and its network. Of course, we get a lot of connections and contacts from Italy and get to be part of a quality control system, and that’s very important. When you’re part of a big system, there is a system for conflict check, to ensure compliance with certain regulations (money-laundering compliance, ethical professional standards checks). All of this is very useful, thus, in my view, our choice of model is the best.

In 2024, the Egyptian government presented a draft law to Parliament to establish a committee tasked with promoting integrity, transparency, and excellence within companies. What challenges do you foresee in the practical implementation of the new corporate governance and anti-corruption law in Egypt?

El Kahwagy:

There are many different sectors that make up the Egyptian economy, but in this context, the focus is on companies regulated under the financial regulatory system (which insures companies). One of the main challenges of the application of ECG requirements within these companies is that these goals are not yet embedded in their corporate culture and they are willing to adjust their internal functioning merely to comply with legal obligations, rather than as a genuine commitment. It is mostly companies that deal with foreign customers and suppliers that particularly need to seek, study and understand the best expertise from advisors to build a transparent environment and ensure efficient governance. Thus, they are more willing to implement internal change. On the other hand, businesses that only have a local presence in Egypt and are not involved in the international market are not very keen on changing their internal bureau regulations as complying with environmental requirements and additional governance policies involves additional costs. I believe that awareness and policy-building capacities are the main challenges the corporate world faces in order to achieve a full implementation of the ambitious aspirations of improving governance and internal transparency.

Strengthening Investment through Arbitration: The Kigali International Arbitration Centre and Rwanda as a Model for Africa - Interview with Victor Mugabe

Virginia Candolini — 2025-10-20T10:23:30+00:00

Victor Mugabe is the Secretary General of the Kigali International Arbitration Centre (KIAC), Rwanda’s leading institution for commercial dispute resolution. In this capacity, he oversees the Centre’s administration, strategic development, and international outreach, promoting Rwanda as a neutral and reliable hub for both domestic and cross-border disputes. A lawyer with extensive experience in legal and institutional development and international arbitration, Mr. Mugabe has been instrumental in positioning KIAC among Africa’s top arbitration institutions and in advancing Rwanda’s reputation as a model for transparent and investor-friendly dispute resolution systems.

Could you provide an overview of the development of commercial and investor-State arbitration in Rwanda in recent decades?

Rwanda’s experience mirrors that of many African countries. With regard to investment arbitration, Rwanda acceded to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention) in 1979. However, the effective implementation of the Convention was not initially clear. Before 1994, the country faced major political and social instability, culminating in the genocide, and, as a result, there are no reliable records indicating how the Convention was implemented during that period.

A more concrete development phase began in the 2000s. Starting around 2005, as Rwanda sought to deal with the aftermath of the genocide, the government adopted a series of short-term and five-year development plans aimed at attracting international investment. Recognizing the need to establish a reliable commercial justice system, commercial courts and specialized judges were introduced in 2007. Following their creation, the business community emphasized that a functioning arbitration framework was essential to further promote investment. In response, an arbitration system was established in 2008. In particular, Rwanda enacted the Law No. 005/2008 of 14 February 2008 on Arbitration and Conciliation in Commercial Matters, creating the domestic legal framework.

In the same year, Rwanda acceded to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, thereby committing to the enforcement of international arbitral decisions. To support this framework and provide an institutional mechanism for the resolution of commercial disputes, the Kigali International Arbitration Centre (KIAC) was established by Law No. 51/2010 of 10 January 2010 and officially launched in 2012. Its mandate focuses primarily on commercial arbitration, while investment arbitration continues to be addressed under the framework of the New York Convention and the ICSID Convention.

Following the establishment of KIAC, Rwanda undertook extensive reforms to improve its business environment and strengthen investor protection. New business-related laws, including those on contracts and insolvency, were enacted. These reforms significantly enhanced investor confidence, and by 2015 Rwanda had become recognized as one of Africa’s most attractive destinations for investment. The arbitration law was subsequently reviewed in 2021 to align with best international practices.

Today, Rwanda is regarded as one of the most favorable jurisdictions for doing business in Africa. The KIAC, despite being one of the youngest institutions on the continent, has gained remarkable recognition. It draws arbitrators from around the world – approximately 90 percent of its 140 registered arbitrators are international – and its rules guarantee freedom of legal representation. As a result, KIAC is now ranked among the top five arbitration centers in Africa.

In your opinion, how important is it for foreign investors operating in Africa to have access to international arbitration institutions such as KIAC? Furthermore, do you believe that, in the long term, the expansion of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) across the African continent could provide benefits by fostering investments, simplifying bureaucracy, and offsetting investor risks?

Considering Rwanda’s current achievements, we believe that establishing efficient arbitration systems across the African continent is essential. The adoption of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) Agreement, which promotes cross-border trade both within Africa and with the rest of the world, already provides a strong foundation for this development and could prove highly beneficial for the continent.

International disputes are increasingly being referred to arbitration centers such as the KIAC, which has become an attractive seat due to its neutrality, efficiency, and transparency. However, to ensure well-functioning arbitration systems throughout Africa, greater synergy among countries is required. It is crucial to guarantee that investors coming to Africa can rely on neutral forums where local courts have only a minimal supervisory role. This ensures that the arbitration environment remains impartial and free from the potential influence of biased domestic courts.

There is a growing willingness among many African states to embrace arbitration and mediation, recognizing their importance for fostering investment and economic growth. Africa is a resource-rich continent with vast potential to attract foreign investment; by promoting credible and effective dispute resolution mechanisms, all member states can share in the continent’s economic flourishing, as Rwanda’s experience demonstrates.

Does the example of Rwanda and the KIAG serve as an inspiration for other African countries for developing international arbitration centers and providing access to ADR mechanisms?

KIAC operates within both political and legal frameworks that cannot be entirely separated. The government’s position toward the Centre has been highly positive, as its establishment has contributed significantly to Rwanda’s economic growth. When governments recognize that arbitration institutions contribute directly to economic development, they are more likely to establish and sustain effective arbitration systems, an approach from which many African countries could benefit.

Following the tragedy of the 1994 genocide, Rwanda has rebuilt itself upon the rule of law and strong institutional foundations that have supported both economic recovery and national well-being. The country’s experience serves as a valuable model for other African nations, particularly those emerging from conflict, by demonstrating how transparent judicial systems and robust arbitration mechanisms can foster stability and growth.

Several delegations from other states have already visited Rwanda to study its arbitration framework and draw inspiration from its success. The Centre, in turn, acknowledges the crucial support it has received from the government and the judiciary. The enactment and enforcement of good laws, coupled with judicial cooperation, have been vital to KIAC’s effectiveness. This synergy among the Centre, the business community, the government, and the judiciary has strengthened Rwanda’s arbitration system and continues to drive its progress.

What are the main challenges encountered in resolving domestic arbitration cases as compared to those involving foreign investors?

In cases involving foreign investors, we often deal with highly experienced legal teams. International business firms usually rely on skilled counsel from their home jurisdictions. Under Rwanda’s arbitration framework, parties may be represented by foreign lawyers without needing prior authorization from the local bar association, a distinctive feature in the African context. This flexibility allows international companies to work with their own specialized legal teams, who are generally well acquainted with arbitration law and practice.

Domestic arbitration, however, presents a different situation. The concept of arbitration is still relatively new in much of Africa, and there remains a noticeable skills gap among local practitioners assisting parties before the Kigali International Arbitration Centre (KIAC). This challenge is particularly evident in domestic cases, where some lawyers still face difficulties with the drafting of arbitration clauses, understanding procedural rules, or even language barriers, especially among seniors.

They are currently working to address the existing skill gap among local practitioners. At present, arbitration is not yet considered a mandatory subject in universities, although efforts are being made to introduce it into academic curricula. Consequently, this remains primarily a domestic challenge.

In recent years, countries and institutions in Europe and beyond have shown increasing interest in the development of the African economy. Projects such as the EU Global Gateway and Italy’s proposed Piano Mattei are meaningful examples in this regard. In your opinion, what role will international arbitration centers – such as the KIAC – play in the practical implementation of these initiatives? Moreover, how important will it be for foreign investors to have access to ADR mechanisms that can promptly address controversies arising from cross-border investments?

This point has been the focus of considerable attention in recent international conferences I have attended. Arbitration centers – such as KIAC – play a pivotal role in supporting and facilitating economic cooperation of this nature.

KIAC has already initiated collaboration with the German business community, thereby demonstrating that arbitration institutions in Africa are fully capable of handling complex and high-value cases. This also underscores that Rwanda provides an attractive legal framework, a supportive judiciary, and a stable, accessible political environment free from security or infrastructural concerns.

The Centre bears a key responsibility to disseminate accurate information through publications and to guarantee fundamental safeguards such as the immunity of arbitrators, the free choice of legal representation, and the participation of legal experts irrespective of nationality. These features significantly enhance investor confidence and constitute essential elements in attracting foreign investment.

Recently, KIAC underwent an evaluation by a financial institution, which recommended the use of arbitration, recognizing it as the most suitable according to the assessment criteria. Such recognition is expected to further encourage the continued modernization of Rwanda’s legal framework. Reputation remains a decisive factor in this regard, strengthened by the parties’ freedom to select their legal representatives. Rwanda’s accessibility, facilitated by its open visa regime, further enhances its attractiveness to foreign investors. Moreover, KIAC operates with full institutional independence, while maintaining constructive cooperation with the local judiciary.

Finally, the Centre holds an important responsibility in promoting awareness within the international community regarding the quality, reliability, and credibility of arbitration in Rwanda and across the African continent.